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Probabilities: Studies in the Foundations of Bayesian Decision Theory
Yang Liu
One central issue in philosophy of probability concerns the interpretation of the
very notion of probability. The fruitful tradition of modern Bayesian subjec-
tivists seeks to ground the concept of probability in a normative theory of rational
decision-making. The upshot is a representation theorem, by which the agent’s
preferences over actions are represented by derived subjective probabilities and
utilities. As the development of Bayesian subjectivism becomes increasingly in-
volved, the corresponding representation theorem has gained considerable com-
plexity and has itself become a subject of philosophical scrutiny. This dissertation
studies systematically various aspects of Bayesian decision theory, especially its
foundational role in Bayesian subjective interpretation of probability. The first two
chapters provide a detailed review of classical theories that are paradigmatic of
such an approach with an emphasis on the works of Leonard J. Savage. As a
technical interlude, Chapter III focuses on the additivity condition of the proba-
bilities derived in Savage’s theory of personal probability, where it is pointed out
that Savage’s arguments for not requiring probability measures derived in his sys-
tem to be countable additive is inconclusive due to an oversight of set-theoretic
details. Chapter IV treats the well-known problem of constant-acts in Savage’s
theory, where a simplification of the system is proposed which yields the repre-
sentation theorem without the constant-act assumption. Chapter V addresses a
series of issues in the epistemic foundations of game theory including the prob-
lem of asymmetry of viewpoints in multi-agent systems and that of self-prediction
in a Bayesian setup. These issues are further analyzed in the context of epistemic
games where a unification of different models that are based on different belief-
representation structures is also proposed.
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Scope and Overview
This dissertation addresses a range of issues in the philosophical and math-
ematical foundations of Bayesian decision theory, broadly construed as covering
topics in epistemology, philosophy of science, philosophical logic, and epistemic
game theory. The Bayesian methodology emphasizes first and foremost the use of
probability as the fundamental measure of uncertainty. Within this paradigm, the
concept and problem of inductive inference—which have been a prominent issue
in philosophy since Aristotle—are provided with a systematic account which can
be ideally characterized in the following two steps:
Prior estimation: Given any scientific inquiry that involves uncertainty,
establish prior probabilistic assessments over those quantities of ultimate
interest (usually open hypotheses) as well as all other quantities that are
relevant to the problem at hand (including background knowledge).
Conditionalization: Update the probabilistic assessments over the quan-
tities of interest in the presence of the incoming evidence, that is, calculate
and interpret appropriate posterior probabilities of the quantities of inter-
est given the observed data.
Great controversies have emerged surrounding each step of this methodological
approach in both philosophical and scientific literatures ever since Thomas Bayes
laid out the basic idea in the mid-eighteenth century. Yet great advancements in
all these areas have also been made in the past fifty years, and many of which will
be the starting points of the investigations in this dissertation.
At the heart of various controversies lies the philosophical question as to how
the very notion of probability should be interpreted: whether probabilities are
objective properties of the world that are independent of what we know or believe,
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or they are measures of our subjective attitudes as actual and justified degrees of
beliefs when facing uncertainty. The difference between the two interpretations of
probability goes beyond mere semantic disputes over the meaning of the term as
it may lead to different opinions as to what constitutes the relevant knowledge of
the underlying inquiry. For instance, an objectivist would take the probability of
getting a head upon flipping a biased coin as limiting frequency of the occurrences
of heads in long run experiments, and she would expect to find one outcome to
appear more frequently than the other in a sequence of repeated trails on the
same coin, from which an approximation of the probability of obtaining a head
can be estimated. A Bayesian subjectivist, on the other hand, would probably see
no reason for favoring one outcome over another given that the direction of bias
is unknown, he however might update his initial probabilistic assessments when
more experiments are conducted. As the number of trials increases the values of
the two kinds of probabilities tend to converge, yet their respective interpretations
remain distinct.
Although many Bayesian theorists embrace the subjective interpretation of
probability, they differ, among other things, on the handling of statistical infer-
ences as to whether Bayesian statistics requires further theoretical foundations, or
that one should merely focus on the pragmatic aspect of Bayesian calculus, whose
flexibility and generality, it is said, are sufficient for dealing with complex issues
without the need to appeal to foundations.
This dissertation studies systematically the decision-theoretic foundations of
Bayesian reasoning where statistical inference is viewed as a particular decision
problem which is subject to further decision theoretic analyses. This approach
seeks to ground the concept of probability in a normative theory of rational
decision-making with the central aim of characterizing how decision makers,
when facing uncertainty, may act rationally so that their respective best interests
be maximally realized or that those undesirable consequences resulting from cer-
tain unwise choices of actions be on the whole avoided. The theory takes as basic
2
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assumptions that, in deliberating the best courses of action, the decision makers
are primarily moved by their beliefs in those uncertain quantities of interest in-
volved in the decision process as well as their concerns for the consequences of
their actions. The goal is to establish a normative theory of decision making as
to how agents’ probabilistic beliefs fit in a coherent manner with value judgments
in the light of changing evidence. This is usually carried out by prescribing vari-
ous rationality principles and structural assumptions that govern the individual’s
preferences over potential actions in decision situations. The upshot is a repre-
sentation theorem, by which the preferences over acts are represented by their
expected utilities using derived subjective probabilities and personal utilities.
From the very beginning, with the prominent work of Frank P. Ramsey, and
subsequently the works of Bruno de Finetti, Leonard J. Savage, among others,
the decision-theoretic foundations of Bayesian subjectivism have been built with
an important mathematical component. As the development of Bayesian theory
becomes increasingly involved, the corresponding formalism has gained consid-
erable complexity and has itself become a subject of philosophical scrutiny. Thus,
a preliminary task of this dissertation is to provide a careful examination of the
conceptual bases as well as the mathematics of some of the classical theories of
subjective expected utility. The aim is to investigate at the foundational level the
relationship between theoretical constructions and their interpretational charac-
terizations in modern Bayesian theory. Modifications and generalizations based
on various philosophical and mathematical considerations are then attempted.
In particular, as preparatory material for discussions in later parts of the dis-
sertation and also as a show of continuous efforts that had been made in order
to build a firm foundation for Bayesianism, we provide in Chapter I a condensed
overview of some classical theories of expected utility, including the works of
Ramsey (1926), von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944), Anscombe and Aumann
(1963). The exposition highlights differences as well as interdependence among
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these theories. A unified mathematical reconstruction of all of these decision mod-
els is also given.
This will be followed by a detailed account of Savage’s theory of subjective
expected utility as presented in his seminal book the Foundations of Statistics (1954;
1972). Savage’s theory is significant in that it provides a purely subjective inter-
pretation of probability, where ‘purely subjective’ means that, unlike other com-
peting accounts, the theory is characterized completely from the agent’s personal
perspective without appealing to any external chance mechanism. And, for this
very reason, the theory has been seen as a paradigm of the decision theoretic foun-
dations of Bayesian subjectivism. Ever since its first appearance in 1954, Savage’s
theory has been widely discussed in both economic and philosophical literatures
and it was once celebrated as “the most brilliant axiomatic theory of utility ever
developed” (Fishburn, 1970) and “the crowning glory of choice theory” (Kreps,
1988), due largely to its deep conceptual depth and high mathematical complexity.
Chapter II will encompass Savage’s system in its full scale. The philosophical and
mathematical analyses made in this chapter will also serve as the basis for the rest
of the dissertation. Our exposition retraces the methodological steps adopted by
Savage in constructing his final representation theorem. This involves dissecting,
evaluating, and reconstructing Savage’s mathematical arguments for deriving nu-
merical probabilities and utilities from the agent’s preferences over actions. Along
the way, we provide general discussions on various conceptual issues involved in
Savage’s system including the well-known “sure-thing” principle.
As a technical interlude, Chapter III is devoted to the discussion of a charged
issue concerning the additivity condition of probability measures derived in Sav-
age’s theory of personal probability. The debate about finite versus countable
additivity is a recurring issue in the foundations of probability theory. This is
largely because de Finetti in his original theory of probability defended a finitistic
account towards the additivity condition of personal probabilities which placed
him in contrast with the countably additive measure tradition of Lebesgue and
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Kolmogorov, a tradition that can retrospectively be traced back to the early writ-
ings of Pascal and Fermat (cf. Appendix A.7). Our focus in this chapter however
is on the arguments against countable additivity given by Savage in his theory of
personal probability. The discussion is divided into three main parts. First, we
comment, by providing a brief historical review, on Savage’s reasons for not re-
quiring the subjective probabilities derived in his decision model to be countably
additive. It is pointed out that Savage’s argument for avoiding countable additiv-
ity is inconclusive due to an oversight of set-theoretic details. In the second part,
we discuss some defects of employing merely finitely additive probability mea-
sures in Savage’s system. A diagnosis is attempted which links the insufficiency
of finite additivity to the failure of continuity in a rich background setting as em-
ployed in Savage’s system. The analyses then lead, in the third part, to a proposal
of introducing countable additivity as an added postulate to the theory, we then
provide a discussion on various conditions under which utilities be extended from
simple acts to acts in general. We will end with some general remarks which opt,
more or less, for a dualistic view towards the probabilistic additivity condition.
Based on a joint work of Gaifman and Liu (2015), Chapter IV presents a the-
ory of context-dependent decision making within Savage’s framework. The de-
velopment of this theory is motivated by solving the problem of the constant-act
assumption. Briefly, a constant act defined in Savage’s system is an act that has
the same consequence with the same value in all states of the world. As an im-
plicit structural assumption, Savage assumes that each possible consequence is a
candidate for constructing a constant act. This implicit assumption is crucial for
Savage as his final representation theorem hinges to a large extent on the struc-
tural properties it provides. The assumption, however, is highly problematic, in
view of simple cases that Savage himself suggests at the beginning of his book
as the kind of scenario that his system is supposed to handle. In this chapter we
provide an in-depth analysis of the problems caused by the constant-act assump-
tion and show that a certain weakened form of the representation theorem with
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context-dependent expected utilities can be derived without the implicit constant-
acts assumption, a form that is sufficient for handling small-world scenarios of the
kind proposed by Savage. The main innovation is that we provide a novel way of
deriving utilities, a method that is different from Savage’s original approach.
The decision-theoretic foundations of Bayesian subjectivist theory discussed
in the preceding chapters have far-reaching influences in contemporary game the-
ory, yet the former differ from the latter in important ways. Their differences
sometimes can be seen as underlying various debates in the foundations of games
which gives rise to many mind-boggling paradoxes or puzzles often discussed in
the philosophical literature. Chapter V addresses a series of issues in the epistemic
foundations of game theory including the problem of asymmetry of viewpoints
in multi-agent systems and that of self-prediction in a Bayesian setup. Attempts
are made to quantify various Bayesian probabilistic representations of beliefs in
games under two decision-theoretic theses: (1) the players’ beliefs be represented
by imprecise probabilities in stead of sharp ones; (2) no self-predicting subjec-
tive probability should be assigned to the players’ own acts. Unifying conditions
compatible with these principles are proposed, and it is shown that under these
conditions different belief structures can be coherently interrelated in the context
of epistemic games.
Chapter I & II (and Appendix A) are expository in nature. The aim there is to,
as the teacher used to say, “express in your own words.” In our expositions we
also provide a good amount of details that might be absent in the works where
these theories were first presented. Original contributions are given in Chapter III,
IV, & V. We are grateful to numerous anonymous reviewers and conference orga-
nizers and participants for their comments and criticisms, where early versions of




Let us now try to find a method of measuring beliefs as bases of possi-
ble actions . . . . The old-established way of measuring a person’s belief




1.1. Degrees of belief and betting method. The opening quote is from Frank
Ramsey’s celebrated essay Truth and Probability (1926) where Ramsey proposed a
theory of personal probability and utility. The theory contained basic ideas which
were later developed or rediscovered in, most notably, the works of de Finetti,
von Neumann and Morgenstern, Savage, Anscombe and Aumann, among others.
Ramsey’s subjectivism introduced a novel idea of measuring at the same time
decision maker’s subjective utilities and probabilities, where the agent’s personal
probability was portrayed as “the logic of partial beliefs” which was given an
operational definition through coherent betting behavior. Let us highlight some
basic ideas of Ramsey’s theory.1
Let X be a set of prizes and, to simplify matters, let x∗ and x∗ represent respec-
tively the best and the worst prizes considered by the decision maker.2 In order to
get a precise measure of her subjective valuations of the prizes in X, the decision
1Ramsey’s paper was first read at the “Moral Sciences Club” at University of Cambridge in 1926
and published posthumously in The Foundations of Mathematics and other Logical Essays (1931), edited
by Richard Braithwaite. It also appears in a collection of Ramsey’s writings edited by Mellor, D. H.,
Philosophical Papers, Cambridge University Press, 1990.
2Note that Ramsey’s original theory does not postulate the existence of these two distinguished
prizes (in fact, any two distinctive prizes would do). We introduce x∗ and x∗ purely for illustrative
purposes, which will be used in later expositions.
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maker is presented with the following betting situation which involves an ethically
neutral proposition p:
i. x∗ if p; x∗ if ¬p
ii. x∗ if ¬p; x∗ if p
where (i) and (ii) can be seen as two lottery tickets with the redeeming policy that
if, say, ticket (i) is chosen and p is indeed true then the agent will be rewarded
with x∗, x∗ if p is false. According to Ramsey, a proposition p is said to be ethically
neutral “if two possible worlds differing only in regard to the truth of p are always
of equal value” (cf. Ramsey, 1926, p.73). In other words, the truth (or the falsity)
of p itself has no added value in evaluating the value of a bet. As we shall see,
this assumption is a forerunner of the state independent axiom adopted in various
decision models which will be discussed later.
Now, under the above betting setup, if the decision maker is indifferent be-
tween (i) and (ii), then it is said that the agent has 1/2 degree of belief in p being
true. Ramsey then postulates in the form of an axiom that there exists an ethi-
cally neutral proposition p believed to degree 1/2. This distinguished proposition
p (with 1/2 degree of belief) can be further used to evaluate the values of other
prizes in X. Consider the following bets
iii. x
iv. x∗ if p; x∗ if ¬p.
If the agent is indifferent between the two bets, then the value of x said to be equal
to half of the total value of x∗ and x∗. To represent numerically, let the utility of x∗
be 1 and x∗ be 0, in symbols u(x∗) = 1 and u(x∗) = 0. According to Ramsey, the
fact that the decision maker’s is indifferent between the two tickets implies that









It is further assumed that the above procedure can be repeated indefinitely, that
is, for instance, there exists some prize x′ whose utility halves the way from x∗
to x with u(x′) = 1/4, and so on. Hence, under this assumption, the utility scale
between x∗ and x∗ can be calibrated to arbitrary precision. Then, for any y ∈ X, y
can be assigned with a numerical utility representation u(y) on the utility scale.
1
u(x∗) · · ·
1/2
u(x) · · ·
1/4
u(x′) · · ·
0
u(x∗)
With subjective utilities for all prizes in hand, Ramsey proceeds to define what
it means to say that the agent believes in the truth of an arbitrary proposition q
to certain degree using the following betting mechanism. For any q, if there exist
prizes x, y, z ∈ X with u(y) ≥ u(x) ≥ u(z) such that the agent is indifferent
between the following bets
v. x
vi. y if q; z if ¬q
then her partial belief in q, denoted by µ(q), is defined as
µ(q) =
u(x)− u(z)
u(y)− u(z) , u(y)− u(z) > 0.
Using a “Dutch-book argument” Ramsey shows that if the agent’s partial belief
assignments are coherent, in the sense that no book can be made against her, then
µ obeys the laws of probability calculus (cf. Ramsey, 1926, p.79).3 We will not go
further into the Dutch-book argument here which is a topic on its own, for further
discussion see, for instance, Earman (1992, Ch.2), Hajek (2008). Our focus is rather
to see how probabilities and utilities are derived in various formal systems.
1.2. Expected utility theory. Ramsey’s essay marked the beginning of a series
of extensive studies in utility theory. In this and the next chapter we explore three
main representation theorems. Here is a quick preview. (The readers may ignore
the technical details upon first reading.)
3For more detailed discussions/expositions on Ramsey’s account, see Fishburn (1981, §5.1), Bradley
(2001). .
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vNM: Let X be a finite set of prizes/consequences, and LX be the set of
probability measures on X. Each p ∈ LX is referred to as a lottery on
X, the intended interpretation is that, for any prize x ∈ X, p(x) is the
probability of getting x. Let ≿ be a preference relation on LX, the von
Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM) expected utility theory states that if ≿
satisfies certain postulated axioms then it can be presented by a utility
function (EUF) U : LX 7→ R such that
p ≿ q ⇐⇒ U(p) ≥ U(q),
where U can be expected utilities, that is, there exists a subjective utility
function u : X 7→ R for which





and u is unique up to a positive linear transformation. We further extend
this result to the case where X may contain infinitely many consequences
and each p ∈ LX is simple (i.e., has finite support).
A-A: Let S be a finite set of states of the world. Define a horse-race lottery to
be a function h mapping from S to LX. Denote the space of horse race
lotteries by H. Then given any horse lottery h and state s ∈ S, h(s) is a
(vNM) lottery defined on X, we also write hs for h(s). Hence, for any prize
x ∈ X, hs(x) is the probability that x is obtained in state s given the horse
lottery h. An Anscombe-Aumann (A-A) representation of a preference
relation ≿ on H is that there exists a utility function u : X 7→ R and a
(subjective) probability measure µ on an algebra of S such that, for any
h, h′ ∈ H,









provided that ≿ satisfies a set of postulated axioms.
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SVG: Further, let S be an (uncountably) infinite set of states and F be some
algebra equipped on S, X be a set of consequences, and let A be the set of
functions mapping from F to X, each f ∈ A is referred to as an act. Then
a Savage representation of the preference ordering ≿ on A is that, under
postulated axioms on ≿, there exists a (subjective) probability measure
µ on (S,F ) and a real-valued utility function u on X such that, for any
f , g ∈ A,















Remark. 1. The decision-theoretic models listed here are not presented in
chronicle order: the Anscombe-Aumann model appeared after the first edition
of Savage’s Foundations of Statistics. The materials presented here are organized
based on the methodological approach they each adopts with increasing com-
putational complexity.
2. In the three decision models above, the respective preference relations are de-
fined on different sets of alternatives (see Table 1.1 for a comparison). To sim-
plify notations, we adopt a systematic ambiguity and use, unless otherwise
specified, the same notation “≿” for all preference relations and let the context
determine on which set of alternatives a preference relation is defined.
Table 1.1. Models of Expected Utility.





Ramsey Aa ✓ ✓ –b
vNM LX ✓ – ✓
A-A H ✓ ✓ ✓
SVG A ✓ ✓ –
a Ramsey uses “propositions” instead of states and events and his preferences are
defined for consequences, acts, and conditional acts.
b Strictly speaking there is no objective probability explicitly employed in Ramsey’s
model, yet it is easily seen that his notion of ethically neutral propositions with
1/2 degrees of belief, which is based on an apparent symmetry consideration,
play a similar role as some chance mechanism.
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1.3. Kinds of probability. In the discussions below, we pay close attention to
different kinds of probability involved, by which we are referring to the (rough)
distinction between objective and subjective probabilities. These probabilities may
appear either as measures (subjective probability) of decision maker’s personal
probabilistic judgments over the occurrences of some events or in the form of
some presupposed chance mechanism (objective probability).
“Probability has often been visualized as a subjective concept more
or less in the nature of an estimation. Since we propose to use it
in constructing an individual, numerical estimation of utility, the
above view of probability would not serve our purpose. The sim-
plest procedure is, therefore, to insist upon the alternative, perfectly
well founded interpretation of probability as frequency in the long
run.” (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944, p.19)
The quotation is from von Neumann and Morgenstern’s well-known book “The
Theory of Games and Economic Behavior,” where they made a distinction be-
tween two different kinds of probabilities. As we shall see, the use of objective
probabilities is crucial to the vNM model and the A-A model, where the decision
maker’s personal utilities and subjective probability (in the case of the A-A model)
are essentially defined in terms of objective chances. Savage, on the other hand,
adopted a purely subjective interpretation of probability upholding that subjective
utility can be integrated with respect to subjective probability. The tradeoff is that
Savage’s theory is considerably more complicated than other models.
The plan for this chapter is as follows. In Section 2 and Section 3, we recon-
struct the decision models developed in von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944)
and Anscombe and Aumann (1963). The expositions owe much to Fishburn (1970,
1981, 1986, 1994); Hammond (1998a,b); Kreps (1988); Mehta (1998); Ok (2007,
2011); Rubinstein (2007), to name just a few. Full mathematical details of the
theories discussed in this chapter can be found in the works just mentioned, our
12
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primary goal is to trace the methodological developments that are related to Sav-
age’s theory of subjective expected utility, which will be the main theme of the
next chapter.
2. von Neumann-Morgenstern Utility Functions
2.1. Lotteries. As mentioned above, a lottery on a finite set X is a probability
function p on X, we sometimes refer to p as a von Neumann-Morganstern (vNM)
lottery. The intended interpretation is that X is a set of prizes and p(x) is the
chance that x ∈ X obtains. Let LX be the set of all probability functions on X.4 In
simple cases, define the degenerate lottery with respect to any given x ∈ X to be the
probability function δx ∈ LX such that, for any y ∈ X,
δx(y) =

1 y = x
0 y ̸= x
. (2.1)
That is, δx assigns probability 1 to x, 0 otherwise. Hence each prize x ∈ X can be
identified with a lottery δx that degenerates at x. Then, it is easily seen that, for




Example 2.1. Suppose that X = {x1, x2, x3}. Write the degenerate lottery δx1
in the form of a triple (1, 0, 0) which says that δx1 assigns probability 1 to prize
x1 and 0 to both x2 and x3. Then LX can be represented geometrically by a 2-
simplex in Figure 2.1 where each vertex of the equilateral triangle corresponds
to a degenerate lottery.5 Note that since in an equilateral triangle the sum of the
perpendiculars from any internal point p to three sides equals its altitude (say, 1),
write any point p in the triangle in the form of (p1, p2, p3) where each coordinate
pi is the length of the perpendicular from p to the edge that is on the opposite
4LX is often written as ∆(X), namely the space of probability functions defined on X.
5Strictly speaking, a standard n-simplex is a unit n + 1-dimensional polygon in Rn+1, Figure 2.1 is
a special case where the 2-simplex is represented as a space of its own in R2.
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Figure 2.1. 2-Simplex with unit altitude.
side of vertex i, then p1 + p2 + p3 = 1. Thus, Figure 2.1 in a representation of the
lotteries in LX where each point p = (p1, p2, p3) corresponds to a lottery in LX
with pi being the probability that p assigns to xi. 
Definition 2.2. Let p, q ∈ LX, a compound lottery of p and q with scalar λ ∈
[0, 1] is a function r such that r(x) = λp(x) + (1 − λ)q(x) for all x ∈ X. Denote
the compound lottery r by the following notation,
p ⊕λ q := λp(x) + (1 − λ)q(x). (2.3)
Intuitively, given any p, q ∈ LX, a compound lottery p ⊕λ q can be considered
as a (second-order) lottery ticket which has the payment policy that, with known
chance λ, lottery p will transpire and, with probability (1 − λ), lottery q obtains.
λ 1 − λ
p ⊕λ q p q
(2.4)
It is easy to see that p ⊕λ q ∈ LX, that is, every (second-order) compound lottery
is in effect equivalent to a (first-order) lottery in LX. To characterize this concept
geometrically using the simplicial representation of Example 2.1, we have that the
point that represents the compound lottery p ⊕λ q (0 ≤ λ ≤ 1) in Figure 2.2 falls
on the line segment that joins p and q.
2.1.1. Preference over lotteries. Presumably, the decision maker has preferences
over the prizes. It is assumed that these preferences are reflected in her preferences
14










Figure 2.2. Compound lottery p ⊕λ q in 2-simplex.
over the lotteries with each lottery specifying the chances of getting the prizes.6
For instance, in Example 2.1, suppose that the agent definitely prefers prize x1
over other two prizes then it must be that she prefers δx1 over δx2 and δx3 , because
the latter two lotteries assign probability 0 to the obtaining of x1. Formally, let ≿
be a preorder on LX (see Appendix A.1), which represents the decision maker’s
preferences over all the lotteries. The following are the von Neumann-Morgenstern
postulates on ≿:7
vNM 1. ≿ is a complete preference relation.
vNM 2. For all p, q, r ∈ LX and any λ ∈ (0, 1],
p ≻ q ⇐⇒ p ⊕λ r ≻ q ⊕λ r.
vNM 3. For any p, q, r ∈ LX, there exist a, b ∈ (0, 1), such that
p ≻ r ≻ q =⇒ p ⊕a q ≻ r ≻ p ⊕b q.
vNM 1 is often referred to as the completeness axiom which asserts that all
lotteries are pair-wisely comparable. This axiom is often defended along the lines
that the decision maker, if pressed, will eventually make a decision between a
given pair of options regardless what her deliberation process might be. Note that
6See von Neumann and Morgenstern (1964, §3.3.1) for their discussions on the relation between
probablistic reasonings and utility considerations.
7See Hammond (1998a, §3) for a discussion on different versions of the independence and the
continuity axioms adopted in the literature. The current system (vNM 1-3) is provably equivalent
to the theory presented there due to Jensen (1967) (see conditions (O), (I), (C), and Lemma 4.5(a),
see also Fishburn (1977, 1981, 1982)).
15
CHAPTER I. SUBJECTIVE EXPECTED UTILITY
given the agent’s ordering among lotteries one can induce an ordering ≿∗ over the
prizes through degenerate lotteries as follows: for all x, y ∈ X,
x ≿∗ y =Df δx ≿ δy. (2.5)
That is, prize x is said to be weakly preferred to prize y, if, under the initial order-
ing ≿, the degenerate lottery δx is at least as good as the lottery that degenerates
at y. It is easily seen that if ≿ is totally (or partially) ordered so is ≿∗. This pref-
erence relation among prizes induced through degenerate lotteries can be seen as
a precursor of Savage’s similar notion of preferences over consequences which is
induced via the notion of constant acts defined in Definition 5.3. However, unlike
degenerate lotteries the notion of constant acts is highly problematic, we shall ad-
dress this issue in Section 14.1. vNM 2 is commonly known as the independence
axiom. To explain in terms of compound lotteries, the axiom says that decision
maker’s (strict) preference between two lotteries remains the same when each is
combined with the same lottery (with respect to the same scalar). To illustrate,
observe that the compound lotteries in (2.6) are so arranged that they agree with
one another on (1 − λ), then vNM 2 mandates that the preference between the
two combined lotteries is solely determined on the part where they are different,
i.e., on λ. This postulate is closely related to (or, perhaps, motivates) Savage’s well
known sure-thing principle which will be examined in §5.2.
λ 1 − λ
p ⊕λ r p r
q ⊕λ r q r
(2.6)
vNM 3 is sometimes called the Archimedean or continuity axiom. Intuitively, it says
that no lottery p (q) is so good (bad) that, for any r ≻ q (p ≻ r), the compound
lottery of p and q is always better (worse) than r. Variants of vNM axioms are
widely adopted in utility theory as they provide some basic characterization of
the underlying preferential structure which mimics the behavior of the standard
16
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ordering ≥ on the real line. The latter paves the way for the eventual real-valued
numerical utility representation of ≿. The following properties can be derived
from the axioms.
Lemma 2.3. For any p, q, r ∈ LX and λ ∈ (0, 1],
(1) p ∼ q if and only if p ∼ p ⊕λ q;
(2) p ≿ q if and only if p ≿ p ⊕λ q ≿ q;
(3) for any 0 ≤ β < α ≤ 1, p ≻ q if and only if p ⊕α q ≻ p ⊕β q;
(4) if p ≿ r ≿ q and p ≻ q, then there exists a unique α ∈ [0, 1] such that
r ∼ p ⊕α q.
Proof. (1) Suppose, to the contrary, that p ≻ p ⊕λ q. Write p as p ⊕λ p, then
we have p⊕λ p ≻ p⊕λ q. The latter implies, via vNM 2, p ≻ q, a contradiction.
Hence p ⊕λ q ≿ p by vNM 1. Similarly, it can be shown p ≿ p ⊕λ q. Thus
p ∼ p ⊕λ q.
(2) Suppose, to the contrary, that q ≻ p ⊕λ q, that is, q ⊕λ q ≻ p ⊕λ q. It follows,
by vNM 2, that q ≻ p, a contradiction. It can be similarly shown that it is not
the case that p ⊕λ q ≻ p. Thus, by vNM 1, p ≿ p ⊕λ q ≿ q.
(3) If β = 0, then, by vNM 2, p ≻ q implies p ⊕α q ≻ q ⊕α q = q = p ⊕β q. If
0 < β < α ≤ 1, then 1 − β/α ∈ (0, 1), by vNM 2, p ⊕α q ≻ q implies that
p ⊕α q = (p ⊕α q)⊕1− βα (p ⊕α q)










αp + (1 − α)q
]
= βp + (1 − β)q = p ⊕β q.
(4) The claim is trivially true if r ∼ p or r ∼ q, in which cases α = 1 or 0,
respectively. We prove the case where p ≻ r ≻ q. Consider the sets
A : =
{
x ∈ [0, 1]
∣∣ p ⊕x q ≿ r};
B : =
{
x ∈ [0, 1]
∣∣ r ≿ p ⊕x q}.
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Let α∗ = inf A and α∗ = sup B. Note that, for any a > α∗, there must exist
some a′ ∈ A such that a > a′ ≥ α∗ (for, otherwise, a is a lower bound of A
that is greater than α∗, which contradicts the assumption α∗ = inf A), hence,
by claim (3) above, p ⊕a q ≻ p ⊕a′ q ≿ r. It follows, via vNM 1, that
a > α∗ =⇒ a /∈ B. (2.7)
The contrapositive of (2.7) says that, for any a, a ∈ B implies that α∗ ≥ a, in
other words, α∗ is an upper bound of B. and hence α∗ ≥ α∗. Similarly, one can
show that, for any a,
α∗ > a =⇒ a /∈ A (2.8)
which leads to α∗ ≥ α∗. Now define α = α∗ = α∗. The proof is completed
if we can show that α ∈ A ∩ B. Suppose, to the contrary, that α /∈ B, then,
by vNM 1, p ⊕α q ≻ r. It follows, by vNM 3 and the assumption r ≻ q, that
there exists some a ∈ (0, 1) such that (p ⊕α q)⊕a q ≻ r, that is, p ⊕a·α q ≻ r.
This implies that a · α ∈ A. However, from α∗ = α > a · α we get, via (2.8),
that a · α /∈ A, a contradiction. Hence we have α ∈ B. Similarly, one can show
α ∈ A. Uniqueness can be easily derived from (2.7) and (2.8). □
Remark 2.4. Note that vNM 3 can also be derived from Lemma 2.3(4) under
vNM 1 and vNM 2. To see this, let p, q, r be such that p ≻ r ≻ q, we show that
there exist a, b ∈ (0, 1), such that p ⊕a q ≻ r ≻ p ⊕b q. By Lemma 2.3(4) there
exists a unique c ∈ (0, 1) for which r ∼ p ⊕c q. Then let a be any number in (c, 1)
and b be any number in (0, c), then, by Lemma 2.3(3) (which is derivable from
under vNM 1 and vNM 2), we are done. Thus vNM 3 is provably equivalent to
Lemma 2.3(4) given vNM 1 and vNM 2. For this reason, we can use vNM 3 and
Lemma 2.3(4) interchangeably as the continuity axiom of vNM theory.
2.2. Cardinal utility. Given the assumption that X is finite, it follows, by
vNM 1, that the set of degenerate lotteries {δx | x ∈ X} has a ≿-maximal and
18
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a ≿-minimal element, that is, there exist a most desired prize x∗ and a least de-
sired prize x∗ in X such that
δx∗ ≿ δx ≿ δx∗ , for all x ∈ X. (2.9)
The following lemma shows that δx∗ and δx∗ are in fact extreme points for all
lotteries in LX under ≿.
Lemma 2.5. There exist x∗, x∗ ∈ X such that δx∗ ≿ p ≿ δx∗ for all p ∈ LX.
Proof. Let δx∗ and δx∗ be defined as in (2.9). Consider the non-trivial case
where δx∗ ≻ δx∗ . Note that, for any p ∈ LX, p can be rewritten as ∑x∈X p(x)δx
via (2.2). Then, by Lemma 2.3(4), for each δx, let λx ∈ [0, 1] be such that δx ∼





























Similarly, it can be shown that p ≿ δx∗ . □
Let us now proceed with the main theorem of this section.
Theorem 2.6 (von Neumann-Morgenstern). Let X be a nonempty finite set,
and ≿ be a preference relation on LX. Then ≿ satisfies vNM 1-3 if and only if
there exists a function u ∈ RX such that





where u is unique up to a positive linear transformation, that is, for any function
v ∈ RX, v satisfies (2.11) if and only if, for some a > 0 and b,
u(x) = av(x) + b. (2.12)
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Proof. We only prove the non-trivial “only if” direction of the theorem in
following steps:
(1) By Lemma 2.5, there exist x∗, x∗ ∈ X such that δx∗ ≿ p ≿ δx∗ for all p ∈ LX.
If δx∗ ∼ δx∗ then p ∼ q for all p, q ∈ LX. In this case, let u be any constant
function. Otherwise, δx∗ ≻ δx∗ , define function U : LX 7→ [0, 1] as follows,
U(p) := inf
{
α ∈ [0, 1]
∣∣ δx∗ ⊕α δx∗ ≿ p}.
By Lemma 2.3(3),
p ≿ q if and only if U(p) ≥ U(q) for all p, q ∈ LX; (2.13)
and by Lemma 2.3(4),
p ∼ δx∗ ⊕λ δx∗ if and only if λ = U(p). (2.14)
(2) We show that U is an affine function on LX, that is, for any sequences λ1, . . . , λn ∈
[0, 1] with ∑i λi = 1 and for any p1, . . . , pn ∈ LX, we have
U(λ1 p1 + · · ·+ λn pn) = λ1U(p1) + · · ·+ λnU(pn). (2.15)
It suffices to show, for any p, q ∈ LX and λ ∈ [0, 1], that
U
(
λp + (1 − λ)q
)
= λU(p) + (1 − λ)U(q). (2.16)
Note that, by (2.14), p ∼ δx∗ ⊕U(p) δx∗ and q ∼ δx∗ ⊕U(q) δx∗ . Let r = λp + (1 −
λ)q. Then, by vNM 2 (twice),









= δx∗ ⊕λU(p)+(1−λ)U(q) δx∗ .
It follows that U(r) = λU(p) + (1 − λ)U(q) via (2.14).
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(3) Now, for any p, q ∈ LX, by (2.13) and (2.2),


















Define u : X 7→ R to be such that u(x) = U(δx), we have that





(4) Finally, we show that u is unique up to a positive linear transformation, we
prove only the nontrivial “only if” direction of the proof. As before, let x∗, x∗ ∈
X be such that δx∗ ≿ δx ≿ δx∗ for all x ∈ X. Further, let a, b be such that
u(x∗) = av(x∗) + b, u(x∗) = av(x∗) + b,
where a > 0 (the existence of such a, b is guaranteed by the hypothesis δx∗ ≻
δx∗ in part (1)). By (2.14), for any x ∈ X, there exists a number λ for which
δx ∼ δx∗ ⊕λ δx∗ , then we have that











λv(x∗) + (1 − λ)v(x∗)
]
+ b = av(x) + b.
This completes the proof of the theorem. □
We refer to the derived function u above as an instance of von Neumann-
Morgenstern utility function (vNMUF). A pair of vNMUFs u and v are said to be
cardinally equivalent if (2.12) is satisfied. The following corollary is a generaliza-
tion of Theorem 2.6, which will become handy later. The proof uses the same
techniques as in the proof Theorem 2.6, and hence omitted.
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Corollary 2.7. Let X,LX be as above, and let C be any convex subset of LX.
Suppose that ≿ is a preference relation on C such that there is an ≿-maximum
and an ≿-minimum in C. Then ≿ satisfies vNM 1-3 if and only if there exists a
(utility function) u ∈ RX such that





where u is unique up to a positive linear transformation.
2.3. Expected utility for simple lotteries. We now extend the von Neumann
and Morgenstern Expected Utility Theorem 2.6 to a class of lotteries defined for
some X that contains potentially infinitely many prizes.
Definition 2.8. Let X be an infinite set of prizes/consequences, a probability
measure p on X is said to be simple if it has a finite support, that is, if
∣∣supp(p)∣∣ = ∣∣{x ∈ X : p(x) > 0}∣∣ < ∞. (2.18)
Denote by L∗X the set of all simple probabilities on X, and we refer to L∗X as
an extended space of lotteries. The notational difference between LX and L∗X is that
LX contains all the probability measures defined on a finite X, whereas, for any
p ∈ L∗X, p is defined on some infinite X but with finite support. Clearly, for any
λ ∈ [0, 1] and any simple probabilities p, q, the mixture of p and q, written p ⊕λ q,
is in L∗X. And for any p ∈ L∗X, p can be written as the sum of degenerate lotteries




Then a similar argument for Lemma 2.5 leads to the following observation.
Lemma 2.9. If there exist a ≿-maximal element x∗ and a ≿-minimal element
x∗ in X then, for each p ∈ L∗X, δx∗ ≿ p ≿ δx∗ .
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Theorem 2.10. Let ≿ be a preference relation on L∗X. Then ≿ satisfies vNM 1-3
if and only if there exists a vNMUF u ∈ RX such that





where u is unique up to a positive linear transformation.
Proof of Theorem 2.10. We prove by modifying step (1)-(4) in the proof of
Theorem 2.6 with (1∗)-(4∗) to account for the added assumption that X is infinite
and that each p ∈ L∗X is a simple probability measure. We only show the modified
steps (1∗) and (3∗), namely the steps where the assumption of X being infinite
plays a role. Steps (2∗) and (4∗) hold with obvious notational changes.
(1∗) If for any p, q ∈ L∗X, p ∼ q, then let u be any constant function, then we
are done. Otherwise, fix any p, q satisfying p ≻ q. By vNM 1, for any
r ∈ L∗X, exactly one of the following cases holds:
(i) p ≿ r ≿ q, (ii) r ≻ p, (iii) q ≻ r.
For case (i), define function U : L∗X 7→ [0, 1] as follows,
U(r) := inf
{
α ∈ [0, 1]
∣∣ p ⊕α q ≿ r}.
Then, by Lemma 2.3(4), r ∼ p ⊕λ q if and only if λ = U(r). It follows that
U(p) = 1 and U(q) = 0. For any r in case (ii), by Lemma 2.3(4), let a
be such that p ∼ r ⊕a q, define U(r) = 1/a. Similarly, for any r in case
(iii), let a be such that q ∼ p ⊕a r, define U(r) = a/(a − 1). Thus, by
Lemma 2.3(3), we have that U is a numerical representation of ≿:
p ≿ q if and only if U(p) ≥ U(q) for all p, q ∈ L∗X. (2.21)
(3∗) Define u : X → R by
u(x) = U(δx) for all x ∈ X. (2.22)
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Then, for any p, q ∈ L∗X, a modified step (2∗) together with (2.19)-(2.21)
yield that






















This completes the proof of the theorem. □
Remark 2.11. Note that all the probability functions (either in LX or in L∗X)
considered in this section are simple (have finite support). The theorems proved
above hold regardless of whether these probabilities are finitely or countably ad-
ditive. This ceases to be true if probability functions defined over X are not simple:
different constraints with different additivity conditions need to be added in or-
der for the representation theorem to hold. See Fishburn (1970, Chapter 8) and
Fishburn (1982, Chapter 3) for an extensive discussion for these cases.
3. Horse-race Lotteries
3.1. Risk versus uncertainty. In the von Neumann and Morgenstern expected
utility model, the decision maker is uncertain as to which outcome/prize will tran-
spire, where the uncertainty is associated with some objective chances attached to
the outcomes. For instance, in a gambling situation, the gambler is uncertain
about the outcome of the spin of a roulette wheel, where the betting on each
possible outcome comes with a known risk (objective probability), and hence the
vNM model is commonly referred to as a decision model under risk. Under the
assumption of these known objective chances, the vNM expected theory provides
a systematic way of retrieving decision makers’ subjective utilities of the outcomes
given their respective preferences among the probability distributions, i.e., among
vNM lotteries. Now, it is conceivable that there are cases where these objective
chances might be lacking. Consider, for instance, that in a horse race the gambler
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needs to choose between two gambles h and h′ on the possible outcomes of the
horse race: either horse H1, or H2, or H3 will the winning horses and the payoffs
of the two gambles are given in the matrix below.
H1 H2 H3
h $100 0 $20
h′ 0 $100 $20
(3.1)
That is, if gamble h is chosen and horse H1 wins the race then the gambler will be
paid with 100 dollars, 0 if H2 is the winner, and so on. Here, the winning horses
form a set of possible states of the world, denoted by S.8
As seen, in this example, there are no objective chances involved. In making
a decision, the gambler needs to provide his own probabilistic estimation on the
winning horse, based perhaps on his knowledge about the horses, past experi-
ences with horse race, or some other considerations. A decision framework that
treats this type of decision problems is often referred to as a decision model under
uncertainty.
A complete treatment of the above case will have to wait until the next Chapter
where we present Savage’s theory of subjective expected utility. In this section
we discuss an intermediate step where, instead of receiving direct cash reward,
the gambler is paid with some other type of prizes, namely roulette lotteries p, q
which indirectly lead to cash reward (e.g., if gamble h is chosen and H1 wins the
horse race then the gambler will be paid with roulette lottery p which in turn says
that with 50-50 chance the gambler will get either $100 or $20 dollars).
H1 H2 H3
h p 0 q
h′ 0 p q
⇒
$100 $20 0
p 1/2 1/2 0
q 0 1/2 1/2
The distinction between these two types of lotteries, namely horse-race lotter-
ies/gambles and roulette lotteries, was made in Anscombe and Aumann (1963),
8We shall provide an analysis of the nature of the states in our discussion of Savage’s decision model
later. For the time being, a state of the world is taken as a specification of a possible way that the
world may unfold that is relevant to the current decision situation.
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where the roulette lotteries are just vNM lotteries. Their decision model is hence a
mixture system containing both subjective and objective probabilities. The goal, as
stated by the authors, is “to define the person’s probabilities in terms of chances,
by an extension of von Neumann-Morgenstern theory.”
Let X be a finite set of prizes, LX be the lottery space of X, and let S be a
finite set of states of the world. A horse-race lottery (or horse lottery for short) is a
function mapping from S to LX.9 Denote the set of all horse lotteries by H, that
is, H = LXS. Given the definition of compound vNM lotteries in (2.3), define the
operation of (convex) combination of horse lotteries as follows: a compound horse




(s) =Df h(s)⊕λ h′(s) for all s ∈ S. (3.2)
Notation. By definition, h(s) is itself a probability function in LX, we often
write h(s)(·) as hs(·) for short. Then, under our current notational convention, h
denotes a horse lottery and hs is a roulette lottery, i.e., a vNM lottery.
Note that, in (3.2), for any given state s ∈ S, it is clear that h(s)⊕λ h′(s) ∈ LX,
and hence h ⊕λ h′ is also a horse lottery in H by definition. The task for our
decision maker is to choose among the horse lotteries the preferred one(s). The
preferences are further represented by a preference relation ≿, from which her
subjective probability measure µ on the occurrences of the states and her subjective
utility measure u on the prizes are to be deduced.
9In later chapters, we will be discussing the additivity condition of the subjective probability mea-
sures derived. This depends on the basic setups of the spaces in which various probability measures
are defined. Anscombe and Aumann (1963) were not explicit about the cardinality of the set of prizes
on which vNM lotteries are defined. They mentioned in passing that the restriction to finite space
in Luce and Raiffa (1957)’s proof of the existence of a vNM utility representation is not necessary,
however, the examples they used (i.e., roulette lotteries) and the details of their proofs involved are
all finitary in nature. They also compared their system with that of Savage (1954), where the horse
lotteries are just a special type of Savage acts (with vNM lotteries as consequences). They did not
give further details on the structure of the state space on which their horse lotteries are defined.
Here, again, their examples and the proposed axioms (Assumption 1 & 2) all use finite structures.
To simplify matters, we discuss the case where all vNM lotteries are simple and the set of states is
finite. That is, we consider LX instead of L∗X .
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3.2. State-dependent utility. Let ≿ be a preference relation (a preorder) on the
set of horse lotteries H. In strict parallel to the von Neumann and Morgenstern
postulates vNM 1-3, the first three Anscombe and Aumann (A-A) axioms on ≿
take the following form.
A-A 1. ≿ is complete.
A-A 2. For all h, h′, t ∈ H and λ ∈ (0, 1],
h ≻ h′ ⇐⇒ h ⊕λ t ≻ h′ ⊕λ t.
A-A 3. For any h, h′, t ∈ H, there exist a, b ∈ (0, 1), such that
h ≻ t ≻ h′ =⇒ h ⊕a h′ ≻ t ≻ h ⊕b h′.
These axioms are sufficient for deriving the following state-dependent represen-
tation theorem which can be seen as a direct consequence of Corollary 2.7.
Theorem 3.1. Let ≿ be a preference relation on HS,X, then ≿ satisfies A-A 1-3
if and only if there exist (state-dependent utility) functions u : S × X 7→ R such
that, for any h, h′ ∈ HS,X,









The right hand side of (3.3) takes the full advantage of the fact that each hs
is itself a probability function, the task is then to show that there exists a utility
function such that the comparison between horse lotteries can be represented by
their expected utilities.
Proof. We give only the non-trivial “only if” direction of the proof. Let LS×X
denote the set of probability functions defined on S × X. Note that, for each horse
lottery h ∈ H = LXS, there corresponds a ĥ ∈ LS×X such that for any s ∈ S and




∣∣ hs(x) = |S| · ĥ(s, x) and h ∈ H}. (3.4)
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Thence Ĥ is subset of LS×X which is convex and compact (because H is). Further,
define an ordering ≿̂ on Ĥ such that, for any ĥ, ĥ′ ∈ Ĥ,
ĥ ≿̂ ĥ′ ⇐⇒ h ≿ h′. (3.5)
It is easy to see that ≿ on H satisfies A-A 1-3 if and only if the induced ordering ≿̂
on Ĥ satisfies vNM 1-3. By compactness and vNM 3 (i.e., continuity), there exists
an ≿̂-maximum and an ≿̂-minimum in Ĥ. Hence, by Corollary 2.7 and (3.5), there
exists a vNMUF v ∈ RS×X such that
h ≿ h′ ⇔ ∑
(s,x)∈S×X













The proof is completed once we define u(s, x) to be v(s, x)/|S|. □
As seen, the derived two-place utility function u is state-dependent as the func-
tion value also depends on the state. For any s ∈ S, we write u(s, ·) as us(·) and
refer to the latter as the utility function with respect to state s. Theorem 3.1 then
states that the agent’s preference relation among horse lotteries can be represented
using a series of state-dependent utility functions {us}s∈S.
3.3. State-independent utility. Theorem 3.1 can be further strengthened by
adding one more axiom so that the representation takes the form of a combina-
tion of agent’s subjective probability on states and her subjective state-independent
utility on the prizes. The strengthening relies on the following concept of “con-
stant horse lotteries”.10
Definition 3.2. A horse lottery is said to be constant with respect to p ∈ LX,
written cp if cp(s) = p for all s ∈ S.
It is clear from the definition above that each constant horse lottery can be
identified with a vNM lottery. This then enables us to define a preference ordering
10Constant horse lotteries are special cases of Savage’s notion of “constant acts” in Definition 5.3
below. More discussion on Savage’s constant acts will be given in Section 14.1.
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≿∗ on LX using the preference relation ≿ over H as follows
p ≿∗ q ⇐⇒ cp ≿ cq for all p, q ∈ LX. (3.6)
Call ≿∗ the preference relation on LX induced by ≿.
Lemma 3.3. Let ≿ be a preference on H and ≿∗ the corresponding induced
preference on LX, if ≿ satisfies A-A 1-3 then ≿∗ satisfies vNM 1-3.
Proof. We prove the lemma by direct verifications.
(1) vNM 1 can be easily verified using the definition of constant horse lottery.
(2) For vNM 2, suppose that p ≻∗ q, then we have cp ≻ cq via (3.6). By A-A 2, for
any r ∈ LX and λ ∈ (0, 1],
cp ≻ cq ⇐⇒ cp ⊕λ cr ≻ cq ⊕λ cr.
By (3.2), cp ⊕λ cr(s) = cp(s)⊕λ cr(s) for all s ∈ S. Since cp, cq, cr are constant
horse lotteries, we have that cp(s) ⊕λ cr(s) = p ⊕λ r for all s ∈ S. Similarly,
cq ⊕λ cr = q ⊕λ r. Hence cp ⊕λ cr ≻ cq ⊕λ cr if and only if cp⊕λr ≻ cq⊕λr, thence
p ⊕λ r ≻∗ q ⊕λ r via (3.6).
(3) Finally, suppose that p ≻∗ r ≻∗ q, then by (3.6) we have cp ≻ cr ≻ cq. By A-
A 3, there exists a, b ∈ (0, 1] such that cp ⊕a cq ≻ cr ≻ cp ⊕b cq. Using a similar
argument as in (2), we get cp⊕aq ≻ cr ≻ cp⊕bq. Therefore, p ⊕a q ≻∗ r ≻∗ p ⊕b q
via (3.6), and hence vNM 3. □
Further, a state s ∈ S is said to be null if the agent is indifferent between any
horse lotteries that differ only on s, s is non-null if it is not null. We are now in the
position to state the fourth A-A axiom which facilitates state-independent utility
representation.
A-A 4. For any h, h′ ∈ H,
(1) if hs ≿∗ h′s for all s ∈ S then h ≿ h′;
(2) if hs ≿∗ h′s for all s ∈ S and hs ≻∗ h′s for some non-null s ∈ S then h ≻ h′;
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where ≿∗ is the preference on LX induced by ≿.
Axiom A-A 4 is commonly known as the Monotonicity axiom (or sometimes
the Dominance or State-independent axiom). It asserts that horse lottery h weakly
dominates h′ if, in each state s, the vNM lottery hs weakly dominates h′s (under
the induced preference ordering through the notion of constant horse lottery); h
strictly dominates h′ if, for some state s, hs strictly dominates h′s. As shown the
in following lemma, the axiom regulates in a very rigid way the two preferential
systems (≿ and ≿∗).
Lemma 3.4. Let ≿ and ≿∗ be as above. Suppose that ≿ satisfies A-A 1-4 and
that, for any s ∈ S, us be a utility function obtained in Theorem 3.1, then us is a
vNMUF with respect to ≿∗.
Proof. By Lemma 3.3, ≿∗ satisfies vNM 1-3, then it suffices to show that, for
any p, q ∈ LX,





From p ≿∗ q we have cp ≿ cq by definition. Fix s, let h be the horse lottery that
differs from cq in precisely the following way
h(ν) =

p if ν = s
q if ν ̸= s
.
That is, h yields p at s but agrees with cq at all other states. Then, by A-A 4, we
have p ≿∗ q iff h ≿ cq. It follows, by (3.3), that

























This completes the proof of the lemma. □
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Theorem 3.5 (Anscombe and Aumann). Let ≿ be a preference relation on H.
Then ≿ satisfies A-A 1-4 if and only if there exists a utility function u ∈ RX and a
probability measure µ on S such that, for any h, h′ ∈ H,









Proof. By Theorem 3.1, there exists a series of state-dependent functions {us}s∈S
such that (3.3) holds. Further, Lemma 3.4 shows that the us’s are vNM utility rep-
resentations with respect to the same preference relation ≿∗ over lotteries, and
hence are unique up to positive affine transformations. That is, if we fix a state s′
and let u = us′ , then for any s ∈ S, there, by (2.12), exist as, bs (as > 0) such that
us = asu + bs. Then, from (3.3), we get














This, together with (3.8), yield what we want. □
In the A-A system above, (3.9) is interpreted as the agent’s subjective probabil-
ity, which, as seen, is defined in terms of the coefficients of a series of vNM utility
functions which, in turn, are defined through vNM lotteries. The model is hence
a dualistic system featuring both subjective and objective probabilities. In the next
chapter, we introduce Savage’s theory of expected utility where probabilities are
given a purely subjective and decision-theoretic interpretation. We shall compare





Personalistic views hold that probability measures the confidence that
a particular individual has in the truth of a particular proposition, for
example, the proposition that it will rain tomorrow. These views pos-
tulate that the individual concerned is in some ways “reasonable,” but
they do not deny the possibility that two reasonable individuals faced
with the same evidence may have different degrees of confidence in the
truth of the same proposition.
—— Savage (1972)
4. Introduction
This chapter introduces Leonard J. Savage’s theory of subjective expected util-
ity as presented in his seminal book the Foundations of Statistics.1 As indicated in
the opening quote, one main objective of this project is to provide a subjective
interpretation of the central notion employed in virtually all stages of statistical
inferences, namely the notion of probability. Built on earlier works of Frank Ram-
sey, Bruno de Finetti, John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern, among others,
Savage’s theory seeks to ground a theory of personal probability in a normative
theory of rational decision making of highly idealized reasonable agents, where by
“reasonable agents” Savage means individuals who are capable of distinguishing
“between coherent behavior and blunder, or demonstrable incoherence, in the face
of uncertainty.” This is achieved by prescribing various rationality principles and
structural assumptions governing decision makers’ behaviors in decision-making
1The first edition of Savage’s book where the axiomatic theory was first introduced appeared in
1954 published by John Wiley & Sons. All citations in this dissertation refer to the second revised
edition published by Dover Publications in 1972.
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situations, by which the agents can police their own potential decisions against
incoherency.
The methodological approach adopted by Savage begins with the decision
maker’s preferences over acts. A set of axioms is postulated on this preference
relation. From the first five postulates a comparative notion of subjective proba-
bility is derived which reflects the agent’s qualitative probabilistic judgments over
possible circumstances under which these actions are taking place. With the sixth
postulate, the derived qualitative probability is further represented by a numerical
probability measure together with a personal utility function for simple acts (i.e.,
acts that may lead to finitely many potential consequences under different states).
The last postulate is brought in so that the utility function for simple acts can be
extended to all acts (cf. Table 4.1).
Table 4.1. Inferential order in Savage’s system.
P1-5 + P6 + P7
Qualitative probability ⇒ Quantitative probability ⇒ Utility for all actsUtility for simple acts
Savage’s approach differs from the methods used by Ramsey and Anscombe-
Aumann in that, in the latter cases, the agents’ subjective probabilities are derived
from their personal utilities, which in turn are constructed based on some pre-
supposed chance mechanisms (or, in the case of Ramsey, the notion of ethically
neutral propositions, which plays a similar role as an unbiased coin receiving ob-
jective probability 1/2). This inferential order is reversed in Savage’s subjectivism
where the preference relation over acts is taken as the only primitive notion, from
which the agent’s personal probabilities and utilities are subsequently revealed.
As a result of this reversal, Savage’s approach may appear to have some compu-
tational disadvantages in the sense that the mathematical representation theorem
given by Savage is considerably more involved than many of its alternatives, yet
the theory is conceptually significant in that the system is maintained as a purely
subjective framework with no direct reference to objective probabilities.
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Our expositions will follow closely Savage’s original approach. The plan is as
follows. After an introduction of basic definitions and notations in Section 5.1, we
provide an analysis of the well-known “sure-thing” principle (Section 5.2). This
will be followed by a reconstruction of Savage’s theory of qualitative probability
(Section 6.1), quantitative probability (Section 6.2), and personal utility for simple
acts (Section 7.1). In Section 7.2, we investigate the role of Savage’s last postulate
(i.e., P7) played in extending utility from simple acts to general acts.
5. Decision Matrix
5.1. States, consequences, and acts. The basic setup of Savage’s decision model
can be illustrated in the decision matrix in Table 5.1, where S = {s1, s2, . . .} is an
(infinite) set of states of the world specifying those possible circumstances that are
relevant to the decision situation at hand,2 X = {o1,1, o1,2, . . .} is a (finite or infi-
nite) set of consequences (or outcomes), and f1, f2, . . . are commonly referred to as
(Savage) acts, which are arbitrary functions mapping from S to X. The intended
interpretation of an act, say fm, is that the agent’s choice of fm will lead to con-
sequence om,n if sn is the true state of the world. Denote the set of all acts by A.
Table 5.1. Savage’s decision matrix.
s1 s2 · · · sn · · ·
f1 o1,1 o1,2 · · · o1,n · · ·
f2 o2,1 o2,2 · · · o2,n · · ·
...
. . .
fm om,1 om,2 · · · om,n · · ·
As a primitive assumption, the agent is assumed to have preferences over acts,
which are modeled by a preorder ≿ on A. Thus, for any acts f , g ∈ A, f ≿ g is
taken to mean that act f is weakly preferred to act g (or that g is not preferred to
f ) by the agent. We define f ≻ g =Df f ≿ g and g ̸≿ f . This means that f is
2 In fact, as a feature of Savage’s theory, S must contain uncountably many states, we will return to
this point later (cf. Remark 6.15 below).
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strictly preferred to g. And define f ∼ g =Df f ≿ g and g ≿ f , that is, f and g
are equi-preferable (or that f is indifferent to g).
Definition 5.1 (Combined acts). For any f , g ∈ A, define the combination of f
and g with respect to an event E (a set of states), written f ⊕E g, to be such that:
( f ⊕E g)(s) =

f (s) if s ∈ E
g(s) if s ∈ EC,
(5.1)
where EC = S − E is the compliment of E.3
That is to say, f ⊕E g is the act which agrees with f on event E, with g on EC,
and it is easily seen that f ⊕E g ∈ A. Using the concept defined in (5.1), we can
interpret ( f ⊕E g)⊕F h as saying: do f if E ∩ F obtains, g if F ∩ EC occurs, and h
if FC, and so on. The following is a list of simple properties of operation ⊕E. The
proof is immediate from the definition and hence omitted.
Lemma 5.2. For any E, F ∈ F , and for any acts f , g ∈ A,
(1) f ⊕E g = g ⊕EC f ;
(2) ( f ⊕E g)⊕F g = f ⊕E∩F g;
(3) f ⊕E ( f ⊕F g) = f ⊕E∪F g;
(4) ( f ⊕E g)⊕EC g = g.
The following concept is a key structural component of Savage’s theory, which
will play an important role in the discussions that follows.
Definition 5.3 (Constant acts). For any a ∈ X, an act is said to be constant
with respect to consequence a, in symbols ca, if
ca(s) = a for all s ∈ S. (5.2)
In other words, act ca “constantly” outputs consequence a no matter which
state s ∈ S transpires. Now, given a preference ordering ≿ on A, an ordering ≿∗
3Some writers use ‘( f , E, g)’ or ‘ f Eg’ or ‘ f |E + g|EC’ or ‘
[
f on E, g on EC
]
’ for combined acts.
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over consequences can be defined using constant acts by
a ≿∗ b ⇐⇒ ca ≿ cb for all a, b ∈ X. (5.3)
That is to say, consequence a is said to be weakly preferred to consequence b if
the constant act ca is weakly preferred to cb. Call ≿∗ the preference relation on X
induced by ≿. For notational purpose, we often use the same symbol ‘≿’ for both
the preference relation over acts and the induced preference over consequences
and let the context determine on which set of alternatives a given preference ≿ is
defined. With these two preference orderings, we proceed to define a (qualitative)
relation among events.
Definition 5.4. For any events E, F ∈ F , say that E is weakly more probable than
F, written E ⪰ F (or F ⪯ E), if, for any a, b ∈ X with a ≿ b,
ca ⊕E cb ≿ ca ⊕F cb (5.4)
(or equivalently if cb ⊕F ca ≿ cb ⊕E ca). E and F are said to be equally probable, in
symbols E ≃ F, if both E ⪰ F and F ⪰ E hold.
The definition says that the agent’s belief that E is more probable than F is
manifested in her preference for the compound act ca ⊕E cb which, in turn, is
determined by the agent’s subjective estimation of the likelihood of obtaining the
more favorable act ca. (A postulate, i.e., SVG 4, is inserted in order to ensure that
the notion of one event being more probable than another is well defined, that is,
the definition in (5.4) does not depend on the choice of a, b.)
Remark. 1. Savage’s “simple ordering” is, in our terminology, a total pre-
order. He uses ‘F’ for the set of consequences and he characterizes total pre-
orders as “simple orderings”. In particular, he uses boldface letters f, g, . . . for
acts and italics f , g, . . . for values of “acts that are constant”, writing f ≡ g
when f(s) = g for all states s. He also uses ‘ f ’ for constant act whose value is f .
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Figure 5.1. Constant act ca and other parameters in Savage’s model.
Furthermore, he sometimes switches to italicized notation even when the func-
tion is not constant, as he does in the statement of P4 on p.31, where he writes
fA(s) instead of fA(s), or in Theorem 1 on page 70, where he writes f (s) = fi
instead of f(s) = fi as he should.
2. As seen from the definitions above, the construction of constant acts ca (a ∈ X)
plays a central role in associating various concepts in Savage’s decision model,
and it is through the notion of constant acts that different binary relations are
interrelated (see Figure 5.1). This notion, however, is highly problematic. We
shall address these issues brought by the assumption of the existence of con-
stant acts (one for each consequence) in great detail in Chapter IV where we
provide a simplification of Savage’s theory without appealing to constant acts.
The exposition in this chapter however will still use constant acts.
The goal is to show that the defined “more probable” relation ⪰ is a qualitative
probability (will be made precise below) and that there exists a unique numerical
probability measure µ on (S,F ) such that4
E ⪰ F ⇐⇒ µ(E) ≥ µ(F), for all E, F ∈ F , (5.5)
4Savage stated explicitly that in his theory probability is defined for all events which are taken to
be all subsets of S, and hence A = XS (Savage, 1972, p.40). Due to the reasons to be discussed in
Chapter III, in our reconstruction, we restrict attention to “measurable acts.” That is to say, given
measurable spaces (S,F ) and (X,G) where F and G are some σ-algebras equipped on S and X,
respectively, we consider only those functions (acts) that are measurable F/G.
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and that there is a real-valued function u on X for which















for all f , g ∈ A, where u is unique up to a positive transformation. This is Savage’s
the main representation theorem we seek to prove, which will be discussed in Sec-
tion 6 and Section 7. But before proceeding to detailed reconstruction, let us first
analyze Savage’s well-known “sure-thing” principle and its formal configurations.
5.2. The sure-thing principle and postulate 2. The cornerstone of Savage’s
decision model is a postulated rationality principle known as the “sure-thing prin-
ciple”. The following is the example used by Savage to motivate this principle.
Example 5.5 (Businessman). A businessman contemplates buying a certain
piece of property. He considers the outcome of the next presidential election
relevant to the attractiveness the purchase. So, to clarify the matter for himself,
he asks whether he would buy if he knew that the Republican candidate were
going to win, and decides that he would do so. Similarly, he considers whether
he would buy if he knew that the Democratic candidate were going to win, and
again finds that he would do so. Seeing that the would buy in either event, he
decides that the should buy, even though he does not know which event obtains,
or will obtain, as we would ordinarily say. 
As illustrated in this example, the principle stems from an intuitive idea of
reasoning by cases that if a decision maker takes certain course of action given
the occurrence of some event and she will do the same if the event does not occur,
then she shall proceed with that action without taking into account as to whether
or not the event takes place, in other words, the implementation of the course of
action is a “sure-thing”. To state in terms of preferences over acts, the sure-thing
principle says that
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STP: If the decision maker prefers one act over another assuming either
certain event obtains or that the compliment of the event obtains, then
her preference over the two acts shall remain unchanged.
The principle is sometimes referred to as the dominance principle, which can be
stated more generally as follows: if the state space is partitioned into n-many mu-
tually exclusive cells, which represent n different decision situations, and if the
consequence of one act weakly dominates that of another in each one of these
possible situations, then the act is weakly preferred throughout. Savage takes this
consideration to be fundamental to rational decision making: “I,” he says, “know
of no other extra-logical principle governing decisions that finds such ready ac-
ceptance” (ibid. p.21).
5.2.1. Conditional preference. Note that the statement of the sure-thing princi-
ple above employs explicitly a concept of conditional preference, that is, one act
being preferred to another given the occurrence of certain event. Since the current
formal setup is based entirely on unconditional preferences over acts, the notion of
conditional preference is not directly expressible. Some alternative arrangements
hence need to be made.
Definition 5.6 (Conditional preference). Let E be some event, then, given acts
f , g ∈ A, f is said to be weakly preferred to g given E, written f ≿E g, if for all
pairs of acts f ′, g′ ∈ A the following condition is satisfied
f (s) = f ′(s), g(s) = g′(s) if s ∈ E
f ′(s) = g′(s) if s ∈ EC
 =⇒ f ′ ≿ g′. (5.7)
That is to say, the conditional preference of f over g on the occurrence of event
E is defined in terms of all unconditional preferences of f ′ over g′ through the
conditions that f ′ and g′ agree, respectively, with f and g on event E and with
each other on EC, and that f ′ unconditionally weakly preferred to g′. Table 5.2a
contains an illustration of conditional preference, where {E, EC} forms a simple
partition of S for which f (s) = a for all s ∈ E and f (s) = c for s ∈ EC (other
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acts defined similarly). Then the definition of conditional preference says that f
is weakly preferred to g given E if f ′ ≿ g′ for all such f ′s and g′s. Now, given the
definition of conditional preference, STP can be translated into5
[
f ≿E g, f ≿EC g
]
=⇒ f ≿ g. (STP)
Savage, however, was unwilling to incorporate (STP) directly into his system for
the concern that the concept of conditional preference is based on knowledge of
the possible occurrences of some events, the introduction of which may lead to,
it is said, unsought philosophical complications.6 Instead, he posited a different
principle which is a technical approximation to STP known as the formal version of
the sure-thing principle, and he left STP itself as an informal or, to use his phrase,
a “loose” version of the sure-thing principle. This alternative principle contains
no direct reference to conditional preferences and is officially stated as his second
postulate (P2) for rational decision making, which says that, for any acts f , g, h, h′
and for any event E,
f ⊕E h ≿ g ⊕E h ⇐⇒ f ⊕E h′ ≿ g ⊕E h′, (P2)
5In what follows, we use the boldface STP to refer to the informal statement of the principle and
use (STP) to refer to its formulation in the formal model, same for P2 and (P2) below.
6 Savage (1972, p.22) explains: “The sure-thing principle [i.e., STP above] cannot appropriately be
accepted as a postulate in the sense that P1 is, because it would introduce new undefined technical
terms referring to knowledge and possibility that would refer it mathematically useless without
still more postulates governing these terms.” See Gaifman (2013, p.375) for a critique of this line
of argument, where it is pointed out that Savage is guilty of confusing hypothetical reasoning with
counterfactual knowledge: it is the former, not the latter, that is involved in formulating the sure-
thing principle, which is conceptually transparent and non-problematic.
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As the example in Table 5.2b illustrates, if f ′ and g′ agree, respectively, with f and
g on E and with each other on EC, then (P2) mandates f ≿ g iff f ′ ≿ g′. Here we
remark that one technical motivation for imposing (P2) is to provide a provision to
the definition of conditional preference in Definition 5.6 so that the notion is well
defined. (Notice that, in the absence of (P2), an act f may fail to be conditionally
preferred to another act g (i.e. f ̸≿E g) if there exist two pairs of acts ( f ′, g′) and
( f ′′, g′′) satisfying both conditions (1) and (2) for which f ′ ≿ g′ and f ′′ ̸≿ g′′. This
possibility for f to fail to be conditionally preferred to g is excluded by (P2), under
which f ̸≿E g if and only if, for all f ′ and g′ satisfying (1) and (2), f ′ ̸≿ g′.) Beyond
this technical reason for invoking (P2) as an additional constraint on the notion
of conditional preferences, the rationale behind (P2) as a self-standing rationality
principle may be characterized as follows
P2: If the consequences of two acts differ on the occurrence of some event
E but otherwise agree with each other, then their preferential comparison
between these two acts shall be decided on those states in E and their
corresponding consequences.
What underlies this principle seems to be the simple consideration that the differ-
ence between any two items is distinguished by the parts where they are actually
different. Then P2 implies that if two sets of decision problems have identical
payoff structures on E but otherwise have respectively in-differentiable payoffs on
EC then if an option is preferred in the first set of decision problem it should also
be favored in the second. Yet, we stress that, even with the presence of this com-
pelling intuition, P2 is after all a different and, in fact, more restrictive principle
than STP. We illustrate this point by showing that (P2) is strictly stronger than
(STP) in the current formal model.7
Lemma 5.7. Let ≿ be a preorder on A, then (P2) implies (STP).
7Gaifman (2013, p.376) outlined a general method of distinguishing STP from P2 in a partial-act
based system, where a partial-act is a (partial) function defined on some event and maybe undefined
on other events. And it was shown that the counterpart of P2 in a partial-act system is independent
of that of STP. Here, we point out that, as far as Savage’s total-act system is concerned, (P2) does
imply (STP), but not vice versa.
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Proof. Assuming (P2), it is easily seen that the definition of conditional pref-
erence can be equivalently stated as follows
f ≿E g ⇐⇒ f ⊕E h ≿ g ⊕E h, for all h ∈ A. (5.8)
Then the left-hand side of (STP) yields, via (5.8), that
f ⊕E h ≿ g ⊕E h (5.9)
f ⊕EC h′ ≿ g ⊕EC h′. (5.10)
where h and h′ are arbitrary acts in A. Now, in (5.9), substitute h with h⊕E f , then,
by (P2), we get f = f ⊕E (h ⊕E f ) ≿ g ⊕E (h ⊕E f ) = g ⊕E f . Similarly, in (5.10),
replace h′ with g ⊕E h′, then f ⊕EC g = f ⊕EC (g ⊕E h′) ≿ g ⊕EC (g ⊕E h′) = g.
Together we have that f ≿ g ⊕E f and f ⊕EC g ≿ g. Note that, by Lemma 5.2(1),
g ⊕E f = f ⊕EC g, therefore, by transitivity of ≿, we have f ≿ g. □
The converse, however, does not necessarily hold, that is, there are situations
in which (STP) is satisfied but (P2) is violated as shown in the following example.
Example 5.8. Let S = {s1, s2}, X = {a, b}. Then there are four possible acts






Consider the case where f1 ≿ f2 ∼ f3 ≺ f4. Then it is easy to see that P2 is violated
but (STP) is trivially satisfied. (This is because our example is so arranged that,
for any acts f , g ∈ { f1, f2, f3, f4}, (1) if f is different from g then, at least one of the
conditional preferences f ≿s1 g and f ≿s2 g fails,9 in which case the antecedent of
8Strictly speaking, the state space S in Savage system needs to contain uncountably many states (cf.
Footnote 2). In writing S = {s1, s2} we can assume that S is partitioned into two events s1 and s2.
9We write f ≿{s1} g as f ≿s1 g for short, same below.
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(STP) is false, and hence the conditional true; (2) if f is identical to g then (STP) is
trivially true). 
Lemma 5.7 shows that Savage’s proposed (P2) is deductively sufficient for
enforcing (STP), however, as shown in Example 5.8, it is more demanding than
what (STP) is intended for. Let us summarize the above discussion in the following
theorem.
Theorem 5.9. Let ≿ be a complete preorder on A, then
(1) (P2) =⇒ (STP),
(2) (STP) ≠⇒ (P2).
To be sure, the reason that (P2) and (STP) are not deductively equivalent in
Savage’s system is largely due to the peculiar way how conditional preferences
are formulated in his model, where the concept of conditional preference and (P2)
are essentially interlocked. Gaifman (2013) suggested a way of defining condi-
tional preference in a more straight forward manner so that STP can be formu-
lated directly without going through Savage’s roundabout way of using mutually
dependent notions of conditional preference and (P2). Our discussions and gen-
eralizations in later sections will still be made within Savage’s framework with
total-acts, we, however, emphasize on a clear distinction between STP and P2,
and their formalizations.
5.2.2. Null events. Further, an event E ⊆ S is said to be a null event if, for
any f , g ∈ A, f ≿E g, that is, the agent is indifferent between any two acts given
the occurrence of E. Intuitively, null events are those events whose occurrences
take no effect in the agent’s decision procedure as the individual believes that it
is impossible that they obtain. As we shall soon see, in the current system null
events corresponds to those events that receive probability zero. The following is
a list of basic properties of null events.
Lemma 5.10. Let E be a null event, then given P2,
(1) E ≃ ∅;
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(2) if f (s) = f ′(s) and g(s) = g′(s) for all s ∈ EC, then f ≿ g iff f ′ ≿ g′;
(3) if f (s) = g(s) for all s ∈ EC, then f ∼ g.
Proof. (1) Let a, b ∈ X be such that a ≿ b. Since E is null, we have ca ≿E cb.
This implies, by (P2) and (5.8), that
ca ⊕E cb ≿ cb ⊕E cb = cb = cb ⊕∅ cb.
By Definition 5.4, E ⪰ ∅. Similarly, from E being null we get cb ≿E ca, thence
ca ⊕∅ cb = cb ⊕E cb ≿ ca ⊕E cb.
By definition, ∅ ⪰ E. Together, we have E ≃ ∅.
(2) By symmetry, we show f ≿ g implies f ′ ≿ g′. Note that, since E is null, we
have f ′ ≿E g′. Then by (STP), we only need to show that f ′ ≿EC g′. By the
definition of conditional preference and (P2), it’s sufficient to show that, there
exists some h ∈ A such that
f ′ ⊕EC h ≿ g′ ⊕EC h. (5.11)
Since f ′ and g′ agree respectively with f and g on EC, (5.11) holds iff
f ⊕EC h ≿ g ⊕EC h.
Take h to be f , then the proof is completed if it can be shown that
f ≿ f ⊕E g. (5.12)
To this end, note that since E is null, we have g ≿E f ⊕E g, it follows, through
(5.8), that, for any t ∈ A, g ⊕E t ≿ ( f ⊕E g)⊕E t. Let t = g, then this together
with the assumption f ≿ g yield (5.12), which is what we want.
(3) This is an easy consequence of (2). □
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Lemma 5.10(2) says that given any pairs of acts, if they differ pair-wisely only
on events that are considered null then their relative preferences will remain the
same (cf. the table below).




f ′ c e
g′ d f
As we shall see, this property plays an important role in deriving a utility
function for consequences.
6. Subjective Probability
6.1. Qualitative probability. As the first step of our reconstruction of Sav-
age’s expected utility representation theory, we introduce the following concept
of qualitative probability:
Definition 6.1 (Qualitative probability). Let S be a nonempty set, a binary
relation ≽ on S is said to be a qualitative probability if, for any A, B, C ∈ F ,
i. ≽ is a weak order (reflexive, transitive, and complete),
ii. A ≽ ∅,
iii. S ≻ ∅,
iv. A ≽ B if and only if A ∪ C ≽ B ∪ C, provided A ∩ C = B ∩ C = ∅.
where ≻ is the strict (i.e., the asymmetric) part of ≽.
We show that if the preference relation ≿ over acts satisfies the following list
of axioms postulated by Savage then the binary relation ⪰ over events (sets of
states) defined in (5.4) is a qualitative probability.10
SVG 1. ≿ is a weak order (complete preorder).
10SVG 1-5 correspond respectively to P1-5 in Savage (1972), the only difference is that we present
these postulates using the notations adopted here, same for SVG 6 and SVG 7 below.
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SVG 2. For any f , g ∈ A and for any E ⊆ S, f ≿E g or g ≿E f .
SVG 3. For any a, b ∈ X and for any non-null event E ⊆ S, ca ≿E cb if and only
if a ≿ b.
SVG 4. For any a, b, c, d ∈ X satisfying a ≿ b and c ≿ d and for any events
E, F ⊆ S, ca ⊕E cb ≿ ca ⊕F cb if and only if cc ⊕E cd ≿ cc ⊕F cd.
SVG 5. For some constant acts ca, cb ∈ A, cb ≻ ca.
Here, SVG 1 says that the preference relation is reflexive, transitive, and com-
plete, in other words, it is assumed in Savage’s system that all acts are pairwise
comparable. SVG 2 can be easily derived from the completeness assumption and
(P2), which says that the conditional preference relation over acts is definable for
any given event and is complete. The next two postulates are commonly known
as the “independence axioms” which place further assumptions that the agent’s
probabilistic estimations over events and value judgments on consequences are,
generally speaking, mutually independent: SVG 3 says that the preference ranking
of constant acts is solely dependent on the values of their respective consequences
which are robust against all states and SVG 4 says that the agent’s qualitative prob-
ability estimations are in independent of his value judgments over consequences
(and that the relation “more probable” in Definition 5.4 is well defined). SVG 5 is
brought in in order to rule out the trivial case where the agent is indifferent among
all consequences (constant acts). With these postulates in hand, let’s proceed to
show the following preparatory results.
Lemma 6.2. For any consequences a, b ∈ X and for any event E ∈ F , if a ≿ b
then ca ≿ ca ⊕E cb ≿ cb.
Proof. Given a ≿ b, we have that ca ≿ cb by (5.3). Let E be any non-null event,
then, by SVG 3, ca ≿E cb (this holds trivially if E is a null event); from which we
get, through (5.8), that for any h ∈ A,
ca ⊕E h ≿ cb ⊕E h. (6.1)
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Let h = cb, that is ca ⊕E cb ≿ cb ⊕E cb = cb. This shows that ca ⊕E cb ≿ cb. Sim-
ilarly, one can show ca ≿ cb ⊕EC ca by replacing h and E in (6.1) with ca and EC,
respectively. Then, by Lemma 5.2(1), ca ≿ ca ⊕E cb. □
Lemma 6.3. For any E, F ⊆ S, if F ⊆ E then E ⪰ F.
Proof. For any a, b ∈ X, assume that a ≿ b, and hence ca ≿ cb, then by
Lemma 6.2, ca ≿ ca ⊕F cb. By SVG 2, for ca and ca ⊕F cb, at least one of the
following two conditions holds,
(i) ca ⊕F cb ≿E ca;
(ii) ca ≿E ca ⊕F cb.
Suppose that (i) is the case, then, by (5.8), for any h ∈ A, (ca ⊕F cb)⊕E h ≿ ca ⊕E
h. Let h = ca, we have ca ⊕EC∪F cb ≿ ca. On the other hand, given set EC ∪ F,
Lemma 6.2 implies that ca ≿ cb ⊕EC∪F cb. Together, we have
ca ⊕EC∪F cb ∼ ca. (6.2)
Note that (6.2) holds for all a, b ∈ X and all E, F ⊆ S with F ⊆ E. Then let E = S
and F = ∅, from which we get ca ∼ cb for all a, b ∈ A. But this is impossible if
SVG 5 is in place.
The remaining possibility is (ii). In this case it follows, again by (5.8), that, for
any h ∈ A, ca ⊕E h ≿ (ca ⊕F cb)⊕E h. Let h = cb, we get ca ⊕E cb ≿ (ca ⊕F cb)⊕E cb.
Apply Lemma 5.2(2),
ca ⊕E cb ≿ (ca ⊕F cb)⊕E cb = ca ⊕F∩E cb = ca ⊕F cb.
This yields that ca ⊕E cb ≿ ca ⊕F cb, hence, by Definition 5.4, E ⪰ F. □
Theorem 6.4. If the preference relation ≿ on A satisfies SVG 1-5 then the
relation ⪰ over events is a qualitative probability.
Proof. We prove by direct verifications that ⪰ as defined in Definition 5.4
satisfies conditions i-iv in Definition 6.1.
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i. Suppose that E ⪰ E′ ⪰ E′′, we show E ⪰ E′′. By definition, for any
a, b ∈ Z with a ≿ b, we have that ca ⊕E cb ≿ ca ⊕E′ cb ≿ ca ⊕E′′ cb; then, by
the transitivity of ≿ (SVG 1), we get ca ⊕E cb ≿ ca ⊕E′′ cb, this yields that
E ⪰ E′′. Hence, ⪰ is transitive. Completeness can be shown similarly.
ii. In Lemma 6.3 let F = ∅, we get E ⪰ ∅ for all E ⊆ S.
iii. Let a, b ∈ X be such that ca ≻ cb (i.e., ca ≿ cb but cb ̸≿ ca, the existence of
the pair is guaranteed by SVG 5). Suppose, to the contrary, that ∅ ⪰ S.
Then, by (5.4), ca ⊕∅ cb ≿ ca ⊕S cb. On the other hand, note that ca ⊕∅ cb =
cb and ca ⊕S cb = ca, hence we have cb ≿ ca, a contradiction. Therefore,
S ≻ ∅.
iv. Suppose E ⪰ E′ and let F be such that E ∩ F = E′ ∩ F = ∅, we show
E ∪ F ⪰ E′ ∪ F. By definition, for any a, b ∈ X with a ≿ b, we have that
ca ⊕E cb ≿ ca ⊕E′ cb. Further, by SVG 2, one of the following is true,
(a) ca ⊕E′ cb ≿FC ca ⊕E cb;
(b) ca ⊕E cb ≿FC ca ⊕E′ cb.









Since E ∩ F = E′ ∩ F = ∅, let h = cb, we get, via Lemma 5.2(2),
ca ⊕E′ cb = ca ⊕E′∩FC cb ≿ ca ⊕E∩FC cb = ca ⊕E cb
By definition, we have E′ ⪰ E. This, together with the assumption E ⪰ E′,
imply that for any E, E′ ⊆ S, E ⪰ E′ iff E′ ⪰ E, which contradicts (iii).
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This yields, via Lemma 5.2(3), that ca ⊕E∪F cb ≿ ca ⊕E′∪F cb, and hence, by
Definition 5.4, E ∪ F ⪰ E′ ∪ F. □
This completes the proof that the “more probable” relation ⪰ among events
is indeed a qualitative probability. Before moving to show that there exists a
unique probability measure that agrees with ⪰, let us explore some properties of
qualitative probabilities which will become handy later.
Corollary 6.5. Let ⪰ be as in Definition 5.4, then for any E, E′, F, F′ ⊆ S the
following hold:
(1) if F ⪰ E and F ∩ F′ = ∅, then F ∪ F′ ⪰ E ∪ F′;
(2) if ∅ ⪰ E, then E ∪ F′ ≃ F′;
(3) if E is a null event, then E ∪ F ≃ F;
(4) if F ⪰ E, F′ ⪰ E′ and F ∩ F′ = ∅, then F ∪ F′ ⪰ E ∪ E′;
(5) if F ∪ F′ ⪰ E ∪ E′ and E ∩ E′ = ∅, then either F ⪰ E or F′ ⪰ E′;
(6) if EC ⪰ E and F ⪰ FC, then F ⪰ E.
Proof. By Theorem 6.4, ⪰ is a qualitative probability, and hence satisfies con-
ditions (a)–(d) in Definition 6.1.
(1) Let E1 = E − F′, then E ∪ F′ = E1 ∪ F′. From E1 ⊆ E and the assumption
F ⪰ E it follows from Lemma 6.3 that F ⪰ E ⪰ E1, hence F ∪ F′ ⪰ E1 ∪ F′,
that is, F ∪ F′ ⪰ E ∪ F′.
(2) In (1) let F = ∅, then F′ ⪰ E ∪ F′. On the other hand E ∪ F′ ⪰ F′ via
Lemma 6.3. Hence E ∪ F′ ≃ F′.
(3) This is a direct consequence of (2) and Lemma 5.10(1).
(4) Let F = A ∪ Q, E′ = B ∪ Q where A = F − E′, B = E′ − F and Q = F ∩ E′,
hence F ∪ B = E′ ∪ A = A ∪ B ∪ Q. Since B ∩ F = ∅, it follows from the
assumption F ⪰ E and (1) that E′ ∪ A = F ∪ B ⪰ E ∪ B. On the other
hand, A ⊆ F and F ∩ F′ = ∅ hence A ∩ F′ = ∅, then from F′ ⪰ E′ it
follows that F′ ∪ A ⪰ E′ ∪ A via (1). Together we have F′ ∪ A ⪰ E ∪ B.
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Finally, since Q ∩ (F′ ∪ A) = ∅ we have, again by (1),
F ∪ F′ = F′ ∪ A ∪ Q ⪰ E ∪ B ∪ Q = E ∪ E′.
(5) Otherwise, E ≻ F and E′ ≻ F′ which imply E ⪰ F and E′ ⪰ F′, then by
(4), E∪ E′ ⪰ F∪ F′. It follows that F∪ F′ ≃ E∪ E′ for all subsets E, E′, F, F′
of S with E ∩ E′ = ∅, which is absurd.
(6) Let {A, B, C, D} be a partition of S such that F = A ∪ B, FC = C ∪ D, E =
A ∪ C, and EC = B ∪ D. By assumption EC = B ∪ D ⪰ C ∪ A = E, this
implies, through (5), that either B ⪰ C or D ⪰ A:
i. If B ⪰ C, it follows from the fact that A, B are disjoint that B ∪ A ⪰
C ∪ A via (1), and hence F ⪰ E.
ii. If D ⪰ A, also F = A ∪ B ⪰ C ∪ D = FC, then by (4) above, A ∪ B ∪
D ⪰ A ∪ C ∪ D. It follows that B ⪰ C via (1), hence back to case (i).
Therefore, F ⪰ E. □
It is easy to verify that Corollary 6.5 (1) and (4)-(6) continue to hold with ‘≻’ in
place of ‘⪰.’ The following observations are easy consequences of Corollary 6.5
which will be useful in the proof of the existence of numerical probability repre-
sentation below.
Corollary 6.6. Let {Ei}ni=1 and {Fj}nj=1 be partitions of S,
(1) if {Ei}ni=1 and {Fj}nj=1 are so indexed that E1 ⪯ · · · ⪯ En and F1 ⪰ · · · ⪰







(2) if in addition Ei ≃ Ej and Fi ≃ Fj for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, i.e., if {Ei}ni=1 and
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Proof. (1) We prove by induction on r. Note that for the case r = 1, it must
be that F1 ⪰ E1. For, otherwise E1 ≻ F1 ⪰ · · · ⪰ Fn. It follows that Ei ≻ Fi
for all i = 1, . . . , n, and hence
∪n
i=1 Ei = S ≻
∪n
i=1 Fj = S (this is obtained by
repeatedly applying the “≻-version” of Corollary 6.5(4) since Ei’s are mutually
disjoint), a contradiction.
In the inductive step, assume that (6.3) holds for r, we show that it holds
for the case r + 1. Suppose, to the contrary, that
∪r
i=1 Ei ∪ Er+1 ≻
∪r
i=1 Fj ∪ Fr+1.




i=1 Ei, hence by Corollary 6.5(5)





i=1 Fj imply that
∪n
i=1 Ei = S ≻
∪n
i=1 Fj = S via
Corollary 6.5(4) , which is impossible.
(2) This is a direct consequence of (1) above. □
Remark 6.7. Kraft et al. (1959) showed, through a counter example, that, con-
trary to what de Finetti (1951) had conjectured, the four conditions in Defini-
tion 6.1 are insufficient to bring about a numerical representation of ⪰ in the
sense of (5.5) even when |S| is finite. They then showed the extra condition that is
needed in order that the probable relation be represented by a numerical probabil-
ity in finite cases (see also Scott, 1964). We shall not pursue this direction here. In
what follows, we study Savage’s approach to the problem, which is more general,
for it also treats infinite cases.
6.2. Quantitative probability. In this section we show that the qualitative
probability relation derived from SVG 1-5 in Theorem 6.4 admits a unique nu-
merical representation provided that an additional postulate is inserted. That is,
we show that there is a unique probability measure µ on (S,F ) such that
E ⪰ F ⇐⇒ µ(E) ≥ µ(F), for all E, F ∈ F , (6.5)
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In this case, we say that the probability measure µ agrees with the qualitative
probability ⪰, and say that µ almost agrees with ⪰ if only the ‘⇒’ direction of (6.5)
holds. The representation rests on the following postulate.
SVG 6. For any f , g ∈ A and for any a ∈ X, if f ≻ g then there is a finite
partition {Pi}ni=1 such that, for all i, ca ⊕Pi f ≻ g and f ≻ ca ⊕Pi g.
The postulate says that if f is strictly preferred to g, then there exists a partition
such that the preferential relation remains the same if f (g) is revised on a cell of
the partition with a constant ca. This postulate is a version of continuity axiom
which is structurally similar to vNM 3 and A-A 3. It amounts to saying that the
state space can be arbitrarily divided so that the revision of an act with respect
to a constant-act on any member of the revision is considered as preferentially
insignificant. As we shall soon see, SVG 6 imposes sufficient structural constraint
on the system that facilities a numerical representation.
6.2.1. Fineness and tightness. As a show of the strength of SVG 6, let us first
make the following observations.
Lemma 6.8. Let ⪰ be a qualitative probability satisfying SVG 6, and E, F be
any events. Suppose that F ≻ E, then there exists a partition {Pi}ni=1(n ≤ ∞) of S
such that F ≻ E ∪ Pi, for all i = 1, . . . , n.
Proof. By Definition 5.4, F ≻ E implies that, for any a, b ∈ X with a ≻ b,
ca ⊕F cb ≻ ca ⊕E cb. Now, in SVG 6 let ca ⊕F cb be in the place of f and let ca ⊕E cb
be in that of g, then there exists a finite partition {Pi}ni=1 such that, for all i,





By Lemma 5.2(3), it follows that
ca ⊕F cb ≻ ca ⊕E∪Pi cb.
Hence, by definition, F ≻ E ∪ Pi. □
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Lemma 6.9. Given any two events E and F, if, for any non-null events G, H
satisfying E ∩ G = F ∩ H = ∅, E ∪ G ⪰ F and F ∪ H ⪰ E, then E ≃ F.
Proof. Suppose, to the contrary, that there exist E, F such that E ≻ F for all
non-null G, H satisfying E ∩ G = F ∩ H = ∅, E ∪ G ⪰ F and F ∪ H ⪰ E. Then by
Lemma 6.8 there exists a partition {Pi}ni=1(n ≤ ∞) of S such that E ≻ F ∪ Pi for
all i = 1, . . . , n. For each Pi, if F ∩ Pi ̸= ∅ then split it into two cells F − Pi and
Pi − F, then we can refine partition {Pi}ni=1 with a new partition {P′j}mj=1 such that,
for each new cell P′j one of the following conditions holds
F ∩ P′j = ∅ or P′j ⊆ F. (6.6)
Since each P′j is a subset of some Pi, by Lemma 6.3, E ≻ F ∪ Pi implies that
E ≻ F ∪ P′j for all j = 1, . . . , m.
Note that if F ∩ P′j = ∅ then P′j must be null, for otherwise, by hypothesis, we
have that F ∪ P′j ≿ E, a contradiction. By (6.6), it follows that the only non-null
cells of {P′j}mj=1 are the ones contained in F, then, by Lemma 6.5(3), we have




which is impossible. Hence E ̸≻ F. Similarly, it can be shown that F ̸≻ E. □
Note that, in Lemma 6.8, let E = ∅, then we have that, for any F ≻ ∅, there is
a partition of S such that no element of which is as probable as F. In this case, we
say that the qualitative probability ⪰ is fine. The property presented in Lemma 6.9
is often referred to as the tightness condition of ⪰. The above shows that both
fineness and tightness are guaranteed if SVG 6 is in place.
6.2.2. Savage’s triples. Next we show some further consequences of SVG 6.
These properties reveal some fine structures the qualitative probability ⪰ under
SVG 1-6.
Lemma 6.10. Let E, F, G, H, K be events, the following properties hold:
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(1) if E ≻ ∅ then E can be partitioned into G, H such that G, H ≻ ∅;
(2) if E, K, F are pairwise disjoint with E ∪ K ≻ F ⪰ E, then K can be parti-
tioned into G, H such that E ∪ H ≻ F ∪ G;
(3) if E, F are such that E, F ≻ ∅ and E ∩ F = ∅ then F can be partitioned
into G, H for which E ∪ G ⪰ H ⪰ G.
Proof. (1) By SVG 6, there exists some partition {Pi} such that E ≻ Pi, and
hence, by Lemma 6.3, E ≻ E ∩ Pi for all i = 1, . . . , n. Suppose that E ∩ Pi ≃ ∅
for all i’s, then by Corollary 6.5(2), E ≃ ∅, a contradiction. Suppose that
there is only one Pi such that E ∩ Pi ̸≃ ∅, then we have E ≃ E ∩ Pi, again, a
contradiction. Hence there are at least two cells Pi, Pj such that E ∩ Pi ̸≃ ∅,
E ∩ Pj ̸≃ ∅, in which case let G = E ∩ Pi and H = E − G.
(2) If E ⪰ F, by (1), F can be partitioned into G, H ≻ ∅ with H ⪰ G, in which case
the claim follows trivially. Otherwise, F ≻ E ≻ ∅, then by SVG 6, there exists a
n-partition {Pi} such that E ≻ Pi and hence E ≻ Pi ∩ F for i = 1, . . . , n. Rename
Pi ∩ F’s as Qi’s and let latter be arranged such that Q1 ⪯ Q2 ⪯ · · · ⪯ Qn. Next,










The existence of such an m is guaranteed by the assumption on {Qi} and
the fact that ⪰ is a qualitative probability. Then let G = ∪mi=1 Qi and H =∪n
i=m+1 Qi. Then (6.7) yields G ⪯ H ⪯ G ∪ Qm+1. Since E ∩ F = ∅ and
E ≻ Qm+1 we get E ∪ G ⪰ Qm+1 ∪ G ⪰ H.
(3) From the assumption E ∪ K ≻ F ⪰ E it is easy to see, via Corollary 6.5(2), that
K ≻ ∅. By SVG 6, there exists a n-partition {Pi} such that E∪K ≻ Pi ∪ F for all
i’s and that there must be one cell, say Pi, of the partition such that K ∩ Pi ≻ ∅,
then we have E ∪ K ≻ (K ∩ Pi) ∪ F. Next, by (1), K ∩ Pi can be partitioned into
G, G′ with G′ ⪰ G, then we have
E ∪
[
(K − G) ∪ G
]
= E ∪ K ≻ (K ∩ Pi) ∪ F = G′ ∪ G ∪ F.
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This yields E ∪ (K − G) ≻ G′ ∪ F ⪰ G ∪ F (because G′ ⪰ G). Let H = K − G,
then we get what we want. □
The existence of a numerical probability over events depends on the following
construction, which is sometimes referred to as Savage triples.
Lemma 6.11. There exists a sequence of 3-fold partitions {Cn, Gn, Dn}∞n=1 of
the state space S satisfying
(1) Cn ∪ Gn ∪ Dn = S;
(2) Cn ∪ Gn ⪰ Dn and Dn ∪ Gn ⪰ Cn;
(3) Cn ⊆ Cn+1, Dn ⊆ Dn+1, and Gn ⊇ Gn+1;
(4) Gn − Gn+1 ⪰ Gn+1.
Proof. By Lemma 6.10(1), S can be partitioned into E, F ≻ ∅. Assume,
WLOG, that F ⪰ E (otherwise, relabel the two events), then, by Lemma 6.10(3),
F can be further partitioned into H, G such that E ∪ G ⪰ H ⪰ G. Let C1 = E,
G1 = G, and D1 = H. Then we have, for the case n = 1,
C1 ∪ G1 ∪ D1 = E ∪ (G ∪ H) = E ∪ F = S,
C1 ∪ G1 = E ∪ G ⪰ H = D1
D1 ∪ G1 = (G ∪ H) = F ⪰ E = C1.
(6.8)
Next, consider the following cases
a. If G1 ≃ ∅ we have, via Corollary 6.5(2), C1 ≃ D1 then it is plain that the claim
is proved if we let Cn = C1 and Dn = D1 for all n’s.
b. If G1 ≻ ∅, we consider two subcases:
i. If C1 ∪G1 ⪯ D1, then we have, via (6.8), that C1 ∪G1 ≃ D1. Apply Lemma 6.10(3)
to C1 and G1, we have that G1 can be partitioned into H, G such that




C2 ∪ G2 ∪ D2 = (C1 ∪ H) ∪ G ∪ D1 = C1 ∪ G1 ∪ D1 = S
C2 ⊇ C2, G2 ⊆ G1, D2 ⊇ D1,
C2 ∪ G2 = (C1 ∪ H) ∪ G = C1 ∪ G1 ≃ D1 = D2,
D2 ∪ G2 = D1 ∪ G ≃ C1 ∪ G1 ⪰ C1 ∪ H = C2,
G1 − G2 = H ⪰ G = G2.
(6.9)
ii. Now suppose C1 ∪ G1 ≻ D1, also, from (6.8), we have D1 ∪ G1 ⪰ C1. For
the latter, if D1 ∪ G1 ≃ C1 then we are back to the previous case, otherwise
we have C1 ∪ G1 ≻ D1 and D1 ∪ G1 ≻ C1. WLOG, assume that C1 ⪰ D1,
apply Lemma 6.10(2), we have that G1 can be partitioned into H′, G′ such
that D1 ∪ H′ ⪰ C1 ∪ G′. Further, by Lemma 6.10(3), H′ can be partitioned
into H, G such that G′ ∪ H ⪰ G ⪰ H. In this case, let C2 = C1 ∪ G′, G2 = G,
and D2 = D1 ∪ H, then we have
C2 ∪ G2 ∪ D2 = (C1 ∪ G′) ∪ G ∪ (D1 ∪ H) = S
C2 ⊇ C2, G2 ⊆ G1, D2 ⊇ D1,
C2 ∪ G2 = C1 ∪ G′ ∪ G ⪰ D1 ∪ G ⪰ D1 ∪ H = D2,
D2 ∪ G2 = D1 ∪ H ∪ G = D1 ∪ H′ ⪰ C1 ∪ G′ = C2,
G1 − G2 = G′ ∪ H ⪰ G = G2.
(6.10)
Repeat the above procedure for all n ≥ 2, then we get what we want. □
6.2.3. Partition with equiprobable events. One crucial step towards numerical
probabilities is to show that, under SVG 1-6, the state space can be arbitrarily
partitioned into equally probable events.
Lemma 6.12. Let ⪰ be a qualitative probability satisfying SVG 6, then S can be
partitioned into 2n (n < ∞) many equiprobable events.
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Proof. By Lemma 6.11, there exists a sequence of Savage-triples {Cn, Gn, Dn}.
Then, for any event E ≻ ∅, we have that E ⪰ Gn when n is large. For, otherwise,
Gn ≻ E for all n. In this case let {Pi}mi=1 be an m-fold partition of S such that E ≻ Pi
(i = 1, . . . , m) (the existence of such a partition is guaranteed by Lemma 6.8). We
have Gn ≻ Pi, for each i. Then, from conditions (3) and (4) above,
G1 − G2 ⪰ · · · ⪰ Gn−2 − Gn−1 ⪰ Gn−1 ⪰ Gn−1 − Gn ⪰ Gn ≻ Pi
By the ‘≻-version’ of Corollary 6.5(4), it follows that G1 = (G1 − G2) ∪ · · · ∪
(Gn−1 − Gn) ∪ Gn ≻
∪
i Pi = S, which is impossible. Hence E ⪰ Gn. Then from




Gn for any E ≻ ∅. (6.11)
Now suppose that
∩
n Gn ≻ ∅, then there exists a partition {Pi}mi=1 of S such that∩
n Gn ≻ Pi for all i. Further let some Pj in the partition be such that Pj ≻ ∅ (such
an Pj must exist, otherwise we have S =
∪
i Pi ≃ ∅, which is impossible). But
observe that if in (6.11) we let E = Pj, then it follows that Pj ⪰
∩
n Gn ≻ Pj, a
contradiction. Hence
∩
n Gn ⪯ ∅.
Now take S1 =
∪




n Gn. By Lemma 6.5(2) and the
conclusion that
∩
Gn ⪯ ∅, we have that S1 ≃ S2 via condition (2) above. Hence
{S1, S2} equally partitions S. Apply the above procedure to S1 and S2, and so on.
Therefore, S can be partitioned into 2n equivalent events for any n. □
Theorem 6.13. Let ≿ and ⪰ be defined as above, then if ≿ satisfies SVG 1-6,
there exists a unique (finitely additive) probability measure µ that represents ⪰:
E ⪰ F ⇐⇒ µ(E) ≥ µ(F). (6.12)
Proof. We proceed in following steps.
(1) By Lemma 6.12, for any large n ≤ ∞ in the form of 2m for some m, there exists
a partition {Ei}ni=1 of S such that Ej ≃ Ek for all j, k ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Let µ(·) be a
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i = 1, 2, . . . , n. (6.13)
Now fix an event B, let r be the largest integer such that the union of r-many
Ei’s is not more probable than B, that is,
r+1∪
i=1




Note that, for any fixed B, this integer r depends on n. However, as shown
in Corollary 6.6(2), it is independent of the choice of n-fold partition of S.







sequence. To this end, suppose that F1, . . . , Fm is an m-fold equal partition
of S and t is the largest integer such that
∪t+1
j=1 Fj ≻ B ⪰
∪t
j=1 Fj. Apply
Lemma 6.12 again, we have that each Ei(1 ≤ i ≤ n) and Fj(1 ≤ j ≤ m)
can be further partitioned, respectively, into m and n equally probable events,
i.e., Ei =
∪m
j=1 Eij and Fj =
∪n
i=1 Fij, where Eij and Fji are cells in the refined




















Then, Corollary 6.6 implies that
(r − 1)m ≤ (t + 1)n. (6.15)
Here, by definition, k(B, n) = r and k(B, m) = t, then (6.15) yields∣∣∣∣ k(B, m)m − k(B, n)n
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 1n + 1m < ε,
where ε is an arbitrarily small number. The second inequality is met when m
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(2) We need to verify that µ(·) defined in (6.13) is a (finitely additive) probability
measure, that is, µ satisfies the following conditions: for any E, F,
(a) µ(E) ≥ 0;
(b) if E ∩ F = ∅, then µ(E ∪ F) = µ(E) + µ(F);
(c) µ(S) = 1.
Condition (a) and (c) can be easily verified. To show condition (b), let {Pi}ni=1
be an n-fold equal partitions of S, and let r = k(E, n), t = k(F, n), and u =
k(E ∪ F, n). Since E ∩ F = ∅, by Corollary 6.5(4) and (6.14),
u+1∪
i=1




















This shows u ≤ r + t + 2 (To see the first inequality, note that otherwise we
have E ∪ F ⪰ ∪r+1i=1 Pi ∪ ∪t+1i=1 Pi, then by Corollary 6.5(5), either E ⪰ ∪r+1i=1 Pi or



















Let n → ∞ we obtain that µ(E ∪ F) = µ(E) + µ(F), which is what we want.
(3) Finally, we show that µ defined in (6.16) is unique. Consider otherwise, then
let µ′ be another probability measure on S such that (6.5) holds. It follows,
via (6.14), that k(B,n)n ≤ µ′(B) ≤
k(B,n)+1
n . Now let n → ∞, we get µ′(B) =
limn→∞
k(B,n)
n = µ(B). This shows uniqueness. □
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One feature of the probability measure µ derived in the theorem above is that
µ is atomless. That is, as the following corollary shows, it allows for partitions of
the state space into sets of arbitrarily small probability.11
Corollary 6.14. Given the probability measure µ on S obtained above, for
any B ⊆ S and 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1, there exists C ⊆ B such that µ(C) = ρµ(B).
Proof. The proof is trivial if B is null. Now assume that µ(B) = p > 0. By













for all i = 1, . . . , n
Now, let r be the largest number such that
(r + 1)
n
> ρ ≥ r
n
.































= pρ as n → ∞. Define C = limn→∞ An. Then
we have that µ(C) = ρµ(B). □
Remark 6.15. Intuitively, Corollary 6.14 says that, for any event B receiving
non-zero probability under µ, B can be infinitely and continuously divided. As a
consequence of this feature, the state space S in Savage’s decision model must con-
tain uncountably many states. This, however, sets a limit to application of Savage’s
theory: it cannot be applied to cases with a finite or countable state space.
7. Personal Utility
11See also Savage (1972, p.34) and Fishburn (1970, p.199).
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7.1. Utilities for simple acts. Next, we seek to construct a utility function for
acts. This was approached by Savage in two steps. First, he considers a special set
of simple acts, or gambles in his terminology, which are acts that potentially lead to
only finitely many possible consequences, for which a von Neumann-Morgenstern
utility function (vNMU) over consequences can be derived. The latter together
with the derived subjective probability µ above give rise to a utility measure U0
of simple acts. He then extends this utility for simple acts to general acts which
can lead to potentially infinitely many consequences. The exposition here follows
Savage’s original approach, in Chapter IV we will provide an alternative method
of deriving utilities without appealing to constant-acts.
Let us start with a close examination of relationship between gambles and the
class of lotteries as introduced in §2.3.
Definition 7.1 (Gambles). An act f ∈ XS is said to be simple if there exist
(i) a n-partition {Pi}ni=1 of S, and
(ii) a finite sequence of consequences x1, x2, . . . , xn such that f (s) = xi for all
s ∈ Pi (i = 1, . . . , n).
Denote the set of all simple acts by A0, we also refer to simple acts as gambles. It is
plain that all constant acts cx(x ∈ X) are gambles/simple acts. Using our notation
for compound acts, a gamble f ∈ A0 can be conveniently expressed by




cx3 ⊕P2 (· · · ⊕Pn−1 cxn) · · ·
))
. (7.1)
7.1.1. Lotteries introduced by gambles. Now, given the subjective probability µ
on S derived from Theorem 6.13, each gamble f ∈ A0 defines a simple probability
measure on X, written p f , as follows
p f (xi) =

µ[ f (s) = xi] if xi ∈ f (S),




where µ[ f (s) = xi] = µ
{
s ∈ S | f (s) = xi} and f (S) denotes the range of f (cf.
§2.1). We refer to p f as the lottery on X introduced by gamble f .
Recall that L∗X is the set of simple probability measures defined on (an infinite)
X (see Definition 2.8). Thus each f ∈ A0 corresponds to a simple probability
measure in the extended lottery space L∗X. Observe that two different gambles
may introduce the same lottery. Take, for instance, E, EC be a partition of S for




Then, we have an example where f ̸= g, yet, by (7.2), p f = pg. That is, f and
g induce the same lottery. We show in the following lemma that this is the case
only if f ∼ g. Intuitively, the lemma says that a pair of simple acts are considered
equally preferable if the probabilities of getting each consequence under either one
of the two acts are the same. As we shall soon see, this is a crucial step moving
towards the full expected utility theory.
Lemma 7.2. For any gambles f , g ∈ A0, if p f = pg then f ∼ g.
Proof. We consider only the case where f (S) = g(S). For if f (S) ̸= g(S), that
is, if there is some x0 ∈ X such that, say, x0 ∈ f (S) but x0 /∈ g(S), then, by the
assumption that p f = pg and (7.2), we have µ[ f (s) = x0] = 0. In this case, we can
construct an act f ′ which differs from f only on the null set E0 = {s | f (s) = x0}
(and hence f ′ ∼ f by Lemma 5.10(3)) such that f ′(S) = f (S)− {x0}. Repeat this
process until we reach some f ∗ and g∗ such that f ∗ ∼ f , g∗ ∼ g and f ∗(S) = g∗(S).
Now let D = f (S) = g(S). The lemma is proved by induction on the size
of D. Suppose that |D| = 1, then f , g are constant acts and f = g, and hence
f ∼ g. For the inductive step, assume that claim holds for n − 1, we show that it
also holds when |D| = n. To this end, let x1, x2, . . . , xn be an enumeration of the
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consequences in D, and let {Pi}ni=1 and {Qi}ni=1 be partitions of S such that
f (s) = g(t) = xi for all s ∈ Pi and t ∈ Qi (i = 1, . . . , n). (7.3)
We proceed with the following two possibilities:
(1) If for some j, Pj and Qj are null events. It follows that µ(Pj) = µ(Qj) = 0, and
hence µ[ f (s) = xj] = µ[g(t) = xj] = 0. In this case, let r be such that Pr, Qr are
non-null. Then construct new gambles f ′ and g′ as follows
f ′(s) =

xi if s ∈ Pi and i /∈ {j, r}




xi if s ∈ Qi and i /∈ {j, r}
xr if s ∈ Qj ∪ Qr
.
That is to say, f ′ agrees with f on all cells of the partition {Pi}ni=1 except for
the null cell Pj, in which f (s) = xj but f ′(s) = xr, same for g and g′. By
Lemma 5.10(2), we have that,
f ≿ g ⇐⇒ f ′ ≿ g′.
From the construction of f ′ and g′ it is easily seen that they are gambles with
n − 1 partitions and that f ′(S) = g′(S) = D − {xj}. Then by the inductive
hypothesis f ′ ∼ g′, and hence f ∼ g.
(2) The remaining case is that Pi, Qi are not null for all i = 1, . . . , n. We deal with
this case in yet another two steps:
(a) As an illustration, consider the simple situation where n = 2. In this case




f (s) = g(t) = xi for all s ∈ Pi, t ∈ Qi (i = 1, 2) (7.4)
µ(P1) = µ(Q1), µ(P2) = µ(Q2). (7.5)
We want to show that f ∼ g. To this end, let A = P1 ∩Q1, B = P2 ∩Q2, C =
P1 ∩ Q2, D = P2 ∩ Q1, then (7.4) can be represented in Table 7.1. (for
instance, f (s) = x1 if s ∈ A or s ∈ C). Next construct f ′ and g′ which
agree, respectively, with f and g on C and D and with each other on A
and B. Then by the sure-thing principle (P2) f ≿ g iff f ′ ≿ g′. It is hence
sufficient to show that f ′ ∼ g′.
A B C D
f x1 x2 x1 x2
g x1 x2 x2 x1
f ′ x2 x2 x1 x2







Note that (7.5) implies µ(C) = µ(D), then, by Theorem 6.13, it must be
C ≃ D (7.6)
One the other hand, f ′ and g′ can be written as
f ′ = cx1 ⊕C cx2 , (7.7)
g′ = cx1 ⊕D cx2 . (7.8)
By Definition 5.4, (7.6)-(7.8) imply that f ′ ∼ g′.
(b) In general, let {Pi}ni=1 and {Qi}ni=1 be the partitions of S with respect to f
and g satisfying (7.3). Let B = Pn ∩ Qn, C = Qn − Pn and D = Pn − Qn.
By assumption, µ(Qn) = µ(Pn). This implies that µ(C) = µ(D). We
consider only the nontrivial case where µ(C) = µ(D) > 0. Further, C can
be partitioned such that Ci = Qn ∩ Pi (i = 1, . . . , n − 1). And it is clear
f (s) = x1 for all s ∈ Ci (i = 1, . . . , n − 1). Next, let µ(C1)/µ(C) = ρ1, then
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by Corollary 6.14, there exists some D1 ⊆ D for which µ(D1)/µ(D) = ρ1,
and hence µ(C1) = µ(D1). It is easy to see that, by repeatedly applying
Corollary 6.14, D can be partitioned into D1, . . . , Dn−1 for which
µ(Ci) = µ(Di), i = 1, . . . , n − 1. (7.9)
Table 7.2









Qn x1 x2 · · · xn
Now construct an act h1 such that it agrees with f on all parts of S except
for C1 and D1 for which
h1(s) =

xn if s ∈ C1,
x1 if s ∈ D1,
g(s) otherwise.
Since µ(C1) = µ(D1), using a similarly argument given in part (a) above,
we conclude that h1 ∼ f . Repeat this process inductively we have that
hi+1(s) =

xn if s ∈ C2,
xi+1 if s ∈ D2,
hi(s) otherwise,
(i < n − 1).
From the construction hi’s we have that hn−1(s) = xn for all s ∈ Ci (i =





Qn xn x2 · · · xn





Qn xn xn · · · xn
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The proof is completed if we show that hn−1 ∼ g. To this end, note
that hn−1 agrees with g on Qn, and hence hn−1 ∼Qn g. In S − Qn, there
are only n − 1 many elements, then by the construction of hn−1 and the
inductive hypothesis we have that hn−1 ∼S−Qn f ∼S−Qn g. Together, we
have hn−1 ∼ g, which is what we want. □
7.1.2. Gambles introduced by lotteries. Conversely, each lottery p ∈ L∗X can be
associated with a gamble. To see this, let x1, x2, . . . , xn be an enumeration of the
members of X that are in the support of p, as defined in (2.18), and let {Pi}ni=0 be
a partition of S such that
µ(Pi) =

0 i = 0,
p(xi) i = 1, . . . , n.
(7.10)
Note that the existence of such a partition is guaranteed by the fact that, by
Lemma 6.12, S can be partitioned into arbitrarily fine equal-probable events and
that µ is a well defined finitely additive probability measure on S for which Corol-
lary 6.14 holds. Now, given p and the corresponding {Pi}ni=0, define fp as follows
fp(s) =

x s ∈ P0,
xi s ∈ Pi (i = 1, . . . , n),
(7.11)
where x is an arbitrary consequence that is not in the support of p. We refer to fp
as a gamble introduced by lottery p. The following observation says that, given any
lottery q, let fq be a gamble introduced by q as defined above, then the introduced
lottery by fq is equal to q. The proof is immediate from (7.2) and (7.11), and hence
omitted.
Lemma 7.3. For any q ∈ L∗X, p fq = q.
It shall be emphasized that, for any simple act g ∈ A0, it is in general not the
case that fpg = g. As the the following example illustrates, this is due to the fact
that, in general, more than one gambles can be associated with the same lottery.
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Example 7.4. Let X = {x1, x2, x3} and p be such that p(x1) = p(x2) = 0 and
p(x3) = 1. Construct f and g to be such that {P1, P2, P3} and {Q1, Q2, Q3} are their
respective partitions of S for which µ(P3) = µ(Q3) = 1. By definition, both f and
g are gambles introduced by p, but f ̸= g.
P1 P2 P3
f x1 x1 x3
Q1 Q2 Q3
g x2 x2 x3
However, in the light of Lemma 7.2 and Lemma 7.3, we note that all gambles
introduced from the same lottery are equally preferable under ≿. It follows that each
lottery p ∈ L∗X can be identified with a class of equally preferable gambles intro-
duced by p, which are ordered under the given preference ≿ on A.12 For each
p, let fp be a representative of the associated equivalence class (under ≿), then a
preference relation L∗X can be induced as follows: for any p, q ∈ L∗X,
p ≿ q if fp ≿ fq. (7.12)
We show that this induced preference on L∗X satisfies von Neumann-Morgenstern
axioms (cf. Remark 2.4).
Lemma 7.5. If preference relation ≿ on A satisfies SVG 1-6, then the induced
ordering on L∗X in (7.12) satisfies the following conditions:
(1) ≿ is a complete preference relation;
(2) For all p, q, r ∈ L∗X and λ ∈ (0, 1], p ≻ q if and only if p ⊕λ r ≻ q ⊕λ r;
(3) For any p, q, r ∈ L∗X, if p ≿ r ≿ q and p ≻ q, then there exists a unique
α ∈ [0, 1] such that r ∼ p ⊕α q.
Proof. (1) This is immediate from (7.12) and SVG 1.
12 Savage (1972, p.71) uses ∑i ρi fi to denote the class of simple acts for which, to use his notations,
there exist partitions Bi of S such that P(Bi) = ρi and f (s) = fi for s ∈ Bi. He further remarks that
if a simple act f is such that “the consequences fi will befall the person in case Bi occurs, then the
value of f is independent of how the partition Bi is chosen.”
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(2) By the definition of induced preference in (7.12), it is sufficient to show that
the introduced gambles satisfy
fp ≻ fq if and only if fp⊕λr ≻ fq⊕λr. (7.13)
To this end, let {Pi}mi=0, {Qj}rj=0, {Rk}nk=0 be partitions of S with respect to
fp, fq, fr, respectively, for which (7.10) and (7.11) are satisfied. By Corollary 6.14,
construct Eik ⊆ Pi ∩ Rk such that µ(Eik) = λµ(Pi ∩ Rk). Further, let Eik =















= (1 − λ)µ(Rk). (7.14)




xi if s ∈ Eik
xk if s ∈ Eik
,
where xi is in the support of p and fp(s) = xi for s ∈ Eik ⊆ Pi and similarly,
xk is in the support of r and fr(s) = xk for s ∈ Eik ⊆ Rk. Now let p f1 be the
lottery introduced by f1, then, by (7.14), for any xi ∈ X,




















= λp(xi) + (1 − λ)r(xi)
= (p ⊕λ r)(xi).
(7.15)
By Lemma 7.3, p fp⊕λr = p ⊕λ r, it follows that p f1 = p fp⊕λr , hence f1 ∼ fp⊕λr
via Lemma 7.2.
Similarly, construct Fjk ⊆ Qj ∩ Rk such that µ(Fjk) = λµ(Qj ∩ Rk), and let
Fjk = (Qj ∩ Rk)− Fjk. Then {Fjk, Fjk}jk partitions S. Define a gamble f2 to be
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xj if s ∈ Fjk
xk if s ∈ Fjk
.
We have that p f2 = q ⊕λ r = p fq⊕λr , and hence f2 ∼ fq⊕λr. Thus, by SVG 1,
(7.13) is proved if it can be shown that fp ≻ fq if and only if f1 ≻ f2.
Observe that, by (7.15), for any xi ∈ X, f1(s) = xi implies s ∈ Pi ∪ Ri and,
similarly, f2(s) = xi only if s ∈ Qi ∪ Ri. Further, since fp, fq, fr satisfy (7.11),
construct two sequences of gambles h1, . . . , hn and h′1, . . . , h
′
n as follows
h1 = fp ⊕RC1 fr and h
′
1 = fq ⊕RC1 fr (7.16)




i ⊕RCi+1 fr (7.17)
From the constructions of f1, f2,, it is easy to see that f1 = hn and f2 = h′n.
Finally, by the sure-thing principle, (7.16) and (7.17) imply that
h1 ≻ h′1 ⇐⇒ fp ≻ fq
hi+1 ≻ h′i+1 ⇐⇒ hi ≻ h′i
Therefore, f1 ≻ f2 if and only if fp ≻ fq, which is what we want.
(3) This claim can be similarly proved. □
By Theorem 2.10, if the induced preference ≿ on L∗X satisfies vNM axioms,
then there exists a vNMUF u for all the consequences in X, and hence an expected
utility function U0 for gambles such that, for each f ∈ A0,
U0[ f ] = ∑
x∈X








Thus, Lemma 7.5 and (7.18) lead to the following theorem.
Theorem 7.6. Let S be a set of states, X be a set of consequences, ≿ be a
preference over the set of acts A = XS, and let A0 ⊆ A be the set of gambles,
then, if ≿ satisfies SVG 1-6, there exists a utility function U0 such that, for any
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f , g ∈ A0,
f ≿ g ⇐⇒ U0[ f ] ≥ U0[g],







The next order of business is to extend the utility function obtained in The-
orem 7.6 for simple acts to that for general acts, namely, to relax the restriction
that acts being considered have only finitely many possible consequences, which
will be the subject of the next subsection. Before moving on, we show that, for
any general act g, if g is bounded by two simple acts then there exits a simple
act/gamble that is equally preferable to g.
Corollary 7.7. Let f1, f2 ∈ A0 satisfying f1 ≻ f2, and g ∈ A. If f1 ≿ g ≿ f2,
then there exists a g0 ∈ A0 such that g0 ∼ g.
Proof. Our proof here parallels the proof of Lemma 2.3(4). In the notation of
(7.2) and (7.11), let p f1 and p f2 be the lotteries induced by f1, f2, and fp f1⊕λ p f2 is a
gamble introduced by some mixer of p f1 and p f2 . Consider the following two sets
A : =
{
x ∈ [0, 1]
∣∣ fp f1⊕x p f2 ≿ g};
B : =
{
x ∈ [0, 1]
∣∣ g ≿ fp f1⊕x p f2}. (7.19)
Let α∗ = inf A and α∗ = sup B. Note that, for any a > α∗, there must exist
some a′ ∈ A such that a > a′ ≥ α∗. Then by Lemma 7.5(2) and Lemma 2.3(3),
fp f1⊕a p f2 ≻ fp f1⊕a′ p f2 ≿ g. This means
a > α∗ =⇒ a /∈ B. (7.20)
The contrapositive of (7.20) says that, for any a, a ∈ B implies that α∗ ≥ a, in other
words, α∗ is an upper bound of B. and hence α∗ ≥ α∗. Similarly, one can show
that, for any a,
α∗ > a =⇒ a /∈ A (7.21)
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which leads to α∗ ≥ α∗. Now define α = α∗ = α∗. It can be similarly shown, by
applying SVG 6, that it cannot be that α /∈ A ∩ B. Finally, define g0 = fp f1⊕α p f2 , we
have g0 ∼ g. □
7.2. Postulate 7 and utility extension to general acts. To extend the utility for
simple acts to acts in general, Savage brought in one final postulate.
SVG 7. For any event E ∈ F , if f ≿E cg(s) for all s ∈ E then f ≿E g.
The postulate says that, for any event E, if the conditional preference of f
given E is no less preferable to any of the constant acts constructed from the
possible consequences of g under each state in E, then f is weakly preferred to
g given E. As seen, this postulate uses constant acts in a systematic way, which,
as we have discussed in Section 14.1, can be troublesome due to the issue of the
applicability of the notion of constant acts. For the time being, let us focus on
the following structural development of utility extension. Savage (1972, p.78) first
demonstrated that SVG 7 is not derivable from the first six postulates. This was
done by constructing a model which satisfies all of SVG 1-6 but fails SVG 7.
Example 7.8. Let S = N+ and X = [0, 1) be the set of consequences, and λ
be the finitely but not countably additive measure on positive integers given in
Example A.4.7. For any act f , let U[ f ] =
∫
S u( f )dλ where u(x) = x is a utility
function on X and V[ f ] = limϵ→0 λ[ f (s) ≥ 1 − ϵ], and let




u( f (s))dλ(s) + lim
ϵ→0
λ[ f (s) ≥ 1 − ϵ]
(7.22)
Define f ≿∗ g to mean that W[ f ] ≥ W[g]. It is not difficulty to verify that the
defined ≿∗ satisfies SVG 1-6.13 Note that for any act g with a finite range, i.e. a
gamble, V[g] = 0, in this case W[g] = U[g] is a utility function like the one given
13See Example 2.1 (and Lemma 1 & 2) in Seidenfeld and Schervish (1983).
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in Theorem 7.6. To see SVG 7 is violated, let f , g be such that
f (x) =

1 − 1/x if x is even
0 if x is odd





Then it is easy to calculate that






















Hence f ≺∗ g by the definition of ≿∗ in terms of W[·] above. On the other hand,
for any s ∈ S, we have g(x) < 1. This means that, for the constant act cg(s),
W[cg(s)] < 1, and hence f ≻∗ cg(s), from which we conclude that f ≿∗ cg(s) for all
s ∈ S, but this contradicts SVG 7 (taking E = S). 
Savage then showed that with SVG 7 the utility function U0 for simple acts can
be extended to a utility function U for general acts. To this end, we first prove the
following lemmas.
Lemma 7.9. For any event E, if, for every consequence a ∈ X, f ≿ ca and
g ≿ ca, then f ∼ g.
Proof. The lemma is proved by simple applications of SVG 7. □
Lemma 7.10. For any f ∈ A, if there exists some a ∈ X and c < ∞ such that




≤ c for all s ∈ S, then there exists some gamble g0 ∈ A0 for
which
g0 ≿ f and U0[g0] ≤ c, (7.23)
where u, U0 are as in Theorem 7.6.
Proof. Suppose that u(a) ≤ c, then we can define g0 = ca. Otherwise, u(a) >
c, in this case, fix any t ∈ S and let f (t) = b ∈ X, we have, by the hypothesis,




≤ c. Let p∗ be a probability mixer of a and b such that
p∗(a)u(a) + (1 − p∗(b))u(b) = c.
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Let E, EC be a partition of S such that µ(E) = p∗(a) and µ(EC) = p∗(b), and define
a gamble g0 to be such that
g0(s) =

a if s ∈ E
b if s ∈ EC
From the construction, we have U0[g0] = c. Further, for any s ∈ S, we have
U0[c f (s)] ≤ c, and hence, by Theorem 7.6, g0 ≥ c f (s). That is, g0 ≥ c f (s) for all s ∈ S
then, by SVG 7, g0 ≿ f . □
A small change of the proof above lead to the following corollary.
Corollary 7.11. For any f ∈ A and for any event E, if there exists some a ∈ X




≤ c for all s ∈ E, then there exists some
gamble g0 ∈ A0 for which
g0 ≿E f and U0[g0] ≤ c. (7.24)
Lemma 7.12. Let {Pi}ni=1 be a partition of S and c1, . . . , cn < ∞. Then, for any




≤ ci for all






Proof. We consider the following two cases:
(1) If, for each Pi, there is some ai such that cai ≿Pi f . Then, by Corollary 7.11, there
exists some gi for which
gi ≿Pi f and U0[gi] ≤ ci for all i = 1, . . . , n.
Define g0 to be such that g0(s) = gi(s) if s ∈ Pi. Then we have g0 ≿ f , hence
g0 ≿ h0. Since both h0 and g0 are gambles, by Theorem 7.6, we have





In this case, (7.25) holds.
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(2) Otherwise, for some Pi,
f ≻Pi ca for all a ∈ X. (7.26)
We show that, in this case, f can be modified to some f ′ so that
1. for each Pi, there is some bi ∈ X such that cbi ≿Pi f ′,
2. there exists some gamble h0 such that f ≿ f ′ ≿ h0, and
3. u( f ′(s)) ≤ ci for all s ∈ Pi.
If such a f ′ exists, this will take us back to case (1) for which (7.25) holds, then
we are done. To this end, let x∗, x∗ ∈ X be such that x∗ ≻ x∗ and u(x∗) < ci
(the existence of such a pair is guarantee by SVG 5 and the fact utility is unique
up to some linear transformation). Fix any a ∈ X, then, by SVG 6, f ≻Pi ca
implies that that there is some non-null A ⊆ Pi such that
cx∗ ⊕A f ≻Pi ca,
cx∗ ⊕A f ≻Pi ca.
(7.27)
It is clear, by SVG 2, that
cx∗ ⊕A f ≻Pi cx∗ ⊕A f . (7.28)
Note that (7.26) implies, via SVG 7, that f ≻Pi cx∗ ⊕A f and f ≻Pi cx∗ ⊕A f .
Further, it cannot be the case that cx∗ ⊕A f ≻Pi cb for all b ∈ X, for, otherwise, by
Lemma 7.9, f ∼Pi cx∗ ⊕A f , and hence cx∗ ⊕A f ≻Pi cx∗ ⊕A f , which contradicts
(7.28). This means that there is some bi ∈ X such that cbi ≿Pi f ∼Pi cx∗ ⊕A f .
Let f ′ = cx∗ ⊕A f , then this is what we need. □
Theorem 7.13 (Savage). If ≿ satisfies SVG 1-7 then there exists a utility func-
tion u on X and and probability function µ on events such that for any f , g ∈ A,













Proof. We prove the theorem in following steps:
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(1) Under the derived utility u on X and µ on F from Theorem 7.6, we define the
utility U of a general act f by14














where sup ranges over all possible finite partitions Pi of S intro F -sets. The
goal is then to show that such a utility U exists under SVG 1-7.
(2) Given any general act f ∈ A, we consider the following possibilities:
(a) ca ≿ f ≿ cb for some a, b ∈ X;
(b) f ≻ ca for all a ∈ X;
(c) ca ≻ f for all a ∈ X.
For case (a), partition S into {Pi}ni=1 and let Pi’s be so arranged that, for any




(c∗ − c∗) ≤ u[ f (s)] ≤ c∗ +
i
n
(c∗ − c∗). (7.31)
where c∗ and c∗ are respectively the greatest lower and least upper bounds of





















On the other hand, by Corollary 7.7, there exists some g0 such that g0 ∼ f .






















Then (7.32) and (7.33) lead to
U[ f ] = U0[g0] as n → ∞. (7.34)
14Cf. Section A.6.
15Theorem 1 on page 79 of Savage (1972) was proved under the assumption that both f , g are
bounded. In fact, Theorem 14.5 of Fishburn (1970, p.206) shows that the utility function u derived
in Theorem 7.6 is bounded under SVG 1-7. See the footnote on page 80 in Savage (1972).
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If (b) is the case, then by Lemma 7.9, all acts that satisfy (b) are equally prefer-
able. In this case, it is easy to show that U[ f ] = c∗. And similarly, for case (c),
it can be shown that U[ f ] = c∗.
(3) Finally, observe that (7.29) holds if we consider a combination of cases where




Interlude: Additivity Condition of Subjective Probability
8. Introduction
This chapter addresses the issue concerning the additivity condition of the
subjective probability measures derived in Savage’s system as presented in Chap-
ter II. In a section titled “Some mathematical details,” Savage (1972, §3.4) discusses
the requirements of the additivity condition of the probability measures derived
in his theory of subjective expected utility, he says,
It is not usual to suppose, as has been done here, that all sets have
a numerical probability, but rather a sufficiently rich class of sets
do so, the remainder being considered unmeasurable . . . the theory
being developed here does assume that probability is defined for all
events, that is, for all sets of states, and it does not imply countable
additivity, but only finite additivity . . . it is a little better not to
assume countable additivity as a postulate, but rather as a special
hypothesis in certain contexts. (ibid. p.40, emphases added)
One main mathematical reason provided by Savage for not requiring the derived
probability measures in his theory to be countably additive (to be made precise
shortly) is that, according to him, there does not exist a countably additive exten-
sion of the Lebesgue measure that is defined on the set of all subsets of the unit
interval (or the real line), whereas in the case of finitely additive measures, such
Different versions of this chapter were presented at the Institute of Information Science, Academia
Sinica, Taiwan and the 11th Conference on Logic and the Foundations of Game and Decision Theory,
Norway. I am grateful to Professor Teddy Seidenfeld who read an earlier draft of this chapter and
pointed out an error in my attempt to extend utility function from simple acts to general acts using
countable additivity, which led me to rewrite Section 11.2.
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an extension does exist. Since events are taken to be “all sets of states” in his
system (which can be interpreted as all subsets of the reals), countable additivity
is ruled out because of this claimed defect.
Savage’s remarks refer to the basic problem of measure theory posed by Henri
Lebesgue at the turn of the twentieth century known as the problem of measurabil-
ity. In what immediately follows, we point out that Savage’s take on the countably
additive extension of Lebesgue measure was in fact inaccurate due to an oversight
of set-theoretic details. We illustrate this point by way of a brief historical re-
view of Lebesgue’s measure problem and some of its further developments. The
goal is to situate our critical assessment of Savage’s mathematical arguments for
not requiring countable additivity in the historical development of the measure
problem. In our discussion, we will also address some common misunderstand-
ings concerning the interpretational values of sophisticated mathematical models
used in practical sciences like decision theory. This will be followed in Section 10
by an extensive analysis of the imbalance between finite additivity and the rich
mathematical structure employed in Savage’s decision model, which, as we will
see, echoes a well-known difficulty associated with finitely additive probability
measures in the context of infinite state space with countable partition. We see
these discussions as providing sufficient reasons for introducing countable addi-
tivity to Savage-style decision models. Thus, based on the work of Villegas (1964),
we introduce in Section 11 a new postulate which brings in countable additivity,
we then discuss the roles countable additivity and Savage postulate 7 played in
extending utilities from simple acts to all acts.
9. Some Set-theoretic Details
9.1. The measure problem. In his 1902 thesis Lebesgue raised the following
question about the real line: Does there exist a measure m such that
(a) m associates with each bounded subset X of R a real number m(x);
(b) m is not identically zero, i.e., m(X) ̸= 0 for some X;
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(c) m is translation-invariant: for any X ⊆ R and any r ∈ R define X + r :=
{x + r | x ∈ X}, then m(X) = m(X + r);
(d) m is countably additive (or σ-additive), that is, if {Xn}∞n=1 is a collection









Lebesgue developed his measure towards the solution to this problem and, unlike
other attempts made around the same period (see Bingham, 2000), the measure
developed by him, later known as the Lebesgue measure, was constructed in ac-
cordance with certain algebraic structure of sets of the real numbers.1 As seen,
the measure problem would be solved if it could be shown that the Lebesgue
measure satisfies all the measurability conditions (a)-(d). Lebesgue’s question was
soon answered in negative by Vitali (1905), who showed that, with the Axiom of
Choice (AC), there exist sets of real numbers that are not (Lebesgue) measurable.2
This means that, in the presence of AC, Lebesgue’s measure is definable only for a
proper class of subsets of the reals, the remainder being considered unmeasurable.
Then a natural question to ask is whether or not there exists an extension of
Lebesgue measure which not only agrees with Lebesgue measure on all measur-
able sets, but is also definable for non-measurable sets. Let us refer to this question
as the revised measure problem. The problem gives rise to a more general question
as to whether there exists a real-valued measure on any infinite set. To anticipate
our discussion on subjective probability measures, let us reformulate the question
in terms of probabilistic measures for some general infinite set. Let S be a (count-
ably or uncountably) infinite set, a (probability) measure on S is a non-negative
real-valued function µ on P(S) such that
i. µ is defined for all subsets of S;
ii. µ(∅) = 0, µ(S) = 1;
1Let S be a nonempty set, a collection F of subsets of S is called a σ-algebra if (1) ∅ ∈ F and S ∈ F ;
(2) X ∈ F implies S − X ∈ F ; (3) X1, X2, . . . ∈ F implies
∪
n Xn ∈ F and
∩
n Xn ∈ F . In the case
of the reals where S = R, let B be the (Borel) σ-algebra generated by (the smallest σ-algebra that
contains) all the sets of the form (a, b] where a, b are real numbers and a < b. Define a Lebesgue
measure (over Borel sets) to be the real-valued function on B such that µ(∅) = 0, µ(R) = +∞, and,




= b − a.
2See Appendix A.2 for a Vitali-type construction.
81
CHAPTER III. ADDITIVITY CONDITION
iii. µ is countably additive (or σ-additive), that is, if {Xn}∞n=1 is a collection of















Here we distinguish two cases depending on the cardinality of S: If S contains
uncountably many elements (e.g., S = R), it is now known that an extension of
Lebesgue measure exists if and only if there exists a measure on the continuum (or
on any S with |S| = 2ℵ0) satisfying conditions (i)-(iii). Hence, the revised measure
problem is solved if the latter can be answered. By referring to a result of Ulam
(1930) on measures on infinite sets (cf. Footnote 6 below.), Savage gave a definitive
answer that such an extension does not exist. One main aim of this section is
to point out that, in fact, there is no straightforward answer to this question: the
existence of a countably additive measure on P(S) that extends Lebesgue measure
depends on the background set theory one chooses to work in. And this question
is in close connection with the theory of large cardinals, we will return to this
point presently in Section 9.2 below.
If, on the other hand, S contains only countably many elements (e.g., S =
N), then it is interesting to note that µ cannot be both countably additive and
uniformly distributed (or, for that matter, µ cannot be a measure that assigns 0 to
all singletons). Indeed, let {s1, s2, . . .} be an enumeration of all the elements in S.
Suppose that µ is uniformly distributed on S, then it must be that µ(si) = 0 for all




= ∑∞i=1 µ(si) = 0,
which is absurd. Hence there does not exist a σ-additive uniform distribution on a
countable set. This, in part, is the reason why de Finetti opposed the employment
of countable additivity across the board arguing that a rational agent should be
ready to believe that the tickets in a countably infinite lottery be equally likely to
win, a view shared, to a large extent, by Savage. This leads to the suggestion of
weakening the additivity condition (iii), to which we now turn.
3We write µ({si}) as µ(si) for short.
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9.2. Large cardinals and additivity conditions. An alternative option is to
replace (iii) with the following condition.
iv. µ is finitely additive, that is, for any X, Y ⊆ S, if X ∩ Y = ∅ then
µ(X ∪ Y) = µ(X) + µ(Y). (9.2)
It is clear that (iii) implies (iv) but not vice versa, hence this condition amounts to
weakening the additivity condition on subjective probabilities.
Admittedly, the employment of finitely additive probability measures has far-
reaching merits. It can be shown that there does exist a finitely additive uniform
distribution on S with at most countably many elements satisfying properties (i),
(ii), and (iv).4 In addition, in justifying his subjective interpretation of probability,
de Finetti (1937b) showed that a rational player affords at least the possibility of
avoiding exposure to a sure loss if and only if the set of betting quotients upon
which the player accepts satisfies conditions (i), (ii), and (iv). More precisely, let S
be a space of possible states, F be some algebra equipped on S, members of F are
referred to as events. An event E occurs just in case s ∈ E where s is the true state
of the world. Let {E1, . . . , En} be a finite partition of S where each Ei ∈ F . Further,
let µ(Ei) represent the decision maker’s degree of belief on the occurrence of Ei,
which is manifested, it is assumed, in her betting behavior that µ(Ei) is the rate at
which the decision maker is willing to enter a bet dependent on the occurrence of
Ei with a payoff of ci for a cost of ciµ(Ei), where ci is decided by the opponent and
is either positive or negative. The decision maker is said to be coherent if there is no







where χEi is the characteristic function of Ei. In other words, the agent’s subjec-
tive probability assignments are coherent if no sequence of bets can be arranged
by the opponent that yields uniformly negative returns for the bettor regardless
which state of the world actually obtains. Guided by this coherence principle,
de Finetti showed that there exists at least one measure µ which admits that, for
4Appendix A.4 contains a set-theoretic construction of one such example, namely the existence of a
finitely additive uniform distribution over the integers.
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≥ 0. In addition,
it was shown by de Finetti (1930a) that µ can be extended to any collection of
events containing F , in particular, µ can be extended to P(S) so that condition
(i) is satisfied; and that µ is a finitely additive probability measure, that is to say,
µ satisfies (ii) and (iv). According to Regazzini (2013), these mathematical results
developed by de Finetti in the 1920-30s played an important role in shaping his
view on the issue of additivity, from which he concluded that there is no need to
insist on countable additivity for probability measures on an algebra of events.5
Savage referred to the above conviction of de Finetti’s (as well as a similar
result given by Banach (1932)) as part of his mathematical reasons not to impose
countable additivity. Before proceeding any further, let us recapitulate the main
reasons that led Savage to take that “it is a little better not to assume countable
additivity as a postulate”:
1. There does not exist a countably additive uniform distribution over integers,
whereas in the case of finite additivity such a distribution does exist.
2. According to Savage, there does not exist a countably additive extension of the
Lebesgue measure to the set of all subsets of the reals, whereas in the case of
finite additivity such an extension does exist.
Note that, for reason (1), Savage provided no further comments on the relationship
between subjective probabilities derivable from his decision-theoretic model and
uniform distribution over integers, he only briefly mentioned that many of us do
have a strong intuitive tendency to regard such a distribution as necessary (p.43).
We will not pursue any further as to under what circumstances this intuitive ap-
peal to uniform distribution over integers may be grounded or refuted (which
is based on an apparent symmetry consideration and it is an important topic of
its own). Our contention however is that, granted that uniform distribution over
5The first chapter of de Finetti (1937b, English translation as de Finetti (1937a)) contains a non-
technical summary of de Finetti (1930a, 1931, in Italian) on “the logic of the probable” where the
aforementioned mathematical results were given (see Regazzini, 2013). Given that our current fo-
cus is on Savage’s system, we shall not delve further into the discussion on de Finetti’s reasons for
rejecting countable additivity, for recent discussions, see Williamson (1999); Regazzini (2013).
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integers is permissible in Savage’s model, finite additivity is still insufficient in
bringing about a coherent system with rich background settings: in Section 10 we
will discuss a classical example, involving finitely additive uniform distribution
over integers, which leads to the making of a money pump. More precisely, fol-
lowing the works of Adams (1962) and Wakker (1993), among others, we point
out that the doctrine that (subjective) probability measure be merely finitely addi-
tive may stand in violations of various rationality constraints that are commonly
adopted in decision-theoretic models.
Now, let us turn to reason (2). Savage (1972, p.41) cites the well-known re-
sult of Ulam (1930) testifying that any atomless σ-additive extension of Lebesgue
measure to all subsets of the unit interval is incompatible with the continuum hy-
pothesis (CH), from which he concludes that there is no extension that satisfies all
of (i)-(iii). However, it is unclear as to why this constitutes a sufficient reason for
rejecting countable additivity.6
As a matter of fact, in his article titled “a model of set theory in which every
set of reals is Lebesgue measurable” Solovay (1970) showed that such a countably
additive extension of Lebesgue measure to all sets of reals does exist if the existence
of an inaccessible cardinal (I) and a weaker version of AC, i.e. the principle of
dependent choice (DC), are assumed.7 Thus, it seems that insofar as the possibility
of obtaining a σ-additive extension of Lebesgue measure to all subsets of the reals
6 Ulam (1930) proved that, for any uncountable set S with |S| = κ, it can be shown in ZFC that if κ
is a successor (and hence a regular) cardinal (e.g., κ = ℵ1), then there does not exist a measure on S
satisfying all of (i)-(iii). It follows that if there is a σ-additive non-trivial extension of Lebesgue mea-
sure on 2ℵ0 then CH must fail. (It is worth mentioning that, prior to Ulam, Banach and Kuratowski
(1929) showed that if there is a measure on 2ℵ0 then 2ℵ0 > ℵ1.) Yet, even without the concern for
CH, there is an aspect of Ulam’s original results that was not addressed by Savage: it was shown
by Ulam (1930) that, in ZFC, if there is a σ-additive non-trivial measure µ on any uncountable set S
with |S| = κ then µ is a measure on κ such that
(1) either κ is a measurable cardinal (and hence an inaccessible cardinal), on which a non-
trivial σ-additive two-valued measure can be defined;
(2) or κ is a real-valued measurable cardinal (and hence a weakly inaccessible cardinal) such
that κ ≤ 2ℵ0 , on which a nontrivial σ-additive atomless measure can be defined.
In the second case, it is plain that µ can be extended to a measure on 2ℵ0 : for any X ⊆ 2ℵ0 , let
µ(X) = µ(X ∩ κ). This leads to a general method of obtaining a countably additive measure on all
subsets of the reals that extends Lebesgue measure (see Jech, 2003, p. 131).
7The relative consistency proof given by Solovay (1970) showed that if ZFC+I has a model then
ZF+DC has a model in which every set of reals is Lebesgue measurable (see also Jech, 2003, p.50).
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is concerned, Savage’s set-theoretic argument, which calls for immediate exclusion
of countable additivity, is inconclusive. This is because the existence of such an
extension really depends on the background set theory: does not exist in ZFC+CH,
but does exist in ZF+DC (assuming ZFC+I is consistent).
In view of the set-theoretic details above, a natural reaction one may have is
that in order to determine whether or not to incorporate countable additivity in
Savage’s personal decision theory further investigation concerning the “appropri-
ate” set theory that one should work with needs to be made. However, to provide
a theoretic reason for choosing one set of set-theoretic axioms over another is no
easy matter, it has become an exceedingly involved issue within the proper sub-
ject of set theory.8 At this point, one might be puzzled that the task of isolating
the “correct” axioms of large cardinals, although highly interesting as a subject
of its own, might be of remote philosophical significance in revealing the role of
additivity played within decision-theoretic models, especially when it comes to
the development of a personal decision theory of a more “mundane kind,” which
was what Savage initially set forth to do. Hence, in defending finite additivity,
one might be tempted to appeal to some practical reasons in matching up with
the appropriate mathematical details contending that countable additivity should
be ruled out precisely because the cost from set-theoretic complications is high,
whereas in the case of finite additivity such complications can be largely mini-
mized. Well, this suggested roundabout approach of circumventing set theory by
suspending countable additivity would be celebrated if the strategy of restricting
to merely finitely additive measures could serve the full purpose of keeping Sav-
age’s system in good health, which, as we will see, is not the case. We will return
to this point in Section 10.
At this point, we would like to remark on a perhaps more important point:
it would be a mistake to think that the issues associated with employing so-
phisticated mathematical constructions in modeling subjective probabilities are of
8See Gaifman (2012) and Koellner (2013) for pertinent discussions.
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“merely internally mathematical interest” and have little conceptual importance
in uncovering the philosophical understanding of the notion of probability and
hence one should avoid such constructions when possible. This prejudice against
the use of complicated formalism is based on a misconception about the role of
mathematical models. One should bear in mind that there is an indisputable
distinction between a mathematically sophisticated model of probability and the
common-sense understanding of probability by “men in the street.” But there is
no conflict between having a good grasp of an everyday concept and forming a so-
phisticated theory about it. In fact, the latter often serve as an illuminating guide
in achieving the former. As an example, we discuss in the next a few paragraphs
how detailed set-theoretic considerations may shed light on our understanding of
subjective probabilities and the spaces on which they are defined.
9.3. Logical omniscience and non-measurable sets. To be sure, Savage’s set-
theoretic argument for not requiring countable additivity was given in ZFC+CH,
where it is known that, in the case of uncountable state space, there is no non-
trivial measure satisfies simultaneously conditions (i) - (iii) above; and Savage’s
immediate reaction was to revise the third, i.e., the additivity condition, and re-
strict the attention to finitely additive measures.9 The particular set-theoretic ar-
gument Savage relied on, namely the existence of Ulam matrix (which leads to the
non-existence of a measure over ℵ1, see Footnote 6), uses AC in an essential way.
The latter allows for the construction of non-measurable sets in ZFC. Now if one
insists on maintaining the first measurability condition of defining subjective prob-
ability measure for all sets of states, this amounts to introducing non-measurable
sets into Savage’s decision-theoretic model as representing certain events. Yet, it
9Savage is not alone in holding this view. Seidenfeld (2001) listed the non-existence of a non-
trivial, σ-additive measure defined over the power set of an uncountable set as the first of his
six reasons for considering theory of finitely additive probability. It is interesting to note that
Seidenfeld also referred to the result of Solovay, however no further discussion on the significant
of this result on additivity was given (see Seidenfeld, 2001, p.168). See Bingham (2010, §9) for
a discussion and responses to each one of Seidenfeld’s six reasons. Our set-theoretic argument
presented here, in response to Seidenfeld’s first, i.e., the measurability reason, is different from
Bingham’s “approximation” argument.
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is unclear what one can benefit from making such high demand. Note that non-
measurable sets are meaningful only insofar as we have a good understanding
of the contexts in which they apply. These sets are highly interesting within cer-
tain branches of mathematics largely for the reason that their introduction reveals
in a deep way the complex structures of the underlying mathematical systems.
This however does not mean that these peculiar set-theoretic constructions should
be carried over to a system that is primarily devised to guide rational decision
making by rational agents.
Here, one might respond by pointing out that, as a normative theory, the
current decision framework is designed only for idealized decision makers, not ac-
tual ones, hence it should be within the bounds of our super agents to conceive
non-measurable sets on which subjective probabilities be defined. This line of re-
sponse, we stress, misses the point of theoretical idealization. Indeed, in various
highly idealized prescriptive decision-theoretic models, including Savage’s origi-
nal system and our analysis in later sections, it is assumed that the decision mak-
ers are equipped with extraordinary abilities. What we usually expect from these
super agents are their supreme logical ability and exceptional computational ca-
pacity. However, it should be emphasized that this step of idealization is not based
on a blind leap of faith, it is grounded in our understanding of the basic logical
apparatus and computational processes involved. We acknowledge that, as actual
reasoners, our inferential performances are bounded by various physical limita-
tions, which prevent us from reaching too far. Yet a good grasp of the underlying
logical machinery gives rise to the conceivable picture as to what it means for a
logically omniscient agent to fulfill, in principle, the task of drawing all the logical
consequences from a given proposition.10 This justificatory picture, which is based
10With these being said, we should however also point out that the demand to have a deductively
closed system remains as a challenge to any normative theory of beliefs. In his essay titled “diffi-
culties in the theory of personal probability,” Savage (1967, p.308) remarked that the postulates of
his theory imply that one should behave in accordance with the logical implications of all that she
knows, which can be very costly. In other words, conducting logical deductions is a very resource
consuming activity, the merits it brings can sometimes be offset by its high costs. Hence some might
say that the assumption of logical omniscience, a promise of the discharge of unlimited deductive
resources, may at its best be seen as an unfeasible idealization. Here is not the place to open a new
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on an apparent inductive reasoning, becomes increasingly blurry when we start
asking our super agent to contemplate the intriguing nature of non-measurable
sets in the context of rational decision making. The Banach-Tarski paradox sets
just the example of how much we lack geometric and physical intuition when it
comes to non-measurable sets. That means, unlike logical omniscience, we don’t
even have a clear idea of what to demand from our super agent: there is not a well-
founded inductive basis for the jump to non-measurable sets beyond any specific
set-theoretic context. Hence, it seems that if there is any set-theoretic oddity to be
avoided in a personal decision theory it should be non-measurable sets.11
On this matter, we should add that Savage himself is fully aware that the
set theoretical framework under which his personal decision model is being de-
veloped exceeds what one can expect from a rational decision maker who uses
subjective probabilities to encompass the best courses of actions and fend against
incoherency (Savage, 1967). He also cites the Banach-Tarski paradox as an example
to show the extent to which highly abstract sophisticated set theory can contradict
common sense intuitions. However, it seems that Savage’s readiness to include
as events “all sets of states” outshines his willingness to avoid this set-theoretic
oddity. In practice, he takes the set of all subsets of the state space, the power set
of the continuum in the case of the reals, as the background algebra, on which his
subjective probabilities be defined. We however will go with a different approach.
In fact, the situation can be largely simplified if we choose to work, instead
of with all subsets of the state space S, but with a sufficiently rich collection of
subsets of S (for instance, the Borel sets B in the case where S = R) where, as a
discussion on the legitimacy of logical omniscience. The point we are trying to make is rather that,
unlike non-measurable sets, being logically all powerful, however unfeasible, is not something that
is not conceptually entertainable.
11In an unpublished work, professor Haim Gaifman made a similarly point against the often cited
analogy between finitely additive probabilities in countable partitions and countably additive prob-
abilities in uncountable partitions in the literature (see, e.g., Schervish and Seidenfeld, 1986) that
such an analogy plays a major heuristic role in set theory but provides no useful guideline in the
case of subjective probabilities for the reason that certain mathematical structures required to make
salient this analogy has no meaning in a personal decision theory.
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well established theory, countable additivity is in perfectly good health. That is to
say, instead of (i), we require that
v. µ is defined on (Lebesgue) measurable sets of S.
Note that this price of forfeiting the demand of defining probability measures on
the set of all subsets of S is a rather small one to pay. It amounts to disregarding
all those events that are defined by Lebesgue non-measurable sets. Indeed, even
Savage himself conceded that
All that has been, or is to be, formally deduced in this book con-
cerning preferences among sets, could be modified, mutatis mutan-
dis, so that the class of events would not be the class of all subsets
of S, but rather a Borel field, that is, a σ-algebra, on S; the set of
all consequences would be measurable space, that is, a set with a
particular σ-algebra singled out; and an act would be a measurable
function from the measurable space of events to the measurable
space of consequences. (Savage, 1972, p.42)
It should be emphasized that this modification of definition of events from, say,
the set of all subsets of (0, 1] to all the Borel set B of (0, 1] is not carried out at the
expense of disregarding a large collection events that are otherwise representable.
As noted by Billingsley (2012, p.23), “[i]n fact, B contains all the subsets of (0, 1]
actually encountered in ordinary analysis and probability. It is large enough for
all ‘practical’ purposes.” Here, by “practical purposes” we take as meaning that
all events and measurable functions considered in economic theories in particular
are definable using only measurable sets, and, consequently, there is no need to
appeal to non-measurable sets. Besides, it is easily seen that this way of restricting
to Lebesgue measurable sets also has the advantage of circumventing the set-
theoretic complications discussed above. We will proceed with our discussions of
Savage’s subjective utility representation theory in this spirit, where we require,
unless otherwise specified (cf. Chapter IV), that all derived subjective probability
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measures be defined on the set of measurable sets of the state space and that they
are countably additive, that is, they satisfy conditions (ii), (iii), and (v).
All in all, Savage chose to base his theory of subjective expected utility on
finitely additive probability measures. This is because he took, for various mathe-
matical considerations, that countable additivity is insufficient for the goals he set
for his decision-theoretic model, whereas finite additivity, it is said, is sufficient for
these purposes, which led him to think that it is not necessary to invoke the count-
able additivity condition, “I know,” says Savage, “of no argument leading to the
requirement of countable additivity” (ibid. p.43). The discussion we have made
so far suggests that Savage’s claim against countable additivity is inadequate due
to an oversight of set-theoretic details. The main aim of the next section is then
to provide an argument for the requirement of countable additivity in Savage’s
system: in Section 10, we point out that the restriction to merely finitely additive
measures may render Savage’s theory incoherent. These considerations will lead
in Section 11 to the introduction of countable additivity as a formal component of
the theory. We then discuss various attempts to extend utility function for simple
acts to acts in general under Savage’s P7 and countable additivity.
10. Finite and Countable Additivity in Savage’s system
10.1. Strict finitism on additivity. Let us refer to the thesis that (subjective)
probabilities be finitely but not countably additive as strict finitism on additivity.
Note that this is not to be confused either with strict finitism (or ultrafinitism) in
philosophy of mathematics which is a school of thoughts that casts doubt, in one
form or another, on large finite sets12 (let alone the use of infinite mathematical
objects); or with finitism which allows the use of the infinite only in a controlled
and reductively finitary manner. By strict finitism on additivity we mean the anti-
pluralist position towards additivity that probability measures can only be finitely
additive in all mathematical systems in which they apply. It is plain that proba-
bility measures are finitely additive in a finitary mathematical system, the dispute
12See Parikh (1971).
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lies in whether subjective probabilities should be merely finitely additive in any
given infinitary system. Clearly, Savage does not question the use of infinitary
mathematics. In fact, many aspects of his theory (examples, proofs, etc.) use in-
finity in an essential way. Yet efforts were made by Savage to bring justification for
finite additivity in his decision model leaving countable additivity “as a special
hypothesis in certain contexts.” In this section, we argue that in many ways Sav-
age’s own decision-theoretic framework is a context in which countable additivity
should apply. We proceed by illustrating that strict finitism on additivity may lead
to some discomforts in Savage’s system.
As noted above, the derived probability measure in Savage’s subjective ex-
pected utility theory features, among other things, the following properties:
Finitely Additive: The probability measure µ on the state space S is finitely
additive.
All-inclusive: Events are defined as all subsets of S, not a collection of
events measurable with respect to some σ-field of subsets of S smaller
than P(S).
Atomless: The state space S is (uncountably) infinite and the probability µ
is atomless.13
We point out an interesting property in systems that feature these three properties:
it can be shown that for each disjoint sequence {Ai} for which countable additivity
fails there exists another sequence {Ci} such that, for each i, the probability of Ai
agrees with that of Ci while countable additivity holds for {Ci}.
Proposition 10.1. Let {Ai}∞i=1 be any sequence of disjoint subsets of S, if µ
is finitely additive, universal, and atomless then ∑∞i=1 µ(Ai) ̸= µ(
∪∞
i=1 Ai) implies
that there exists a partition {Ci}∞i=0 of S satisfying
(1) µ(
∪∞
i=1 Ci) = ∑
∞
i=1 µ(Ai);
13More precisely, a set A is said to be an atom of a given measure µ if, for every X ⊆ A, either
µ(X) = 0 or µ(A − X) = 0. The measure µ is atomless if there are no atoms. The atomlessness
property is implied by the following stronger condition derivable in Savage’s system: for any A ⊆ S
and any 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1, there exists B ⊆ A such that µ(B) = ρµ(A), (cf. Savage, 1972, p.34, Theorem 2).
In the following, it is this stronger condition we will be referring to as the atomlessness condition.
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(2) µ(Ci) = µ(Ai) for all i = 1, 2, . . .;
(3) ∑∞i=1 µ(Ci) = µ(
∪∞
i=1 Ci).
Proof. Suppose that {Ai}∞i=1 is a sequence of pair-wise disjoint subsets of S
such that ∑∞i=1 µ(Ai) ̸= µ(
∪∞
i=1 Ai). The latter implies that exactly one of < or >

























Similarly, there exists some B1 ⊆ B for which µ(B1) = µ(A1). By finite additivity,
we have µ(B − B1) = µ(
∪∞
i=2 Ai). Using the same argument, there exist some
B2 ⊆ B − B1 for which µ(B2) = µ(A2). Repeat this process until we form a
sequence {Bi}∞i=1 of subsets of B such that Bi+1 ⊆ B −
∪i
j=1 Bj and µ(Bi) = µ(Ai)














µ(Ai) = µ(B). (10.3)
From which we conclude, via finite additivity, that µ(B −∪∞i=1 Bi) = 0. The proof
is completed if we let {Ci}∞i=0 be a partition of S such that C0 = (S − B) ∪ (B −∪∞
i=1 Bi) and Ci = Bi for all i = 1, 2, . . .. □
In light of Proposition 10.1, it seems that, probabilistically speaking, there is little
point in restricting to merely finitely additive measures in a system that features
all three properties above. For, given any finitely (but not countably) additive
measure satisfying all three properties, the proof above shows that, for every se-
quence of events that fails countable additivity, there exists another sequence of
events which agrees with the original sequence on all local probabilistic details
such that countable additivity holds under the same measure!
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It may be argued that even though each Ci agrees probabilistically with Ai
for all i’s, this does not mean that {Ai} can be replaced by {Ci}: they are af-
ter all different sequences of events and hence may lead to different configura-
tions/partitions of the state space and different constructions of Savage acts. On
this view, Proposition 10.1 can at most be seen as a peculiar feature of the sys-
tem while maintaining that {Ai} and {Ci} remain as distinctive strings of events
with different probabilistic properties. However, it should be pointed out that
the admission of sequences of events with same local but different global prob-
abilistic properties opens the door to various counter-intuitive examples, which
can be constructed using precisely the imbalance between their different proba-
bilistic characterizations. To name one such example, note that, in the proof of
Proposition 10.1, if let A0 denote S −
∪∞
i=1 Ai, it is easily seen that the proposition
implies that for any partition {Ai}∞i=0 for which countable additivity fails there
exists a partition {Ci}∞i=0 such that the following holds: (1) µ(A0) < µ(C0); (2)









like these, Wakker (1993) constructed two Savage acts that stand in clear violation
of the (strict) Stochastic dominance.14 The latter, however, is an intuitive rationality
principle that is widely adopted in various decision-theoretic models. It would be
scandalous if this rationality principle is violated in Savage’s system.
To be sure, the issue we address here is closely related to what is called the con-
glomerability property for probability measures first defined by de Finetti (1930b).
Without delving too far into this literature, we should briefly mention that Hill
and Lane (1985) confirmed de Finetti’s conjecture that a probability measure is
conglomerable if and only if it is countably additive. Schervish and Seidenfeld
14(Strict) Stochastic dominance mandates that act f is strictly preferred to act g if the probability of
f yielding any consequence that is “at as valuable as” x is no less than that of g for all consequences
x ∈ X and with some strict inequality at some x:
µ[ f ≿ x] ≥ µ[g ≿ x] for all x ∈ X
µ[ f ≿ x] > µ[g ≿ x] for some x ∈ X
}
=⇒ f ≻ g.
Assuming that consequences are linearly ordered with endpoints, Wakker (1993) showed that there
are f and g constructed, respectively, from {Ai} and {Ci} such that f strictly dominates g even
though they have the same expected utility.
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(1986) showed that the failure of countable additivity (for the cases with count-
able partitions) may lead to the failure of dominance. That is, if µ is not countably
additive, then there exist two acts f and g such that f is conditionally preferred
to g for each cell of the partition H = {H1, H2, . . .}, yet f is not unconditionally
preferred to g. This stands in clear violation of Savage’s “loose” version of the
sure-thing principle (cf. Savage (1972, p.22) and Section 5.2 above). So it seems
that not requiring countable additivity can be a somewhat self-undermining strat-
egy for Savage in setting up his decision model, for it may lead to violations of
one of his most fundamental postulates for rational decision making.
10.2. Money pump. Prior to Wakker, Adams (1962) showed that there are sce-
narios in which the failure of countably additivity leads to a money pump. More
precisely, Adams’ example presents a betting situation where a (Bayes) rational
gambler is justified in accepting, with a small fee, each bet of a sequences of bets,
but the acceptance of all the bets leads to sure loss. For illustrative purpose, we
reproduce this example here.15
Example 10.2. Let S = N, X = [−1, 1], and let the identity function u(x) = x
be the utility function on X. Let λ be the finitely but not countably additive
measure on positive integers given in Example A.4.7 (in Appendix A.4) and let η




for all n ∈ S.




for all n ∈ S. (10.4)
The following is a list of simple properties of µ.
(1) µ is a finitely but not countably additive probability measure.
15The following example is altered from Stinchcombe (1997).
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Table 10.1. Gamble gn
Bn = {n} BCn
gn 1/2n+1 − r 1/2n+1


































Now, for each n, consider the gamble gn with payoff described as in the matrix




no matter which state obtains,
but will cost the gambler r ∈ ( 12 , 1) in the event of Bn = {n} (see Table 10.1). Since



















· (1 − r).
Hence, a (Bayes) rational gambler should be willing to pay a small fee (< U[gn])
to accept each gamble. However, the acceptance of all gambles leads to sure loss
no matter which number eventually transpires. To see this, note that for any given




− r · χBn(m)












− r < 0.
That is to say, for each possible outcome m ∈ S, the expected value of getting m
from accepting all the gambles gn’s is negative. 
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10.3. Infinite bets. Adams’ money pump is surprising, because it results in a
series of incoherent choices made by the gambler which is precisely what Savage’s
subjective system is devised to prevent.
In dealing with this difficulty, advocates of finite additivity often argue that
given that a subjective theory is a systematic characterization of coherent decision
making by rational decision makers it is unclear as to what it means for a decision
maker to fulfill the task of coherently choosing infinitely many times. Hence, on
this view, the challenge from Example 10.2, which requires the gambler to accept
infinitely many gambles, is really a non-starter, for it envisages a situation that is
not conceptually admissible within a finitary framework with respect to coherent
choosing which is best captured by finite additivity.16
We however differ from this reading of accepting infinitely many gambles. As
noted before, there is a great deal of idealization built in the current decision-
theoretic framework where we grant our decision maker with unlimited comput-
ing capacity. Again, this step of idealization is grounded in our understanding of
the basic logical and computational apparatuses involved. The process of ideal-
ization is then the process of disregarding the physical limitations of our perfor-
mances as actual reasoners. Admittedly, being deductively all-capable does not
necessarily imply that our super agent has the ability of handling infinitely many
gambles; besides, as we have discussed in the case of non-measurable sets, not all
forms of idealization are meaningful for the purpose of developing a normative
theory for personal decision making. However, it seems that the same inductive
justification for the assumption of logical omniscience can be employed to provide
a conceptual basis for extending the decision problem to include infinite gambles.
Note that the procedure involved in deciding whether or not any given gamble gn
is acceptable is well understood (i.e., calculating its expected utility). The process
of idealization is then the process of disregarding the sheer quantity of gambles
a (Bayes) rational decision maker is obliged to accept, an ability our super agent
16We thank professor Isaac Levi for pointing out this line of objection, which echoes de Finetti’s
position that a rational agent is obliged to accept no more than finitely many fair bets at any time.
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is expected to possess. Unlike non-measurable sets, this process is not something
that we, qua actual reasoners, cannot conceive. It would be a double standard to
insist that the decision maker should be infinitely capable when it comes to com-
putational and inferential performances, but to appeal to physical/psychological
realism when it comes to accepting bets.
11. Countable Additivity and Utility Extension
11.1. Quantitative and qualitative continuities. Note that, in Savage’s repre-
sentation theorem, it is crucial that the underlying algebra is closed under infinite
unions and intersections. Indeed, Savage himself remarks that
It may seem peculiar to insist on σ-algebras as opposed to finitely
additive algebras even in a context where finitely additive mea-
sures are the central objects, but countable union do seems to be
essential to some theorems of §3 . . . (Savage, 1972, p.43)
This “peculiar” feature implies that, in a strictly finitely additive system, it is
not always the case that the convergence of an infinite sequence of events at the
limit point can be characterized in the corresponding probabilistic terms due to
failure of continuity. To be more precise, let (S,F , µ) be a measure space, µ is
said to be continuous from below, if, for any sequence of events {An}∞n=1 and event
A in F , An ↑ A implies that µ(An) ↑ µ(A); it is continuous from above if An ↓ A
implies µ(An) ↓ µ(A), and it is continuous if it is continuous from both above
and below.17 It can be easily shown that continuity fails in general, if µ is merely
finitely additive. As an illustration, it is interesting to note that the strictly finitely
additive measure λ (Example A.4.7) used in constructing the probability measure
in Adams’ example is neither continuous from above nor from below. In fact, it
can be proved that the aforementioned properties of continuity hold if and only if
µ is countably additive.
17As notational conventions, An ↑ A means that A1 ⊆ A2 ⊆ · · · and
∪
i Ai = A, and µ(An) ↑ µ(A)
means that µ(A1) ≤ µ(A2) ≤ · · · and µ(An) → µ(A) as n → ∞. Similar for the other case.
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Intuitively speaking, in order to establish continuity it is necessary that the set
functions in question (in our case derived probability measures) be sensitive to
the set operations of infinite union and intersection at limit points. This balance
is undermined if we allow, on the one hand, infinite unions and intersections but
do not require underlying measures to be countably additive on the other. This
gives rise to the mismatch between accepting infinitely many gambles and the
corresponding probability calculation, which ultimately is what fueled Adams’
money pump.
One way to introduce countable additivity, and hence continuity, to Savage’s
system is to strengthen the underlying qualitative probability so that the afore-
mentioned continuity conditions can be satisfied. Following Villegas (1964), let ⪰
be a qualitative probability (Definition 6.1) defined on a σ-algebra F of the state
space S, ⪰ is said to be monotonely continuous if, given any sequence of events
An ↑ A (An ↓ A) and any event B,
An ⪯ B (An ⪰ B) for all n =⇒ A ⪯ B (A ⪰ B). (11.1)
Moreover, Villegas showed that if a qualitative probability ⪰ is atomless and
monotonely continuous then the numerical probability µ that agrees with ⪰ is
unique and countably additive.18
Since the qualitative probability measures in Savage’s system are non-atomic,
it is sufficient to introduce the the property of monotone continuity in order to
introduce countable additivity. We thus propose the following postulate, P8, to be
added to Savage’s P1-7 (cf. SVG 1-7 above), which is a reformulation of (11.1) in
terms of preferences among Savage acts.
P8: For any a, b ∈ X and for any event B and any sequence of events {An},
18Villegas (1964) showed that monotone continuity is a necessary and sufficient condition for the
agreeing numerical measure to be countably additive. It was further shown that any qualitative
probability defined on a finitely additive algebra can be extended to a qualitative probability σ-
algebra satisfying monotone continuity, fineness, tightness. Thanks largely to Savage’s P6, the
qualitative probabilities derived in the system are atomless, fine, and tight, then countable additivity
obtains if the monotone continuity is in place.
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(i) if An ↑ A and ca ⊕An cb ≾ ca ⊕B cb for all n then ca ⊕A cb ≾ ca ⊕B cb;
(ii) if An ↓ A and ca ⊕An cb ≿ ca ⊕B cb for all n then ca ⊕A cb ≿ ca ⊕B cb.
11.2. Countable additivity and P7. As seen, we have taken the step of intro-
ducing countable additivity as a formal assumption to Savage’s decision model
through an added postulate. Countable additivity, however, cannot replace P7.
The latter, as seen in Section 7.2, is used by Savage to extend utility from sim-
ple acts to acts in general. In this section, we investigate the relations between
countable additivity and P7 in extending utility extensions.
Recall that we have an example (Example 7.8) which satisfies the first six of
Savage’s seven postulates but not the last one. This shows that the seventh pos-
tulate (SVG 7) is independent from other postulates in Savage’s original system.
Upon showing the independence of P7, Savage (1972, p.78) remarked that “[f]inite,
as opposed to countable, additivity seems to be essential to this example [i.e., Ex-
ample 7.8],” and he conjectured that “perhaps, if the theory were worked out in
a countably additive spirit from the start, little or no counterparts of P7 would be
necessary.” It turned out that this is inaccurate. Our aim is to provide a deeper
analysis of Savage’s remark on the relation between countable additivity and util-
ity extension under various versions of P7. Let us start with the footnote Savage
added to the remark above: “Fishburn (1970, Exercise 21, p.213) has suggested an
appropriate wakening of P7.” The following is Fishburn’s suggestion (expressed
using our notation).
P7b: For any event E ∈ F and a ∈ X, if ca ≿E cg(s) for all s ∈ E then ca ≿E g;
and if ca ≾E cg(s) for all s ∈ E then ca ≾E g.
P7b is weaker than SVG 7 in that it compares act g with a constant act instead
of another general act f . Note that Fishburn’s P7b is derived from the following
condition A4b occurred in his discussion on preferences axioms and bounded
utilities (ibid. §10.4).
A4b: Let X be a set of prizes/consequences and ∆(X) be the set of all prob-
ability measure defined on X, then for any P ∈ ∆(X) and any A ⊆ X if
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P(A) = 1 and, for all x ∈ A, δx ≿ (≾)δy for some y ∈ X then P ≿ (≾)δy,
where, in the notation of Section 2.1, δx denotes the probability that de-
generates at x.
A4b, together with other preference axioms discussed in the same section, are
used to illustrate, among other things, the differences between measures that are
countably additive and those that are not. It was proved by Fishburn that the
expected utility hypothesis holds under A4b, that is,
P ≻ Q ⇐⇒ E(u, P) > E(u, Q), for all P, Q ∈ ∆(X) (11.2)
if ∆(X) contains only countably additive measure. Fishburn then showed, by way
of a counterexample, that the hypothesis fails if the set of probability measure
contains also merely finitely additive ones. Because of its direct relevancy to our
discussion on the additivity condition, let us reproduce this example (Fishburn,
1970, Theorem 10.2) here.
Example 11.1. Let X = N+ with u(x) = x/(1 + x) for all x ∈ X. Let ∆(X) be
the set of all probability measures on the set of all subsets of X and defined u on
∆(X) by




u(x) ≥ 1 − ϵ
]
: 0 < ϵ ≤ 1
}
. (11.3)
Define ≻ on ∆(X) by P ≻ Q iff u(P) > u(Q). It is easy to show that A4b
holds under this definition. However if one takes P to be the measure in Ex-
ample A.4.7, i.e., a finitely but not countably additivity probability measure, then
we have u(λ) = 1 + 1 = 2 (cf. Example A.6.2). Hence u(λ) ̸= E(u, λ) = 1. This
shows the expected utility hypothesis fails under this example. 
However, as pointed by Seidenfeld and Schervish (1983, Appendix), Fish-
burn’s proof of (11.2) under A4b used the assumption that ∆(X) is closed under
countable convex combination (condition S4 in Fishburn, 1970, p.137), which in
fact is not derivable in Savage’s system. They show through the following ex-
ample (Example 2.3 in Seidenfeld and Schervish, 1983, p.404) that the expected
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hypothesis fails under the weakened P7b (together with SVG 1-SVG 6) and this is
so even when the underlying probability be countably additive.
Example 11.2. Let S be [0, 1) and X be the set of rational numbers in [0, 1).
Let µ be uniform probability on measurable subsets of S and let all measurable
function f from S to X satisfying V[ f ] = limi→∞ µ
[
f (s) ≥ 1− 2−i
]
be acts. For any
act f , let U[ f ] =
∫
S u( f )dλ where u(x) = x is a utility function on X and define













Further, define f ≻ g if W[ f ] > W[g]. It is easy to see that SVG 1-SVG 6 are
satisfied. To see that W satisfies P7b, note that if for any event E and any a ∈ X,
ca ≿E cg(s) for all s ∈ E, then by (11.4), we have 1 > u(a) ≥ u(g(s)) for any s ∈ E.





E u(g(s))dµ(s) = W[gχE]. The case ca ≾E cg(s) can be
similarly shown. 
In other words, contrary to what Savage had thought, P7b is in fact insuffi-
cient in bringing about a full utility representation theorem even in the presence
of countable additivity. This shows, a fortiori, that countable additivity alone is in-
sufficient in carrying the utility function derived from SVG 1-SVG 6 from simple
acts to general acts.19 Seidenfeld and Schervish (1983, Example 2.2) also showed
that this remains the case even the set of probabilities measure is taken to be closed
under countable convex combination.
Example 11.3. Let S = X = [0, 1] and let µ be uniform probability on measur-
able subsets of S. Let all measurable functions from S to X be acts and define
V[ f ] = inf
{
µ(E) : f takes only finitely many values on EC
}
. (11.5)
19I thank Professor Teddy Seidenfeld for helping me see this point.
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For any act f , let U[ f ] =
∫
S u( f )dλ where u(x) = x is a utility function on X and
define W[ f ] = U[ f ] + V[ f ]. As before, define f ≻ g if W[ f ] > W[g]. We have that
the-defined preference relation ≿ satisfies all of SVG 1-SVG 6 and the property of
countable convex combination, but W is not an expected utility. In fact, W violates
SVG 7. To see this, let f , g be such that
f (x) =

x if x ̸= 1
0 if x = 1
and g(x) = 1 for all x ∈ S.
Then W[ f ] = .5 + 1 = 1.5 and W[g] = 1 + 0 = 1, hence f ≻ g by the definition of
≻ by W. But for any fixed s ∈ S, W[c f (s)] = s, and hence c f (s) ≾ g for all s ∈ S.
But this contracts SVG 7 (taking E = S). 
As we have seen, Savage’s P7 which plays the role of extending the utilities
from simple acts to acts in general cannot be easily weakened even in the presence
of countable additivity. Yet, on the other hand, it is clear that countable additivity
is a stronger condition than finite additivity originally adopted in Savage’s theory.
So, for future work, one might be interested in finding an appropriate weakening
of P7 in a Savage-style system augmented with countable additivity.
12. Concluding Remarks
The debate about finite versus countable additivity often operates on two
fronts. First, there is the concern for mathematical consequences as to whether
or not the kind of additivity in use accords well with demanded mathematical
details. Second, there is the concern for philosophical foundations as to whether
or not the kind of additivity in use is conceptually justifiable (using our intuitions
or rationality principles like the Dutch book argument etc.).
Regarding the first concern, Savage provided a set-theoretic argument against
countable additivity arguing that countable additivity, it is said, is not in good
conformity with demanded set-theoretic details. As we have seen in Section 9, this
line of reasoning is unwarranted: his argument is misguided due to an overlook
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of some crucial technical details concerning large cardinals assumptions and non-
measurable sets. Countable additivity can be coherently incorporated without
serious set-theoretic complications.
As for the second concern with conceptual justification, we have seen above
that there are cases in which finite additivity is insufficient in bringing about a
coherent theory in Savage’s framework due to the failure of continuity on the part
of derived probability measures, which may lead to the construction of money
pump. This is largely due to the imbalance between finite additivity and the
rich background settings employed in his system, which naturally led us to enlist
countable additivity as an additional postulate.
Indeed, as far as Savage’s system is concerned, we see no sufficient reason as
to why the decision model has to be restricted to just finitely additive measures.
The general perception seems to be that there is no need to be dogmatic about
this additivity condition, countable additivity can be employed as needed. Yet, on
the other hand, given how widespread countably additive measures are used in
modern probability theory, it seems it is advantageous to presuppose countable





As we have seen in Chapter II, Savage’s framework of subjective preference
among acts provides a paradigmatic derivation of rational subjective probabil-
ities within a more general theory of rational decisions. The system is based
on a set of possible states of the world, and on acts, which are functions that
assign to each state a “consequence.” The representation theorem states that the
given preference between acts can be represented by their expected utilities, based
on uniquely determined finitely additive probabilities (assigned to sets of states),
and numeric utilities (assigned to consequences). Savage’s derivation, however, is
based on a highly problematic assumption not included among his postulates: for
any consequence of an act in some state, there is a “constant act” which has that
consequence in all states. This chapter is devoted to addressing and solving the
problems caused by this implicit assumption. As the analysis in the next section
shows, this ability to transfer consequences from state to state is, in many cases,
miraculous – including simple scenarios suggested by Savage as natural cases for
applying his theory. In Section 15, we propose a simplification of the system,
which yields the representation theorem without the constant act assumption.
This is done at the cost of reducing the richness of the set of acts included in the
setup. The reduction excludes certain theoretical infinitary scenarios, but includes
the scenarios that should be handled by a system that models human decisions.
This chapter is slightly adapted from a joint work of Gaifman and Liu (2015). A version of this
chapter was presented at the 5th International Workshop on Logic, Rationality and Interaction
(LORI-V), Taipei, Taiwan.
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14. The Problem of the Constant-act Assumption
14.1. Miraculous acts. One crucial element of the system is the notion of con-
stant acts or, in Savage’s phrasing, “acts that are constant” (p.25). The idea is that
a constant act has the same consequence in all states. To be precise, being a con-
stant act is not a property of a single act, but is subject to an axiom that applies
to a bunch of acts: the preference between two constant acts, given some event,
does not depend on the event. The fifth postulate (P5) posits the existence of two
non-equivalent constant acts.
Savage’s representation theorem claims that a preference relation that satisfies
the postulates determines a unique (finitely additive) probability on B and a utility
function (unique up to a linear transformation) which assigns numeric utilities to
consequences, such that f ≿ g iff the expected utility of f is greater or equal to that
of g. As seen in Chapter II the derivation of a probability and a utility is carried
out in two stages. In the first stage a finitely additive probability is derived from
a preference relation, which satisfies the postulates P1–P6. As far as constant acts
are concerned, this derivation does not require more than P5 (the existence of two
non-equivalent constant acts is sufficient). But in the second stage—the derivation
of a utility in chapter 5—Savage tacitly assumes the following:
CAA (constant-acts assumption): For every consequence a ∈ C there exists
a constant act ca, such that ca(s) = a, for all s ∈ S.
Note that after introducing “acts that are constant” Savage hardly uses the
term anymore and one has to infer that such and such acts are constant only from
the notation, which is not always consistent. Fishburn (1970) who observed that
CAA is required for the proof of the representation theorem, has also pointed out
the problematic nature of CAA (cf. Footnote 1 below). Among others who have
also emphasized the need for CAA in Savage’s system are Pratt (1974); Seidenfeld
and Schervish (1983); Shafer (1986). This assumption, we shall argue, does not sit
well with certain simple scenarios of decision making, which Savage considers as
the kind of situations that his system is supposed to handle.
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Table 14.1. Savage omelet example.
Act State
Good Rotten
break into bowl six-egg omelet no omelet and all
five eggs destroyed
break into saucer six-egg omelet and a
saucer to wash
five-egg omelet and
a saucer to wash
throw away five-egg omelet
and one good egg
wasted
five-egg omelet
The difficulty is the fact that the very possibility of some consequence may
depend on the world being in a certain state: the consequence could not exist in a
different state of the world. At the beginning of his book Savage (1972, p.14) proposes
the following omelet-making problem to illustrate the way his system works. The
agent, call him John (in the book it is ‘you’), has to finish making an omelet, which
was begun by his wife. She broke into a bowl five good eggs and John finds a sixth
egg, which can be added to the bowl or thrown away (we assume that there is no
option of keeping it for future use). John does not know if the egg is good or
rotten and has to decide between three acts: (1) Break it into the bowl (2) break it
into a saucer to see if it is good or rotten (3) throw it away. There are two possible
states of the world good and rotten, which are determined by the state of the sixth
egg. The consequences of each act are given in Table 14.1, as it appears in the
book.
John’s ranking of the acts (that is, his preference relation, ≿) reflects both his
probabilistic estimates regarding the likeliness of each state, as well as the utility
values of the consequences; for example, if he is sufficiently confident that the
egg is good and if washing the saucer is, for him, of considerable nuisance, he
will prefer “break into bowl” to “break into saucer”. His preferences for these
three acts cannot, of course, determine the probabilities and utilities, but if the
set of acts over which the preference relation is defined is sufficiently rich (where
“sufficiently rich” is determined by the postulates), then we get probabilities and
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utilities. Obviously the consequence “six-egg omelet” means an omelet made of
the six eggs of the story, in the case where the sixth egg is good. Yet CAA requires
that there should be a constant act that yields that consequence also in the state in
which the sixth egg is rotten. It would involve a miraculous production of a good
six-egg omelet out of five good eggs and a rotten one.1
The problem arises also in the second scenario, which Savage proposes for
the very purpose of clarifying what is implied by a constant act (ibid. p.25). A
person, call her Jane, plans to go with friends on a picnic, and she has to choose
between buying a tennis racquet and buying a bathing suit (assume that buying
both is ruled out for financial reasons). The bathing suit would be handier if the
picnic is held near water where one can swim; the racquet would be better, if
the picnic is not held near water but near a tennis court. One might consider
the possession of a bathing suit and the possession of a tennis racquet as constant,
state-independent consequences. But Savage makes it clear that this would not do,
since the preference order of possessing a racquet and possessing a bathing suit
depends on the state of the world, where the state of the world includes the picnic-
location. Savage argues that the payoffs should be entities such as: “a refreshing
swim with friends, or sitting on a shadeless beach twiddling a brand-new tennis
racquet while one’s friends swim”. That, however, does not make the constant-
acts problem easier. To get a constant act, we have to appeal to the theoretical
possibility that while Jane sits on a shadeless beach twiddling a brand new tennis
racket, she has somehow the enjoyment of a refreshing swim with her friends.
Perhaps the constant-acts problem is not so difficult if we consider getting
sums of money, or some other quantitative goods, as being of equivalent value to
the consequences in question. In the omelet scenario, John may consider getting
$k as being equivalent to a six-egg omelet and this can serve also as a payoff
1 In passing, Fishburn (1970, p.166-7) also voiced this unsatisfactory feature of CAA. He pointed
out that, for any states s, s′ ∈ S, if W(s) and W(s′) are respectively the sets of consequences that
may occur under s and s′, then it might well be that W(s) ̸= W(s′) (or even that W(s)∩W(s′) = ∅),
in which case the CAA fails. He remarked that he is not aware of any axiomatic system that does
not make the assumption that W(s) = W(s′) = C for all s, s′ ∈ S, and he left this line of research as
an open question (see also Fishburn, 1981, p.162).
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in the state “rotten”. But it is not clear what the equivalence of $k with a six-egg
omelet means in the given context where John has to finish making the omelet. We
may consider replacing Table 14.1 by the following table, in which the entries are
dollar amounts; this would turn the problem into a problem of choosing between
gambles. (Obviously, k is assumed to be the largest payoff, l is the smallest, m > n
Act State
Good Rotten
Gamble 1 $k $l
Gamble 2 $m $n
Gamble 3 $p $q
and q > n.) And we may consider offering John the choice of not completing
the task – throwing out all eggs – and getting in return to choose a gamble from
the table above. But this artificial dubious device undermines the big attraction
of Savage’s system: its ability to evaluate consequences that do not consist in
winning or loosing sums of money or goods. If all consequences are to be replaced
by dollar sums before the system is applied, the main point of the system is lost.
One objective of this chapter is to show that CAA is not required for applying
Savage’s system to any finitistic problem, that is to say, a problem that is stated in
terms of finitely many evants, finitely many acts and finitely many possible consequences.
All that we need is the existence of two distinguished constant acts.
14.2. The Significance of the Set of Acts and the Boolean Algebra. The
weaker the postulates and the presuppositions which are needed to get the rep-
resentation theorem, the stronger the theorem is. The basic presupposition of
Savages system is that the preference relation is defined over some very rich set
of acts. In some places Savage even considers every function from states to conse-
quences to be an act, in situations in which the set of states, as well as the set of
consequences, has the cardinality of the continuum. This is exorbitant. Of course
the set of acts should be sufficient for handling the kind of problems that the sys-
tem is designed for. As a rule, these problems are stated in terms of finitely many
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simple acts, where a simple act is an act, f , which has finitely many values, such
that, f−1(x) is an event (a member of the Boolean algebra B) for each consequence
x that is a value of f . Such acts are called by Savage gambles.
In the initial scenario the agent is supposed to decide between given options
that belong to some finite set of simple acts. P6 implies however that the prefer-
ence is to be defined over richer sets that involve more refined events (cf. Theo-
rem 15.3 below). But, as we shall show, we never need more than simple acts. (In
Section 15.2.2, we comment on how our model can be generalized to treat certain
infinitary cases.)
Now the richness of the set of acts is also determined by the richness of
the Boolean algebra B of events, namely the collection of subsets that constitute
events. As noted, Savage considers possibilities in which this Boolean algebra
consists of all subsets of real numbers (cf. Chapter III). But his proof of the repre-
sentation theorem requires only that it be a σ-algebra, that is, closed under unions
of countable many sets. Our results can be now stated as follows:
i. While we assume that the Boolean algebra is a σ-algebra, we can derive the
representation theorem if we consider only a preference defined over simple
acts, which include two non-equivalent constant ones.
ii. Moreover, we can also give up the assumption that the algebra is a σ-algebra
and get the representation theorem, nonetheless. In fact, we need only a
countable Boolean algebra so that the simple acts defined over it satisfy P6.
(i) is proved by using Savage’s derivation of probabilities from two constant acts.
We deviate from him in the derivation of expected utilities for simple acts (where
the set of consequences is arbitrary). In the next section, we lay out the basic
ideas behind our construction. (ii) is a more difficult result that is based on a
more difficult derivation of probabilities, we hope to address in future work. We
will highlight in Section 16 difference between our model and Savage’s system




We seek to develop a theory of context-dependent decision making where the
relevancy and the value of a consequence depend on the contexts under which
it arises. We assume that the set of acts consists of those acts that are either
included in the given initial decision problem (like f1, f2, f3 in the omelet example)
or generated by applying one or more of the axioms (under the assumption of the
background algebra). We show that a variant of Savage’s representation theorem
can be derived without appealing to SVG 7 or CAA.
15.1. Deriving probability and ordinal utility without CAA. Recall from
Section 6 that to derive subjective probability from preferences Savage uses SVG 1-
6. The construction starts with a derivation of qualitative probabilities.
Definition 15.1. For any events E, F, say that E is weakly more probable than F,
written E ⪰ F (or F ⪯ E), if, for any constant acts ca and cb such that ca ≿ cb,
ca ⊕E cb ≿ ca ⊕F cb. (15.1)
Savage’s SVG 4 guarantees that (15.1) does not depend on the choice of the
pair of constant acts. Obviously, this concept does not rely on CAA. It is also
not difficult to show that ≿ is a qualitative probability (Theorem 6.4 above). The
task is to show that this qualitative probability admits a numerical representation:
there exists a real-valued probability measure µ defined on an algebra of events
satisfying:
E ⪰ F ⇐⇒ µ(E) ≥ µ(F). (15.2)
15.1.1. Numerical probability. As noted in Chapter III, Savage takes as back-
ground algebra F the power set of the state space. In both Chapter II and this
chapter, we deviate from Savage’s approach by considering a σ-algebra of S over
which µ is defined. (That one can do without the assumption of a σ-algebra but
with a countable algebra is, as noted above, beyond the scope of discussion in
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this dissertation.) So far only two non-equivalent constant acts are required.2 This
then leads us to the following theorem.
Theorem 15.2 (Savage). Let ≿ be a preference relation among acts. Suppose
that ≿ satisfies SVG 1-6 and that the Boolean algebra F of events is a σ-algebra,
then there exists a unique (finitely additive) probability measure µ for which (15.2)
holds.
The proof of the theorem establishes also the following result (i.e., Corol-
lary 6.14 above), which holds under the assumption that the algebra of events
is a σ-algebra. (Note that, unlike Theorem 15.2, Theorem 15.3 fails if the assump-
tion that the Boolean algebra is a σ-algebra is omitted. A weaker version of it
holds: The set of all ρ for which the equality holds is dense in (0, 1).)
Theorem 15.3. Given the probability measure µ obtained above, for any event
E and any 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1, there exists some F ⊆ E such that µ(F) = ρµ(E).
15.1.2. Utilities for acts. In deriving numerical utilities for acts, we need neither
SVG 7 nor CAA. All we need are two distinct constant acts, say c0 and c1, which
will serve as reference points for which an ordinal utility function can be defined.
The following are some simple properties of the two distinguished constant acts,
which are immediate from the definitions and Theorem 15.2 above.
Lemma 15.4. For any events E, F,
(1) µ(E) > µ(F) iff c1 ⊕E c0 ≻ c1 ⊕F c0,
(2) µ(E) = µ(F) iff c1 ⊕E c0 ∼ c1 ⊕F c0.
We show that, under SVG 1-6 and the assumption that there exist two constant
acts c0 and c1, the agent’s preferences can be represented by an ordinal utility func-
tion in Savage’s system without appealing to CAA. To this end, we first observe
2This observation is also noted in Fishburn (1981, p.161) where he remarked that “[as far as obtain-
ing a unique probability measure is concerned] Savage’s C [i.e., the set of consequences] can contain
as few as two consequences.” See Section 6 or Fishburn (1970, §14.1-3) for an exposition of Savage’s
proof of (15.2), and see especially Fishburn’s §14.3 for an illustration of the role of Savage’s SVG 1-6




c1 ⊕E f c0 ∼ f






c1 ⊕E f c0
Figure 15.1. The case where c1 ≿ f ≿ c0
that to each act f ∈ A satisfying c1 ≿ f ≿ c0 there corresponds a combined act
using the two distinguished constant acts which is indifferent to f under ≿.
Lemma 15.5. For and f ∈ A, if c1 ≿ f ≿ c0, there exists an event E f such that
c1 ⊕E f c0 ∼ f . (15.3)
In proving this lemma, we make full use of the derived personal probability µ
from Theorem 15.2, the proof given here is somewhat standard in utility theory.
Figure 15.1 provides an illustration of the general method involved in the proof,
where c1 ⊕E f c0 is the act that yields c1 if E f occurs, status quo otherwise. The
aim is to find the appropriate E f so that the given event f is indifferent to this
combined act.








∣∣∣ c1 ⊕E c0 ≾ f}.
It is easily seen that B and C are nonempty, for at least we have S ∈ B and ∅ ∈ C.
Let µ be the probability measure derived from Theorem 15.2, Next, consider the
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∣∣∣ E ∈ C}. (15.4)
Let α∗ = infBµ and α∗ = sup Cµ. Note that, for any a > α∗, there must exist some
a′ ∈ Bµ such that a > a′ ≥ α∗ (for, otherwise, a is a lower bound of Bµ strictly
greater than α∗, which contradicts the assumption α∗ = infBµ). Since a′ ∈ Bµ
then, by the definition of Bµ in (15.4), there is some event, say, F′ ∈ B such that
µ(F′) = a′. Further, let F be an event such that µ(F) = a (the existence of F is
guaranteed by Theorem 15.3). Then, by Lemma 15.4, µ(F) = a > µ(F′) = a′ ≥ α∗
implies c1 ⊕F c0 ≻ c1 ⊕F′ c0 ≿ f . It follows, via SVG 1, that, for any F,
µ(F) > α∗ =⇒ F /∈ C. (15.5)
The contrapositive of (15.5) says that, for any F, F ∈ C implies that µ(F) ≤ α∗. In
other words, α∗ is an upper bound of Cµ, and hence α∗ = sup Cµ ≤ α∗. Using a
symmetric argument one can show that α∗ ≥ α∗. Hence α∗ = α∗.
Next, let E f be such that µ(E f ) = α∗ = α∗ (again, the existence of E f is guar-
anteed by Theorem 15.3). The proof is completed if we can show that E f ∈ B ∩ C.
Suppose, to the contrary, E f /∈ B, then, by P1, f ≻ c1 ⊕E f c0. The latter im-
plies, via P6, there exists a partition {Pi}ni=1 such that, for all i = 1, . . . , n, f ≻
c1 ⊕Pi
[
c1 ⊕E f c0
]
, that is,
f ≻ c1 ⊕E f ∪Pi c0 (i = 1, . . . , n). (15.6)
Then, it follows that E f ∪ Pi ∈ C for all i = 1, . . . , n. On the other hand, note that
Pi’s form a partition of S, we consider two cases:
(1) If for some Pj in the partition we have µ(E f ∪ Pj) > µ(E f ) = α∗, then, by
(15.5), E f ∪ Pj /∈ C, a contradiction.
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(2) If µ(E f ∪ Pj) ≤ µ(E f ) = α∗ for all j = 1, . . . , n, then it is easily seen that
µ(E f ) = 1. By Corollary 15.4(2), it follows that c1 ⊕E f c0 ∼ c1 ⊕S c0 = c1,
and hence E f ∈ B, but this contradicts the hypothesis E f /∈ B.
Hence, E f must be in B. Similarly, it can be shown that E f ∈ C. Then we have
E f ∈ B ∩ C. This completes the proof of the lemma. □
Remark. 1. In light of the lemma, for any f ∈ A satisfying c1 ≿ f ≿ c0, let E f
be such that (15.3) holds, we define the utility of f to be
U[ f ] := µ(E f ), (15.7)
where µ is obtained through Theorem 15.2 and E f is from (15.3).
2. Notice that, if there exists another event E′f for which (15.3) holds, then we have
c1 ⊕E f c0 ∼ c1 ⊕E′f c0. It follows, via Lemma 15.4(2), that µ(E
′
f ) = µ(E f ), hence
U[ f ] is well defined.
3. For the two distinguished constant acts c1 and c0, trivially we have Ec1 = S and
Ec0 = ∅, then (15.7) yields that U[c1] = 1 and U[c0] = 0.
4. It is plain that U does not need to be uniquely defined by (15.7): if h is any
monotonically increasing function on the reals (or any order preserving func-
tion), then U can also be defined by h ◦ µ.
5. If f ≻ c1 (or c0 ≻ f ), it is easy to see that Lemma 15.5 can be adjusted to show
that there exists some E f such that f ⊕E f c0 ∼ c1 (or c1 ⊕E f f ∼ c0), in which
case U can be defined standardly as in (15.9) below.
Theorem 15.6. Let ≿ be a preference relation over acts, if ≿ satisfies SVG 1-6,
then there exists a real-valued function U on A satisfying, for all f , g ∈ A,
f ≿ g ⇐⇒ U[ f ] ≥ U[g], (15.8)
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where




if f ≻ c1,
µ(E f ) if c1 ≿ f ≿ c0,
µ(E f )
µ(E f )−1
if c0 ≻ f .
(15.9)
15.2. Context-dependent expected utility for simple acts. The strength of
SVG 1-6 does not end with Theorem 15.6, we show that under these postulates
the utility of a simple act can be further decomposed into (context-dependent) ex-
pected utilities. After proving this claim, we shall comment on how this method
can be extended to certain infinitary cases.
15.2.1. Finitary cases. Let f ∈ A0 be a simple act. Then there are finitely
many consequences, say, x1, . . . , xn, and a partition {P1, . . . , Pn} of the state space
S where each Pi is the set of states under which xi obtains, that is,
Pi = f−1(xi) (i = 1, . . . , n),





We seek to define a utility function u over consequences such that the utility of a
simple act U[ f ] can be represented by its expected utility:





where u(Pi, xi) is the utility of consequences xi given that Pi occurs. We thus speak
of context-dependent utilities where the relevancy of value of a consequence depend
on the context Pi it arises. To this end, let us first adopt the following notation:
c∗x(s) :=

x if s ∈ E,
0 if s /∈ E,
for some E ∈ B. (15.12)
We refer to c∗x as a locally constant act which yields x in all states in E, 0 (status
quo) otherwise. It is obvious that c∗x is a generalization of Savage’s notion of
constant act. But, unlike Savage, we do not impose any structural assumptions on
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c∗x, in particular E needs not to be the universal set S. With (15.12), a simple act f
satisfying (15.10) can be conveniently expressed by




c∗x3 ⊕P3 (· · · ⊕Pn−1 c
∗
xn) · · ·
))
. (15.13)
The goal is to represent simple acts in the form of (15.13) by expected utilities.
Observe that, if µ(Pi) = 0 for some Pi, then the term µ(Pi)u(Pi, xi) in (15.11)
is 0, in which case xi can be seen as having no contribution to the total utility
calculation. As a rule, one can assign in this situation an arbitrary finite value to
the consequence f (s) where s ∈ Pi. If, on the other hand, µ(Pi) ̸= 0, consider act
c∗xi ⊕Pi c0. Then in light of Theorem 15.6, define the utility of xi in Pi in terms of
the utility of c∗xi ⊕Pi c0 as follows
u(Pi, xi) :=

c if µ(Pi) = 0,
U[c∗xi⊕Pi c0]
µ(Pi)
if µ(Pi) ̸= 0,
(15.14)
where c can be any number in [0, 1]. Finally, it remains to verify that ≿ among
simple acts indeed admits an expected utility representation using the probability
measure µ and utility function u given above. We put this claim in the form of the
following theorem.
Theorem 15.7. Let ≿ be a preference relation over acts, if ≿ satisfies SVG 1-
6, then there exist a probability measure µ on events and a utility function u on
events and the set of consequences such that, for any f , g ∈ A0,





















Proof. Let µ be the subjective provability measure derived in Theorem 15.2.
By Theorem 15.6, there exists a utility function U for which (15.8) holds. We
show that if U takes the form of (15.9) then it can be further decomposed into
(15.11) using the utility function defined in (15.14). To simplify matters, assume
that f = c∗x1 ⊕P1 c
∗
x2 and that c1 ≿ c
∗
xi ⊕Pi c0 ≿ c0 (i = 1, 2). (The more general
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case of (15.13) can be similarly shown). Let us consider the non-trivial case where
















It is not difficulty to see that u(P1, x1), u(P2, x2) ≤ 1. Apply Theorem 15.3 again,
we get F1 ⊆ P1 and F2 ⊆ P2 such that µ(F1) = µ(Ex1) and µ(F2) = µ(Ex2), then, by
Lemma 15.4 we have
c1 ⊕F1 c0 ≡ c1 ⊕Ex1 c0 ∼ c
∗
x1 ⊕P1 c0,







= u(P1, x1) and
µ(F2)
µ(P2)
= u(P2, x2). (15.17)
Note that {P1, P2} partitions S and F1 ⊆ P1, F2 ⊆ P2, it follows, via SVG 2 and that











= c1 ⊕(P1∩F1)∪(P2∩F2) c0
= c1 ⊕F1∪F2 c0.
(15.18)
Finally, by the definition of U in (15.7), (15.17) and (15.18) imply




= µ(F1) + µ(F2) = µ(P1)u(P1, x1) + µ(P2)u(P2, x2).
This shows, via Theorem 15.6, that if f is the form of c∗x1 ⊕P1 c
∗
x2 , it indeed admits
a context-dependent expected utility representation. □
15.2.2. Infinitary Cases. Our method can be generalized to treat certain infini-
tary case. There are acts, f , in which there are countably many consequences, say
x1, x2, . . . , xn, . . . such that f−1(xn) is a non-null set for every n. In other words,
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we allow the number of cells of the partition in (15.10) to be unbounded. Then
(15.14) and Theorem 15.7 also apply to this case, where the expected utility of f













provided that ∑∞i=1 µ
[
f (s) = xi
]
·
∣∣u( f−1(xi), xi)∣∣ converges. It is defined as the
sum of the positive values minus the sum of the negative ones. Note that µ does
not need to be countably additive. The expectation in that case is defined for
discrete random variables, for which the sum absolutely converges.
Finally, we point out that Savage needed the CAA because he wanted to extend
utilities to continuous random variables, that is, he wanted to define the integral:
∫
X(s) dµ(s) (15.20)
where X is a measurable function, which is interpreted in his system as a general
act with potentially uncountably many consequences, and µ is a finitely additive
probability. This can be seen as an attempt to integrate modern measure theory
(albeit with finitely additive probability measures) into the theory of expected util-
ities. Mathematically this is interesting. But it is unclear whether this is required
for applying his system to decision scenarios which a rational human agent is
expected to face.
16. Concluding Remarks
Savage’s method of deriving expected utilities for simple acts is different from
what we have just shown. As detailed in Section 7, his approach relies on defining
a von Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM) lottery space in terms of the derived sub-
jective probability measure µ and the set of all simple acts in order that a vNM
utility function u for consequences can be derived. More precisely, the method
adopted by Savage in deriving the utility function u for consequences includes
the following logical steps:
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(1) Each simple act f induces a simple probability function (a vNM lottery),
written p f , on the set C of consequences as follows
p f (xi) =

µ[ f (s) = xi] if xi ∈ f (S),
0 if xi ∈ C − f (S).
(2) To each vNM lottery p (a simple probability measure defined on C) there
corresponds a simple act fp. To define fp, let x1, x2, . . . , xn be an enumer-
ation of the members of C that are in the support of p and let {Pi}ni=0 be
a partition of S such that
µ(Pi) =

0 i = 0,
p(xi) i = 1, . . . , n.
Then define fp as follows
fp(s) =

x0 s ∈ P0,
xi s ∈ Pi (i = 1, . . . , n),
where x0 is an arbitrary consequence that is not in the support of p.
(3) Show that, under SVG 1-6, if two simple acts f , g induce the same proba-
bility measure on C then it must be that f ∼ g, that is,
p f = pg =⇒ f ∼ g.
(4) Under the above constructions, each vNM lottery can be identified with
a equivalent class of Savage simple acts under ≿.
(5) Induce a preference relation ≿∗ among vNM lotteries:
p ≿∗ q if fp ≿ fq.
(6) Finally, show that if ≿ satisfies SVG 1-6 then ≿∗ satisfies all the vNM
axioms. The latter then yields a utility function u for all consequences.
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Note that in order for this method of deriving utility to fully function it is
crucial that CAA is in place, this is because, under the above constructions, each
constant ca (a ∈ C) corresponds to the vNM lottery that degenerates at a, and the
latter is needed in order to apply the vNM expected utility theorem. In contrast,
our approach does not need to go through such a construction.
A different approach to state-dependent utility representation has been stud-
ied by Karni et al. (1983), Schervish et al. (1990), among others. These works
are based on the analytic framework of Anscombe and Aumann (1963). The ax-
iomatic system developed by Anscombe and Aumann (A-A) was intended to be
a “simplification” of Savage’s system (Savage, 1954), and the objective, as stated
by the authors, was “to define the person’s probabilities in terms of chances, by
an extension of the von Neumann-Morgenstern theory.” More precisely, the A-
A theory starts by enriching Savage’s system with an auxiliary randomization
mechanism which introduces vNM lotteries over consequences, then, under the
standard vNM axioms, a utility function for consequences can be arrived at. The
person’s subjective probability over states is further separated from the derived
utility function by imposing an additional, i.e., the dominance axiom. The result
is a state-independent representation theorem. Based on a proposal of Karni et al.
(1983), Schervish et al. (1990) generalizes the A-A theory by allowing the vNM
lotteries to be defined on a product space of both consequences and states, from
which a vNM utility function for each consequence-state lottery can be extracted
(and hence the utilities are taken to be state-dependent). The agent’s subjective
probability is separated from this derived state-dependent utility by a consistency
axiom (see Schervish et al. (1990, p.864), see also Karni (1993)).
Observe that the A-A theory reverses the inferential order originally adopted
by Savage in that the subjective probability in the A-A system is derived from per-
sonal utility which in turn is defined in terms of some extraneous chance mecha-
nism (cf. Figure 19.1). The resulting theory is hence a dualistic system featuring
both objective and subjective probabilities. Admittedly, this approach has certain
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Figure 16.1. Inferential orders in various theories of expected utility.
computational advantages in the sense that the mathematical representation the-
orem proved in A-A is considerably simpler than that in Savage’s original theory.
There is, however, an undue conceptual complication. As known, one primary
goal of Savage’s project was to provide a subjective interpretation of probability for
Bayesian inferences in general. The A-A system impoverishes this goal by essen-
tially defining subjective probabilities in terms of objective ones. Our proof, on
the other hand, follows Savage’s original approach where we make no reference
to any chance mechanism, our model remains as a purely subjective framework.
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Epistemic Limitations and Bayesian Priors in Games
17. Introduction
The epistemic approach to non-cooperative game theory is largely directed
at refining various game-theoretic “solution concepts” with explicitly articulated
epistemic profiles of different parties of a given game, where the players’ choices
of the best courses of actions are determined not only by the structure of the un-
derlying game (including the set of players, their possible actions, payoffs, and
preferences, etc.) but also by their beliefs about the structure of the game, their
beliefs about other players’ beliefs about the game, and so on. An adequate game-
theoretic model hence seeks to include, as a constituent component of the model,
systematic representations of players’ beliefs. Two main types of formal repre-
sentation of beliefs are widely adopted in the philosophical literature, namely the
Kripke doxastic structure K and the Bayesian probabilistic structure P . Both structures
are constructed on some possible world framework where an agent’s belief in a
given proposition (or belief about the occurrence of an event in the probabilistic
case) is modeled in terms of various qualitative and quantitative properties among
sets of possible worlds (or sets of possible states of the world).
In a game-theoretic setting, each possible world corresponds to a complete
description of an alternative way a given game may evolve, and it is customary in
game theory that players’ beliefs be modeled using Aumann information structures
Early versions of different sections of this chapter were presented at the Constructive in Logic and
Applications, New York, USA; the 4th Formal Epistemology Festival, Germany; the 67th European
Meeting of the Econometric Society, Sweden; National Chung Cheng University, Taiwan and Peking
University, Beijing, China. An abbreviated version of Section 18 was published as Liu (2013).
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I , a game-theoretic counterpart of Kripke structure, where different representa-
tions of beliefs are seen as different measures of information distributions among
players. The Bayesian probabilistic model of beliefs is echoed in game-theoretic
analyses by various Harsanyi type structures T . Briefly, depending on the particular
modeling, a type is a probability function that measures a player’s uncertainties
about other players’ payoffs (or actions, preferences, beliefs, etc.), which is consid-
ered as an integral part of overall doxastic assessments of the player.
Discussions on various representations of knowledge/beliefs in games and
their interrelationships are readily available in Aumann (1999a,b), Battigalli and
Bonanno (1999), Halpern (2003), Samuelson (2004), Pacuit and Roy (2015), to name
a few. The main objectives of the present work are to (1) address various concep-
tual difficulties involved in these multi-agent systems, and (2) attempt a synthesis
of the aforementioned belief structures (K, I ;P , T ) under two epistemic restric-
tions on probability assignments in all probabilistic models of beliefs:
Imprecise Probabilities (IP): The agent’s beliefs are measured by imprecise
probabilities (a set of subjective probabilities).
No Self-referential Probabilities for Acts (NSPA): No subjective probabil-
ities should be assigned to the players’ own actions that are under their
current deliberations.
To limit the scope of our discussion, in this work, we do not engage in the philo-
sophical debate about the first principle as to whether or not rational agents’
beliefs should be represented by sharp probabilities. Instead, we take for granted
that they are represented by imprecise ones. Our focus is rather to see how differ-
ent belief structures fit into one another with IP in sight.1
1The literature on imprecise probabilities is vast: Early works on intervals/sets of probabilities
include Koopman (1940), Smith (1961), Good (1962), Dempster (1967). These were followed by a
systematic philosophical account defended by Levi (1974, 1986) that the credal state of a rational
agent should be represented by indeterminate probability (see also Levi, 1985, for his distinction
between indeterminate and imprecise probabilities). The current term ‘imprecise probaiblities’ was
coined by Walley in his influential book ‘Statistical Reasoning with Imprecise Probabilities’ (1991).
Systems that use or motivate IP include Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), Seidenfeld et al. (1995).
Gilboa et al. (2008) discusses a range of models in economic literature that use IP as representations
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Different versions of the second, i.e., the NSPA principle, have been defended
by Spohn (1977), Levi (1989, 1996), Gaifman (1999), among others. We stress that
this principle, which places a strict restriction on assigning subjective probability
to agents’ self-actions, is incompatible with some of the existing game-theoretic
models. In particular, according to Aumann (1987, p.2) “subjective probabilities
should be assignable to every prospect, including that of players choosing certain
strategies in certain games,” where “every prospect” includes assigning probabil-
ities to the players own actions, and hence contradicts the NSPA principle. The
aim of the next section is to provide a detailed conceptual analysis of this conflict.
18. Epistemic Limitations
Note that by “subjective probabilities” Aumann means that each player is as-
sumed to “conform to the Savage theory.” In what follows, we point out that this
take on Savage’s conception of personal probability is misguided: there is no evi-
dence that Savage’s theory suggests that the agent’s subjective probability can be
assigned to just “every prospect” including the agent’s own actions. This discus-
sion will then be followed by an analysis of the notion of all-inclusive states, over
which Aumann’s subjective probabilities (player’s priors) are defined. We show,
by advancing a similar argument given by Spohn (1977) and Levi (1996), that in
the presence of NSPA there is a serious conceptual difficulty in allowing Bayesian
priors to be assigned to states that are all-inclusive.
18.1. Self-prediction and subjective probability. The so-called no subjective
probability for acts thesis was already hinted at in Savage’s discussion on the
“small world” semantics where the discussion seems to suggest that probabilities
for acts play no role in individual decision making. To illustrate, let us revisit the
example provided by Savage. Suppose that John is torn between either (i) buying
a sedan, (ii) buying a convertible, or (iii) keeping the money without buying any
car. In a simple decision scenario, it is conceivable that the decision maker’s
of decision makers’ beliefs (multi-prior models). For recent discussions/surveys of philosophical
motivations for employing IP, see Joyce (2010), Hájek and Smithson (2012), Bradley (2014).
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choice of action is solely determined by her preferences over the consequences to
which each action leads: in our example, if John prefers the convertible the most,
then he should just go ahead and buy a convertible, “[c]hance and uncertainty are
considered to have nothing to do with the situation” (Savage, 1972, p.83).
At this point, one might object by suggesting that if, say, John likes equally the
sedan, he might come to make a decision on his purchasing either a convertible or
a sedan by, say, flipping a coin or by utilizing some internal randomizing mecha-
nism (whim, impulse, etc.). Then, in this case, there seems to be a sense in which
one could say that John will take such-and-such action with so-and-so probability.
However, the very formulation of the objection makes it clear that the probability
in question is essentially about the randomizing device in use, which can hardly
qualify for the agent’s genuine subjective probability assignment for his actions.
In a more complicated scenario where more careful deliberation is required,
the agent’s actions are further evaluated in terms of different consequences ob-
tained under different contingencies, where different contingencies are seen as
different decision situations under which the actions are to take place. Accord-
ing to Savage, it is these possible decision situations (i.e., states of the world)
that are subject to the agent’s probabilistic estimations. Say that John has finally
made a decision that he will buy a convertible and this is because he realized
that he will be taking a vacation in Monterey, California next month, in which
case the enjoyment of driving a convertible by the seaside in warm spring breeze
will be maximally materialized. In other words, the agent’s choices of actions are
not deliberated in isolation: they are always placed in various decision contexts in
which the acts are being evaluated, where these contexts come with descriptions
of various decision situations and different consequences as results of implement-
ing different actions. These considerations led Savage to his belief-act-consequence
model, where acts are taken as functions mapping from (act-independent) states
to consequences, and it is the states over which the acts are defined that are the
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subject of uncertainty but not the acts themselves. Hence, Aumann’s universal
probability assignment is not completely in line with Savage’s theory.
Note that even if we grant that Aumann’s notion of subjective probabilities be
understood through some general Bayesian betting interpretation, it is not difficult
to see that no non-trivial subjective probabilities can be meaningfully assigned to
one’s own acts.2 To wit, suppose that John is faced with choices of either going to
an Italian restaurant or a French restaurant for dinner. In an attempt to elicit his
subjective probabilities assigned to his two possible actions, John is offered a bet
with payoffs as follows
(1) win $X if John goes to an Italian restaurant,
(2) nothing if John goes to a French restaurant.
Now suppose that John’s subjective probability for his going to an Italian restau-
rant is p, then he should be willing to pay a fee of pX to accept the bet in exchange
of a reward of X on the event that he indeed is going to have Italian food for
dinner. So far, the example accords well with the standard Bayesian betting inter-
pretation of subjective probabilities. But situation changes once we notice that the
mere fact that John is willing to accept the bet of his going to an Italian restaurant
at a cost of pX > 0 implies that he will be going to an Italian restaurant for sure!
For, otherwise, it would be extremely unwise for John to knowingly pay a fee of
pX but actually go to a French restaurant while gaining nothing from the bet he
paid for, where the lost can easily be avoided by simply rejecting the bet. And
this is true for any 0 < p ≤ 1. Furthermore, if p = 0 then this means that John
will be going to a French restaurant for sure. Then it follows that the betting rate
upon which John is willing to pay a fair price for his acts collapses into 1 or 0.
In other words, personal probabilities tend to be “gappy” when it comes to the
agents’ own actions.
2See Spohn (1977) and Levi (1989) for further discussion on the argument presented here. Rabi-
nowicz (2002) and Levi (2007) contain a pair of exchange on Levi’s well-known thesis “deliberation
crowds out prediction.”
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To be sure, there shall be no mystery as to why the above betting interpretation
falls apart: unlike the car example where John has no control over the occurrences
of the events in the decision problem he is facing, namely the weather condition
in Monterey next month (although he does seem to have a strong belief that it
will be good), the “events” of his going to either restaurant in the betting situation
above are under his immediate control, in which case the values of his actions of
going to Italian or French restaurant are solely determined by the values of the
consequences they lead to: Italian dinner together with $X reward versus French
food. Then he should act upon whichever way he favors. Again, “chance and
uncertainty are considered to have nothing to do with the situation.”
Thus it seems that, when understood either in the sense of Savage’s original
theory of personal probability or under standard Bayesian betting interpretation,
no subjective probabilities can be meaningfully assigned by an agent to his or her
own actions that are being deliberated, or, more generally, to events whose occur-
rences depend directly on the agent’s actions.3 This restriction on Bayesian prior
assignments however poses a serious challenge to many classical game-theoretic
models. This is because the states of the world in these systems usually include
complete descriptions of players’ actions/strategies and the players are assumed to
have prior probabilistic assessments over the occurrences of these states. Then, if
3Spohn (1977) remarked that the decision model developed in Jeffrey (1965) is problematic in that
the subjective probabilities in Jeffrey’s system are assignable to act-dependent events. More precisely,
unlike Savage’s system where there is a strict separation of states, consequences and acts with events
comprising solely states, Jeffrey’s model has a single algebra of events consisting of descriptions of
all aspects of decision making processes, then a probability assignment to these events unavoidably
includes an assignment to acts, and hence contradict the NSPA principle. Spohn then mounted a
similar criticism against Luce and Krantz (1971) arguing that the occurrence of certain event A in
their model implies that fA (a Savage-style act partially defined on A) is performed, and hence,
according to Spohn, their systems “contain hidden probabilities for acts.” Here, we point out that
there seems to be a misunderstanding on the part of Spohn. Note that one main motivation for Luce
and Krantz to define acts as partial, instead of total, functions mapping from states to consequences
is that they want to avoid a known interpretational difficulty in Savage’s system concerning the
meaningfulness of some structurally constructed acts (see also Fishburn, 1981; Shafer, 1986). In
Luce and Krantz’s system, a (conditional) act fA is taken to be an act that is meaningful under A
(it needs not to be definable in states outside A). Hence in Luce and Krantz (1971) it is not that the
events are act-dependent, it is rather that the meaningfulness of acts relies on the events over which
they are defined. This is an important issue in conditional/partial-acts based systems, we hope to
address it more fully elsewhere.
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probability assignments to self-actions are to be avoided then no Bayesian priors
should be assigned by the players to those states which contain descriptions of their
own actions. To substantiate this remark, let us turn to a more detailed analysis
of the nature of states. We will start with a related and recurring issue concerning
different epistemic viewpoints in modeling games.
18.2. The problem of asymmetric epistemic viewpoints. In a series of ex-
changes with Harsanyi (1982a,b) on the foundations of Bayesian games, Kadane
and Larkey (1982a,b) argued that many of the core assumptions that are the bases
of various “solution concepts” in classical game theory, assumptions like the com-
mon knowledge of rationality on the behaviors of the participants in a game and
that of their prior probabilistic judgments on the incomplete information about
the underlying game etc., are formed from the perspective of an external observer;
yet, from the point of view of an individual player, other players’ behaviors and
beliefs (including their higher order beliefs about yet other players’ behaviors and
beliefs, etc.) are just as much parts of the setting of the game as everything else.
Hence, they argued, it seems that no principle of rationality can mandate that one
should, or even could, take the stance of an external observer and accept solution
recommendations prescribed from “the above and beyond,” because the imple-
mentation of which has far exceeded the individual player’s epistemic capacity.
Let us refer to the asymmetry between different levels of viewpoints in modeling
a game, namely the point of view of an individual player and that of an external
observer, as the first-person/third-person distinction in the epistemic standpoints
of games; and refer to the criticism Kadane and Larkey made against the conven-
tional equilibrium approach in game theory as the problem of asymmetric epistemic
viewpoints.
Harsanyi (1982b), in response, formulated this well-known difficulty for multi-
agent systems in terms of the tension between normative (or prescriptive) and
descriptive (or predictive) accounts of games. According to him, the problem of
asymmetric viewpoints can be resolved within a normative theory by stipulating
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various rationality postulates on the part of the players. A descriptive model, on
the other hand, theorizes “actual—often error-prone—human behavior in game
situations” where individual players’ epistemic expectations may deviate from
what is prescribed in a normative theory. The two ways of modeling a game
belong to different intellectual enterprises: one theoretical and one practical, yet
they are related in that the former provides helpful guidelines for the latter. To
illustrate this point, Harsanyi (1982a,b) drew an analogy to arithmetic arguing
that arithmetic, being identified with a normative theory for “correct” computa-
tion, serves also an explanatory purpose for understanding actual computations
performed by human agents: “[n]o psychologist studying how people perform
arithmetic computations can develop a realistic descriptive theory of computing
behavior without knowing arithmetic.”
The last point on arithmetic is very true, however it should be pointed out that
there is an important difference between arithmetic being instructive in theorizing
human computation on the one hand and a normative theory of games being
instrumental in guiding the study of the actual play of a game on the other.
Notice that, in actual computations, the human agents are subject to the same
basic principles of arithmetic as described in a normative theory (simple defi-
nitions and properties of the natural numbers, rules of calculations, etc.), their
failure to conform to the correct computation is largely due to their limited phys-
ical capacities or perhaps to some other psychological factors that prevent them
from fulfilling the task of computing, which nonetheless can in principle be en-
hanced or in some cases be even eliminated (by, for instance, using a calculator or
being permitted with more time to compute in an environment with less pressure
or stress, etc.); whereas in the case of games, many of the fundamental assump-
tions made in a normative theory are different from that of a descriptive theory
(which, if I understood correctly, was precisely the point Kadane and Larkey were
trying to make), and the players’ failure to conform to the paradigm prescribed in
a normative account is often due to the first-person standpoint they are in, which
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cannot be lifted into a third-person stance by mere stipulation. In other words,
what is being criticized is not the strength of the player’s epistemic capacity but its
very possibility. There is hence a gap created by the epistemic limitations on the
part of participating agents.
18.3. All-inclusive states. Aumann (1987) made considerable attempts to fill
this gap, where he reformulated the asymmetry of different epistemic viewpoints
in terms of the tension between the “Bayesian” and the “game-theoretic” views of
the world maintaining that the two accounts can be coherently integrated through
the notion of subjective correlated equilibrium and he claims that the choices made
by Bayes rational players will form a correlated equilibrium. The cornerstone of
Aumann’s construction is the use of “all-inclusive” states of the world, an assump-
tion that is widely adopted in game-theoretic analysis.4 Here is a characterization
of the nature of an all-inclusive state summarized by Geanakoplos (1992):
A “state of the world” is very detailed. It specifies the physi-
cal universe, past, present, and future; it describes what every
agent knows, and what every agent knows about what every agent
knows, and so on; it specifies what every agent does, and what
every agent thinks about what every agent does, and what every
agent thinks about what every agent thinks about what every agent
does, and so on; it specifies the utility to every agent of every ac-
tion, not only of those that are taken in that state of nature, but
also those that hypothetically might have been taken, and it specifies
what everybody thinks about the utility to everybody else of every
possible action, and so on; it specifies not only what agents know,
4Aumann and Brandenburger (1995) adopted a more refined approach to the problem where each
player’s belief about other players’ actions and beliefs are explicitly represented through the notions
of conjectures and theories respectively. Both concepts are constituent components of the player’s
types, an idea originated by Harsanyi (1968), which essentially plays the same role as all-inclusive
states with perhaps less informative contents about the physical world. But, at any rate, each type
profile (a state) includes a description of actions of all players and it is further assumed that there
is a common prior defined over all states. This implies that the players have prior probabilistic
judgments over their own actions. We will raise further concerns in regard to this feature of the
model in the next section.
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but what probability they assign to every event, and what proba-
bility they assign to every other agent assigning some probability
to each event, and so on. (ibid. p.57, emphasis added)
In other words, a state is assumed to be a complete description of the world, which
includes not only the information about the actions the players may carry out and
their mutual beliefs about each other’s actions and beliefs, which are usually di-
rect targets of game-theoretic modeling (call information of this type information
at the theoretic level); it contains also meta-theoretic information such as players’
global probabilities judgments over all the states, their criteria for rational deci-
sion making (i.e., to what extend the other players are being rational), and their
information structures over the states (to be made precise below). The slogan is
“conditional on one particular state, everybody knows everything!”
Now, it is easily seen that the aforementioned first-person/third-person dis-
tinction is really a nonstarter in a framework that embraces all-inclusive states, for
the latter encode not only information that is obtainable by each individual player
(first-person) but also meta-theoretic information which is usually accessible only
to the theorist (third-person). As a result of this universal encoding, the problem
of asymmetric viewpoints seems to have disappeared. This is because, according
to Aumann, in a given game situation the players are uncertain as to which state
is the true state of the world, each player is however “informed of” a set of states
which constitutes their information sets. Since each member of an information
set (i.e., an all-inclusive state) is assumed to carry meta-theoretic information, it is
then tautologically true, it is said, that the players will be automatically equipped
with information of higher orders, which includes Bayesian rationality, common
knowledge of information partitions of all players, and common prior over the
states. Consequently, for Bayes rational players, the convergence to equilibrium
points will proceed in the same way as in classical theory (cf. Aumann, 1987).
However, the immediate epistemological question to ask is: How can any in-
dividual player come across a state of this kind in the first place? Recall that our
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initial task was to explicate the intriguing question concerning the epistemic asym-
metry between different viewpoints and its consequences in game-theoretic anal-
yses, that is, how is it possible that, by mere stipulation, players can acquire infor-
mation that is beyond their epistemic capabilities. Aumann approaches the ques-
tion by invoking, as a primitive notion in his theory, the concept of all-inclusive
states, and, as discussed above, in each one of these states the distinction between
the first-person and the third-person perspectives is removed as a result of the very
assumption. Hence, it seems that, instead of explicating as to how it is possible
to alternate between internal and external viewpoints, the distinction between the
two is suppressed and subsumed under the assumption of all-inclusive states. We
will return to this with more technical details in Section 19.3.
Before moving on, it should be mentioned that Savage (1954) was among the
first to advocate the distinction between, what he calls, normative and empirical
interpretations of a formal theory. He held that, by prescribing various rationality
and structural principles governing decision makers’ behaviors during decision-
making processes, a normative theory provides healthy guidance by which the
agents can police their own potential decisions against incoherency. In his theory
he also took that the description of a state of the world can be arbitrarily refined to
include as much detailed information as needed (in order that the consequences
under each state be precisely stated). Admittedly, Savage’s theory has its own
difficulties (see, e.g., Fishburn, 1981; Savage, 1967; Shafer, 1986), yet his views on
issues concerning the informativeness of a state and probability assignments over
acts are quite different from what we have discussed above in important ways.
First, the states in Savage’s theory are taken to be act-independent: they do not
include descriptions of the agent’s actions nor do they encode any meta-theoretic
information. Moreover, Savage’s theory is a single-agent decision theory which
theorizes decisions made by a highly idealized self-policing Bayesian agent. The
criticisms mounted against Savage’s theory from the empirical side are usually
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that the various postulates made in his system are computationally or psycho-
logically too demanding for actual decision makers. But Savage’s theory, as a
single-agent decision system, does not suffers from the difficulty of asymmetric
epistemic viewpoints. The latter requires the agents to transcend their epistemic
limitations, which might appear as a tall order.
In what follows, we re-examine different representations (K, I ;P , T ) of beliefs
that are widely adopted in game-theoretic models, the goal is to adjust these mod-
els so that various epistemic considerations and quantifications discussed above
be distinguished within the formalism.
The plan for the rest of the chapter is as follows: since information takes
the center stage in various game-theoretic analyses, we first provide an extended
discussion on non-probabilistic information structures and its relation to Kripke
structures, where, as a case study, a purely information-theoretic version of Au-
mann’s (1976) impossibility theorem is analyzed. The proof relies on the notion of
doxastic blindspots and a generalized Savage’s sure-thing principle (GSTP) which
will be made clear shortly. We then discuss how these formal results should be
interpreted given the clear epistemic limitation of the model. This will then be
followed by an introduction of different probabilistic representations of beliefs.
Conditions (A1, A2, B1, C1, and C2) are given in an attempt to unify different
belief structures in the context of epistemic games.
19. Information Structure and Asymmetric Viewpoints
One mysterious feature of the notion of states of the world in game models
seems to be that there is an imbalance between the conceptual presupposition
of their being all-inclusive on the one hand and their precise theoretical imple-
mentations in a concrete model on the other, by which we mean that, far from
being all-inclusive, the actual formulations of states in a game-theoretic model
are always highly restrictive and precise: they are usually points in a Cartesian
product space of players’ actions and beliefs (about other players’ actions and/or
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beliefs, represented by some probability measures) or some other variation of this
joint space. Meta-theoretic information is often not modeled directly but inserted
informally as further constraints as to how those precisely formulated states are
structured. Hence there seems to be two different notions of states tacitly em-
ployed in a quantitative model: one, being all-inclusive, is the conceptual presup-
position which plays an important interpretational role in constructing the theory;
the other, being highly restrictive and precise, is the mathematical underpinning
of the conceptual idealization. Considerable information however may get lost or
smuggled in when one moves from one notion of states to another.
The situation echoes the tacit shifts between first-person and third-person
viewpoints in a game-theoretic model discussed above. And this, we argue, is
the source of many puzzlements in multi-agent systems, especially when it comes
to the interpretations of various formal results proved in a representational sys-
tem of knowledge or beliefs. In what follows, we introduce a notion of doxastic
blindspots to our game model.5 As we will see, as a component of the under-
lying formal model the concept of doxastic blindspots makes sense only from a
third-person (the external theorist’s) point of view. This allows us to separate the
interpretational values of a formal system viewed from different epistemic stand-
points. Our goal in this section is to tackle the issue of asymmetric viewpoints in
concrete game models, some formalism is hence needed.
19.1. Information structures and blindspots. We start with the well known
Kripke and Aumann information structures. Along the way we will list various
formal properties of these structures, the proofs of some of the claims are standard
and hence omitted, our focus is rather on their epistemic implications.
Let Ω be a (finite) set which is referred to as the state space. A Kripke model
(of beliefs) over Ω is a relational structure that is distinguished by a binary relation
; ⊆ Ω × Ω, where ; is often referred to as a doxastic accessibility relation among
possible states. Intuitively, ω ;i ω′ says that, from the perspective of player i,
5Our concept of doxastic blindspot is altered from Collins (1996), who in turn introduced the term
from Sorensen (1988).
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ω′ is considered doxastically possible in state ω. We also say that state ω′ is ;i-
accessible from ω. The following is a list of properties of ; that are commonly
adopted in a doxastic model: for any ω, ω′, ω′′ ∈ Ω,
Seriality: for each ω there exists an ω′ such that ω ; ω′.
Transitivity: if ω ; ω′′and ω′′ ; ω′ then ω ; ω′.
Euclid: if ω ; ω′ and ω ; ω′′ then ω′ ; ω′′.
19.1.1. Information structures. Given ;i above, define function I i : Ω → 2Ω by
I i(ω) =
{
ω′ ∈ Ω | ω ;i ω′
}
. (A1)
Then I i(ω) is the set of states that are ;i-accessible from ω, call I i(ω) the infor-
mation set of i in state ω, the intended interpretation is that I i(ω) contains all the
relevant information that is accessible by i at ω. Player i is said to be informed of
certain event E (a set of states) in state ω if I i(ω) ⊆ E (i.e., if the information i pos-
sesses at ω is contained in E). For any E ⊆ Ω, denote by I i(E) the set of all states
that are ;i-accessible from the states in E, i.e., I i(E) = ∪ω∈E I i(ω). Further, let
I i = {I i(ω) | ω ∈ Ω} be the information structure of player i. Hence I i provides a
full description of what information player i has in each state.
Here we adopt a systematic ambiguity using I i to denote the information
structure of player i and using I i(·) to denote the information function of i. There
should be no danger of confusion: I i(ω) is the information set of player i at ω,
which is also an element of I i.
Alternatively, one can take the information function I i : Ω → 2Ω of player i as
primitive and define i’s accessibility relation ;i over Ω by
;i:=
{
(ω, ω′) ∈ Ω × Ω | ω′ ∈ I i(ω)
}
. (A2)
Consider the following properties of an information structure I : for any ω ∈ Ω,
Viability: I(ω) ̸= ∅.
Inclusion: if ω′ ∈ I(ω) then I(ω′) ⊆ I(ω).
Mutuality: if ω′, ω′′ ∈ I(ω) then ω′′ ∈ I(ω′) and ω′ ∈ I(ω′′).
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Proposition 19.1. Let I be an information structure and ; be the correspond-
ing accessibility relation for which (A1) and (A2) are satisfied, then
(1) ; is serial if and only if I is viable,
(2) ; is transitive if and only if I is inclusive,
(3) ; is Euclidean if and only if I is mutual.
Definition 19.2. An information structure I is said to be divisible if it is (a)
viable, (b) inclusive, and (c) mutual; I is partitional if it is divisible and I(Ω) = Ω.
Proposition 19.3. If I is divisible then, for any ω, ω′ ∈ Ω, either I(ω) ∩
I(ω′) = ∅ or I(ω) = I(ω′).
Proof. Let ω, ω′ ∈ Ω, then, by viability, I(ω) and I(ω′) are non-empty. If
I(ω) ∩ I(ω′) = ∅ then we are done. Otherwise, let ν′ ∈ I(ω) ∩ I(ω′) and ν ∈
I(ω), from the former we get ν′ ∈ I(ω) and hence I(ν′) ⊆ I(ω′) by inclusion.
Then ν ∈ I(ω) and ν′ ∈ I(ω) implies ν ∈ I(ν′) via mutuality, hence ν ∈ I(ω′).
This is shows that I(ω) ⊆ I(ω′). Similarly, I(ω′) ⊆ I(ω). Together, we have
I(ω) = I(ω′). □
It is easy to see that if I is divisible then, by Proposition 19.1, the correspond-
ing accessibility relation ; forms an equivalence relation over Ω, in this case we
have that I(ω) = [ω]; for all ω ∈ Ω.
19.1.2. Doxastic blindspot. The above construction enables a formal classifica-
tion of states in Ω. Note that if I(Ω) is a proper subset of Ω then it follows that
there are some states that do not belong to any information set. In other words,
given (A1) and (A2), members of Ω − I(Ω) are states that are not ;i-accessible
for i from any state in Ω. We refer to such states as player i’s doxastic blindspots.
Formally, for any ω ∈ Ω, ω is said to be a doxastic blindspot (or blindspot for short)
of player i if there is no ν ∈ Ω such that ω ∈ I i(ν). Denote the set of all blindspots
of i by Bi(Ω).6
6Collins (1996) defines a doxastic blindspot for player i to a singleton event {ω} such that ω /∈ I i(ω)
(ω /∈ Pi(ω) in his notation). Our definition is equivalent to his in a KD45 system.
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ω1 // ω2

Figure 19.1. Player i’s information structure.
Example 19.4. Let Ω = {ω1, ω2} and I i(ω1) = I i(ω2) = {ω2}. Then ω1 is a
doxastic blindspot for i, see Figure 19.1. 
A doxastic blindspot ω can also be interpreted as saying that the agent may
falsely believe I i(ω) as she does not consider ω as an epistemic possibility. Then,
from the definition, it is clear that the concept of blindspots is only intelligible if
it is modeled from the third person point of view, a lesson we learn from G. E.
Moore. The following are some simple formal properties of doxastic blindspots.
Proposition 19.5. I i(Ω) ∩ Bi(Ω) = ∅ and I i(Ω) ∪ Bi(Ω) = Ω.
Proposition 19.6. Suppose that, for any i, j ∈ N, the information structures
I i and I j are divisible, then
(1) ω /∈ I i(ω) if and only if ω ∈ Bi(Ω);
(2) if ν ∈ I i(ω) then ν ∈ I i(ν) = I i(ω);
(3) if I i(Ω) = I j(Ω) then, for any ν ∈ I i(Ω), ν ∈ I j(ν).
Proof. By definition, I i and I j are divisible if and only if they are viable,
inclusive, and mutual.
(1) If ω is a blindspot it is trivially true that ω /∈ I i(ω) by definition. It
remains to show the “only if” direction. Suppose, for contradiction, that
ω /∈ Bi(Ω), then by definition this implies, there is some ν ∈ Ω for
which ω ∈ I i(ν), from which we get I i(ω) ⊆ I i(ν) via inclusion. On the
other other hand, by viability, I i(ω) is non-empty, then let ω′ ∈ I i(ω),
hence ω′ ∈ I i(ν). From ω ∈ I i(ν) and ω′ ∈ I i(ν) we conclude that
ω ∈ I i(ω′) and ω′ ∈ I i(ω) via mutuality. The latter also implies that
I i(ω′) ⊆ I i(ω), and hence ω ∈ I i(ω), a contradiction. Thus, if I i is
divisible, then ω /∈ I i(ω) implies that ω ∈ Bi(Ω).
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(2) Suppose, to the contrary, that ν ̸∈ I i(ν), then, by (1), ν ∈ Bi(Ω), but this
contradicts the assumption that ν ∈ I i(ω), and hence ν ∈ I i(ν). This
yields ν ∈ I i(ν) ∩ I i(ω), then, by Proposition 19.3, I i(ν) = I i(ω).
(3) For any ν ∈ I i(Ω), we have ν ∈ I j(Ω). The latter implies that there is
some ω′ ∈ Ω for which ν ∈ I j(ω′). Then, by (2), ν ∈ I j(ν). □
Further, note that the existence of blindspots differentiates a doxastic infor-
mation model from an epistemic one, the latter is widely used in representing
knowledge where it is assumed that ω ∈ I i(ω) for all ω ∈ Ω, that is, it is as-
sumed that it is impossible that the players’ information sets exclude “the true
state of the world” (and hence there is no blindspot). The assumption is often
referred to as the “truth condition” of information sets which is connected to the
assumption that knowledge is infallible.
This assumption however is not uncontroversial, especially when observing
from the agent’s point of view, it is unclear as to how blindspots can be elimi-
nated by stipulating that players’ information be always truthful. Yet, contrary to
what many had thought, the infallibility condition is in fact not essential to the
agreeing-to-disagree type arguments. In the next section, we provide a purely
information-theoretic analysis of Aumann (1976), where we present a scenario
without the infallibility assumption under which a variant of Aumann’s impos-
sibility result holds under weakened conditions. The aim is to uncover the logic
behind the formal derivation of the agreement theorem and, most importantly, the
epistemic presuppositions needed for the interpretation of the underlying model.
The analysis relies on a generalized Savage’s sure-thing principle and a notion of
common information, which is analogous to the concept of common knowledge (or
common beliefs), to which we now turn.
19.2. Agreeing to disagree and different types of common knowledge. In
the interactive situation, let ;N be the smallest transitive relation that contains all
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where ‘TC’ stands for the transitive closure operator. Then, relation ;N represents
the maximum reachability of all ;i’s (cf. Proposition 19.7(1) below). Call ;N the
group accessibility relation of N. For any (ω, ω′) ∈;N , we also say that ω′ is ;N-
accessible from ω. From the group accessibility relation ;N a corresponding notion
of group information function IN : Ω → 2Ω can be defined by
IN(ω) = {ω′ ∈ Ω | ω ;N ω′}. (19.2)
And let IN be the group information structure such that IN = {IN(ω) | ω ∈ Ω}. Al-
ternatively, one can take players’ information structures I i, . . . , In as primitive and
define group information structure IN as the meet of the I is, i.e., IN = ∧i∈N I i,
and define group accessibility relation ;N by
;N := {(ω, ω′) ∈ Ω × Ω | ω′ ∈ IN(ω)}. (19.1’)
19.2.1. Common information. Let E be any event, say that E is common informa-
tion among members of group N at ω, if IN(ω) ⊆ E. The following is a list of
basic properties of the group accessibility relation ;N and the group information
structure IN .
Proposition 19.7. Let I i,;N , and IN be defined as above, then we have
(1) For any (ω, ω′) ∈;N , there corresponds a sequence i1, i2, . . . , ik ∈ N and
a sequence of states ω0, ω1, . . . , ωk ∈ {ν | ω ;N ν} with ω0 = ω and
ωk = ω
′ such that ω0 ;i1 ω1 ;i2 · · · ;ik ωk, where 0 ≤ k < ∞.
(2) For any ω ∈ Ω we have I i(ω) ⊆ IN(ω).





(4) Given any ω ∈ Ω, if, for any i, j ∈ N, I i and I j are divisible and I i(Ω) =
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Now suppose, to the contrary, that there is some δ such that δ ∈ ∪ν∈IN(ω) I i(ν)
but δ /∈ IN(ω). From the latter we conclude that δ is not ;N-accessible from ω;
the former, on the other hand, implies that there is some ν ∈ IN(ω) such that
δ ∈ I i(ν), from which we get that δ can be reached from ω (first to ν via ;N and
then to δ through ;i), and hence is ;N-accessible from ω, a contradiction.
For (4), it is sufficient to show that IN(ω) ⊆ I i(IN(ω)) under the assumption
that I i(Ω) = I j(Ω) for all i, j ∈ N. Let ν ∈ IN(ω), then, by (1), there should be a
sequence i1, i2, . . . , ik ∈ N and a sequence ω0, . . . , ωk−1, ωk ∈ IN(ω) with ω0 = ω
and ωk = ν such that ν ∈ I ik(ωk−1). The latter implies that ν ∈ I ik(Ω), then,
by Proposition 19.6(3), ν ∈ I i(ν), and hence ν ∈ ∪ν∈IN(ω) I i(ν) in (19.3). This
completes the proof of the lemma. □
19.2.2. The sure-thing principle and agreeing-to-disagree. By Proposition 19.7(2),
if, for some event E, IN(ω) ⊆ E, that is, if E is common information shared
among group N in state ω, then player i must be informed of E at ω. These
properties together with the following generalized notion of Savage’s sure-thing
principle will lead to an information-theoretic version of the Agreement theorem
of Aumann (1976).
Generalized Sure-thing Principle: If a decision maker makes the same de-
cision conditional on the information she has in all possible decision sit-
uations, then she should make the same decision unconditionally.7
7Recall that Savage’s second postulate (P2) is derived from, what he calls, a “loose” version of
the sure-thing principle (STP) which says that if the decision maker prefers one act over another
assuming either certain event obtains or the compliment of the event obtains, then her preference
over the two acts should remain unchanged. This “loose” version of STP is sometimes referred
to as the dominance principle which captures an intuitive idea of reasoning by cases: if one act is
weakly preferred to another in all cases than it should be weakly preferred throughout. Our notion
of informational decision function is defined in this spirit.
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Formally, let D be a nonempty set with unspecified domain, call f : 2Ω → D an















= d is a decision made by player i in state ν based on her infor-
mation set I i(ν), and S is a set of possible situations. Then (GSTP) says that if
player i makes the same decision d in all possible situations (states) in S then she
should decide on d without differentiating the information generated in S (i.e.,
I i(ν)’s where ν ∈ S). We may now prove the following:
Theorem 19.8. Let Ω, N, I i be defined as above and ω be the actual state of
the world. Suppose that, for any i, j ∈ N,
(1) I i, I j are divisible,
(2) Bi(Ω) = B j(Ω);
(3) f is an informational decision function for N; and
(4) i’s decision di is common information shared among members of N at ω.
Then, di = dj for all i, j ∈ N.




∣∣∣ f (I i(ν)) = di}, di ∈ D (19.4)
where Ei is the set of possible states in which f yield di given player i’s information
I i(ν) at ν. It is plain that ω ∈ Ei for all i ∈ N. By definition, the assumption that
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Note that each I i is assumed to be divisible, this implies, by Proposition 19.7(4),





Finally, since f is an informational decision function for each i, apply (GSTP) to






Therefore, di = dj for all i, j ∈ N. □
Remark 19.9. If f in the theorem above is intended to be a conditional prob-
ability of some event A (i.e., if f (·) = Pr(A | ·)) and I i(Ω) = Ω (and hence
Bi(Ω) = ∅ by Proposition 19.5), then we have the impossibility result of Aumann
(1976) as a special case of the theorem above.
19.3. Different types of common knowledge? Intuitively, Theorem 19.8 says
that if the players (1) have appropriate information distributions, (2) are “epistem-
ically ignorant” in an identical way, (3) follow the same decision-making protocol,
and (4) share, as common information, their decisions within the group, then it is
impossible for them to make different decisions.
As with Aumann’s original impossibility theorem, this statement sounds strik-
ing. Indeed, Geanakoplos (1992, 1994) gave various interesting real world “appli-
cations” of the agreement theorem which show how counter-intuitive these theo-
rems may seem. Our aim here, however, is to see how, epistemically speaking, the
frameworks under which these theorems are derived be interpreted.
Recall that Aumann’s original proof uses a knowledge model that is provably
equivalent to a S5 multi-agent system in epistemic logic. In other words, the play-
ers in Aumann’s theory are assumed to be fully introspective agents: their knowl-
edge is infallible, they know what they know, and they know what they don’t
know. In addition, it is assumed that the players commonly know what everyone,
in principle, could have known in different situations, namely they are assumed to
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commonly know everyone’s knowledge structure. According to Aumann (1987, p.9-10,
where his information model of knowledge is more fully articulated), the latter
is a different type of knowledge which is not explicitly expressible within the
knowledge model yet it is “not an assumption, but a “theorem”, a tautology; it is
implicit in the model itself.” This is because, we are told, the same meta-theoretic
information about all players’ information partitions is already coded in each pos-
sible state of the world which can be read off by each player regardless of what
immediate epistemic situation he or she is in.
Now, in view of Theorem 19.8, we argue that Aumann’s second type common
knowledge of player’s knowledge/information structures is indeed a substantive
presupposition instead of an innocuous internal property of the system.
Observe that Theorem 19.8 not only reproduces the mathematics behind Au-
mann’s original agreement theorem to the effect that the logical steps we have
taken from (19.4) to (19.8) almost parallel the ones in Aumann’s proof, it also al-
lows us to separate the formal derivation from the assumptions made on players’
epistemic capacities in the agreement argument. The interpretational difference
between Theorem 19.8 and Aumann’s theorem is that the players in the former
need not be S5 agents and, more importantly, that they are not assumed to have
access to any meta-theoretic information about their information structures. In
fact, given the notion of doxastic blindspots incorporated in the current model we
cannot assume that the players in Theorem 19.8 have access to meta-theoretic infor-
mation about their information structures: the theorem proved here is intelligible
only from an external point of view.
With these said, we should add that this is not to say that the players can
never acquire meta-theoretic information about the information partitions. Chess
game is an example where the players themselves can come to theorize the entire
play as if they are external observers. But, in these cases, the acquisition of the
theorist’s external point view is rather accidental: it is the particular game situa-
tion with perfect information that gives rise to the merge of the internal and the
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external points of view. Yet this is still far removed from saying that the meta-
theoretic information is a built-in feature and can be “known” by all the players
as tautological truth of the underlying model.
Hence it seems that the notion of all-inclusive states is convenient only as a
theoretic presupposition yet it is unclear how it can be fully realized in a concrete
theory. And the asymmetry of different epistemic viewpoints is not something
to be ignored in game analyses, and certainly not something that can eliminated
simply by stipulation.
20. Bayesian Epistemic Games
In this section we discuss different formal probabilistic representations of be-
liefs and their relations to the model discussed in the last section. Efforts will be
made in order that various epistemic limitations discussed above are accommo-
dated in the constructions of the formal systems. In particular, guided by the IP
principle, in all Bayesian probabilistic models, the players’ beliefs will be repre-
sented by imprecise probabilities instead of sharp ones. In addition, a distinction
will be made between global and local probabilities, the former are taken to be
assignable only by an external theorist, the later by the players of the underlying
game. This is to avoid the conceptual difficulty encountered when players assign
subjective probabilities to act-dependent events as mandated by the NSPA princi-
ple. The aim is to see the interrelationships between different structures of beliefs
in modeling games, for which a series of unifying conditions are provided so that
various concepts can be correlated in the context of epistemic games.
20.1. Belief operator and Bayesian priors. To simplify matters, we assume
that the state space Ω is finite and the algebra F equipped on Ω is 2Ω. In a
standard information model of beliefs, to say that player i believes certain event
E ∈ F , in symbols BiE, is for the player to have the information about E. Given
the characterization of the information structure of player i above, we say that
player i believes certain event E in state ω if I i(ω) ⊆ E. Formally, a belief operator B
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is a set-valued function on 2Ω satisfying
BE = {ω ∈ Ω | I(ω) ⊆ E}; (20.1)
or, equivalently, by (A1),
BE =
{
ω ∈ Ω | for any ν ∈ Ω, ω ; ν implies ν ∈ E
}
. (20.2)
The following is a list of properties that are commonly associate with a belief
operator B: for any E, F ⊆ Ω,
N: BΩ = Ω
K: B(E ∪ F) ∩ B¬E ⊆ BF
D: BE ⊆ ¬B¬E
4: BE ⊆ BBE
5: ¬BE ⊆ B¬BE
where ¬E stand for Ω− E. The labels of these properties echoes the corresponding
rule of necessitation and axioms in modal logic. It is easily seen that if B is a belief
operator, then B satisfies N and K.
Proposition 20.1. Let B be a belief operator defined in (20.1), then
(1) B satisfies D if and only if the underlying information structure I is vi-
able;
(2) B satisfies 4 if and only if I is inclusive;
(3) B satisfies 5 if and only if I is mutual.
The proof of above proposition is straightforward and hence omitted. Now,
in light of Proposition 19.1 and Proposition 20.1, let us summarize the relations
between properties of a belief operator B and that of its defining information
structure I and doxastic accessibility relation ; in Table 20.1.
20.1.1. Beliefs and partial beliefs. In defining a belief operator in (20.1), an event
E is said to be believed by player i if the information i possesses in state ω is
completely included in E. Now let us consider the case where the inclusion is not
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complete, that is, the information i has at ω is only partially contained in E. In this
case, the player is said to be uncertain about the occurrence of E. We hence need a
more fine-grained measure of beliefs. This is usually fulfilled by using probability
measures to represent players’ partial beliefs.
Formally, let player i’s credal states be represented by a set P i of probability
functions on F (imprecise probabilities). We refer to P i as the global probability
assignments for player i. As we will see later, the description of a state may contain
the player’s own actions, hence global probabilities are prescribed purely from an
external observer’s point of view.
We stress that here is where we depart from classical models where p ∈ P i is
often taken to be player i’s prior probability defined over the state space Ω, which,
as we have argued in length, is highly problematic given the NSPA principle.
Presumably, in a given state space Ω, the doxastic accessibility relation ;i
among members of Ω and the probability functions in P i over Ω are different
modelings of the same epistemic capability of player i, namely his beliefs. Hence,
there shall be some compatibility requirement that correlates these different mea-
sures. Recall that Bi(Ω) stands for the set of blindspots of i in Ω. That is to say,
for any ω ∈ Bi(Ω), ω is not considered by the agent to be accessible from any
state. It is then conceivable that, in the corresponding probabilistic model, doxas-
tic blindspots be identified with those states with zero probability. This leads to
the following consistency requirement,8
ω ∈ Bi(Ω) if and only if ρi(ω) = 0, for any ρi ∈ P i. (B1)
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In other words, ω is a doxastic blindspot for i if and only if any global probabilities
of i assign 0 to ω.9 By Proposition 19.5, (B1) implies that, for any ω ∈ I i(Ω),
ρi(ω) ̸= 0 for all ρi ∈ P i, that is, ω is ;i-accessible from some state if and only
if ρi(ω) > 0 for all ρi ∈ P i. Condition (B1) characterizes a global relationship
between P i and I i(Ω) (and Bi(Ω)); the next question is, at the local level, what is
the relationship between P i and each I i(ω), for all ω ∈ Ω. We discuss this in the
context of epistemic games.
20.2. Belief structures in epistemic games. We consider models of games in
strategic form augmented by type structure. Formally, let Γ = ⟨N, {Ai}, {ui}⟩ be
a (finite) strategic game, where N is a finite group of players and, for each player
i ∈ N, Ai is a nonempty set of actions from which player i choose to act. Let
A = ∏i∈N Ai be the product space of all action spaces, each member of which
forms an action profile, that is, for any a ∈ A, a = (a1, . . . , an) where ai ∈ Ai. We
refer to a real function ui : A → R as the payoff function of i. The interpretation is
that if the players in N adopt respectively the actions described in the profile a ∈ A
then ui(a) is the payoff (or the outcome) for i. Following the convention in game
theory, we often write an action profile a = (a1, . . . , an) ∈ A as (ai, a−i) where ai
is the ith coordinate of a, which is also denoted by (a)i, i.e., the action adopted
by player i in profile a, and a−i is the action profile of a of the players other than
i. Write A−i for ∏j ̸=i Aj, hence, for any a ∈ A, we have ai ∈ Ai and a−i ∈ A−i.
Further, let Ti = ∆(A−i × T−i) denote the set of the probability measures defined
on the product space of A−i and T−i. We refer to a member ti of Ti as a type of
player i, which characterizes i’s belief about other players’ actions and beliefs. Now,
let T = ∏i∈N Ti be the type space of N, and hence, for any t = (t1, . . . , tn) ∈ T ,
t provides a type profile of group N. Similarly, write T−i for ∏j ̸=i T j, then, for any
t = (ti, t−i) ∈ T , ti ∈ Ti and t−i ∈ T−i. An epistemic extension Γ′ of strategic game
9This essentially amounts to identifying doxastically possible states with probabilistically non-zero
states and doxastically impossible states with probabilistically zero ones. This is not problematic
for a space with finitely many states. But see Hájek (2013) for discussion on the issue concerning
regularity for infinite space.
148
20. BAYESIAN EPISTEMIC GAMES
Γ is a structure of the form Γ′ = ⟨N, {Ai}, {ui}, {Ti}⟩. Now, let the state space Ω
be A× T , then, for each ω ∈ Ω, ω is in the form of
ω = (a, t) = (ai, ti; a−i, t−i).
We refer to each ω as a state-description of the given game situation which includes
a profile of actions and a profile of types of all players. For notational purpose,
we use Ja−i, t−iK to denote the set of all states in Ω that contain profile (a−i, t−i):
Ja−i, t−iK = {ω ∈ Ω ∣∣∣ ω = (bi, si; b−i, s−i) and b−i = a−i and s−i = t−i}.
As before, let P i be the set of global probability functions of player i defined
over Ω. Then player i’s types should be consistent with the globally probabilistic
assessments, that is, for each ti ∈ Ti, there is some ρi ∈ P i such that,
ti(a−i, t−i) = ρi
(Ja−i, t−iK) for all (a−i, t−i) ∈ A−i × T−i. (C1)
Further, to relate to player i’s doxastic accessibility relation ;i in Ω, define that,
for any ω = (ai, ti; a−i, t−i) and ω′ = (bi, si; b−i, s−i),





That is to say, state ω′ is considered by player i as a doxastic possibility in state ω
if i assigns a non-zero probability to (b−i, s−i) contained in ω′.
Theorem 20.2. Given (B1) and (C1), the accessibility relation ;i (i ∈ N) de-
fined in (C2) is (1) serial, (2) transitive, and (3) Euclidean.
Proof. Let ω = (ai, ti; a−i, t−i), ω′ = (bi, si; b−i, s−i) and ω′′ = (ci, ui; c−i, u−i).
(1) Suppose that, for ω, there is no ω′ such that ω ;i ω′, this implies, by (C2),
that, for any (b−i, s−i) ∈ A−i × T−i, ti(b−i, s−i) = 0, and hence
∑
(b−i ,s−i)∈A−i×T−i
ti(b−i, s−i) = 0.
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Figure 20.1. Unifying belief structures in epistemic games
But this contradicts the assumption that ti is probability function on A−i × T−i.
Thus, for any ω ∈ Ω, there exists some ω′ such that ω ;i ω′.
(2) Assume that ω ;i ω′ and ω′ ;i ω′′, then, by (C2),
ti(b−i, s−i) > 0; and si(c−i, u−i) > 0.
We show ti(c−i, u−i) > 0, i.e., ω ;i ω′′. Suppose that this is not the case, then
ti(c−i, u−i) = 0, hence, by (C1), there is some ρi ∈ P i for which ti(c−i, u−i) =
ρi(Jc−i, u−iK) = 0. This implies that Jc−i, u−iK is a set of blindspots via (B1). On
the other hand, from si(c−i, u−i) > 0 we conclude that there is some σi ∈ P i
such that si(c−i, u−i) = σi
(Jc−i, u−iK) > 0. But if Jc−i, u−iK is a set of blindspots
then, by (B1), σi
(Jc−i, u−iK) = 0, a contradiction. Hence, ;i is transitive.
(3) Finally, assume that ω ;i ω′ and ω ;i ω′′, we show that ω′ ;i ω′′. The as-
sumption implies that ti(b−i, s−i) > 0 and ti(c−i, u−i) > 0, and hence, for some
ρi ∈ P i, ti(c−i, u−i) = ρi(Jc−i, u−iK) > 0. Now suppose, to the contrary, that
ω′ ̸;i ω′′, that is, si(c−i, u−i) = 0. The latter implies, via (C1) and (B1), that
Jc−i, u−iK is a set of blindspots, and hence ρi(Jc−i, u−iK) = 0, a contradiction.
Therefore, ;i is Euclidean. □
Remark 20.3. As a direct consequence of Proposition 19.1, Proposition 20.1
and Theorem 20.2, we have that, for any i ∈ N, let I i and Bi be defined in terms of




To sum up, we addressed in this chapter various issues concerning epistemic
limitations in modeling games including the problem of asymmetric viewpoints,
the IP principle, and the NSPA principle. The discussion then led us to recon-
struct various models of beliefs in accordance with these principles, for which we
proposed a series of unifying conditions A1, A2, B1, C1, and C2 in the context of
epistemic games. Figure 20.1 is an illustration of the interrelationships of these
conditions. As seen, the Kripke structure can be related to the probabilistic struc-
ture through the concept of types, where a type t ∈ T is taken to be a player local
probabilistic assessments of other players’ actions and beliefs, which in turn is a
constituent part of the global probabilistic assessments P . Local probabilities also
provide a refined measurement of doxastic accessibility, for, by (C2), we can now
say that ω′ is ;i-accessible from ω to degree c if ti(b−i, s−i) = c, which accords well
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Gathered here are some of the definitions and results used or referred
to in the main texts. They deliver some more details that complement
discussions above. References of the sources are given from time to
time, but all mistakes are mine.
A.1. Binary relations. Let X be a nonempty set, a binary relation R on X is
a set of ordered pairs of elements of X. Following a notational convention, we
sometimes write (x, y) ∈ R in the form of xRy. The following is a list of properties
of R: for any x, y, z ∈ X,
reflexivity: xRx
irreflexivity: ¬xRx
symmetry: xRy ⇒ yRx
asymmetry: xRy ⇒ ¬yRx
antisymmetry: (xRy ∧ xRy) ⇒ x = y
transitivity: (xRy ∧ yRz) ⇒ xRz
negatively transitivity: (¬xRz ∧ ¬zRy) ⇒ ¬xRy or xRy ⇒ (xRz ∨ zRy)
completeness: xRy or yRx.
Definition A.1.1. Let R be a binary relation on X, R is
(1) a preorder if it is reflexive and transitive;
(2) a weak order (or total order) if it a complete preorder;
(3) a partial order if it is an antisymmetric preorder;
(4) a linear order if it is a complete partial order.
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∣∣ x ≿ y and y ≿ x}, and by the asymmetric part (i.e., the strict part)
of ≿, denoted by ≻, we mean ≻=
{
(x, y) ∈≿
∣∣ x ≿ y and y ̸≿ x}.
Definition A.1.2. A preordered set is a structure (X,≿) where X is a nonempty
set and ≿ is a preorder on X. A preordered set is said to be a poset (X,⪰) if ⪰ is
a partial order on X; it is a loset (X,≥) if ≥ is a linear order on X.
A binary relation E on X is said to be an equivalence relation if it is reflexive,
symmetric and transitive. For any x ∈ X, the equivalence class of x with respect to
E is the set
[x]E = {ν ∈ X | xEν}.
The collection of all equivalence classes of X with respect to E, denoted by X/E
is the quotient set of X with respect to E, that is, X/E =
{
[x]E | x ∈ X
}
. It is
plain that, for any given preorder set (X,≿), ≿ induces a partial order ⪰ on the
quotient set X/∼ of X such that
[x]∼ ≻ [y]∼ if and only if x ≻ y
[x]∼ = [y]∼ if and only if x ∼ y.
Definition A.1.3. Let (X,≿) be a preordered set, any x, y of X are said to be
≿-comparable if either x ≿ y or y ≿ x, and they are ≿-incomparable if they are not
≿-comparable, that is, if x ̸≿ y and y ̸≿ x, denoted by x ▷◁ y (some writers also
use ‘x ∥ y’ for incomparability).
A.2. Non-measurable sets. The following example is due to Vitali (1905). It
shows that there exist sets of real numbers that are not Lebesgue measurable.
Example A.2.1 (Vitali). Define an equivalence relation ∼ on R by:
x ∼ y if and only if x − y ∈ Q.
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By the Axiom of Choice, there exists a set V of representatives from each equiva-
lent class. Now consider the set {V + r | r ∈ Q}, it has following two properties:
(1) For any distinct rational numbers r1, r2,
V + r1 ∩ V + r2 = ∅.
(Otherwise, V + r1 and V + r2 share some point h1 + r1 = h2 + r2, then
h1 ∼ h2. Since h1, h2 are representatives it follows h1 = h2, and hence
r1 = r2, a contradiction.)
(2) For any x ∈ R, x ∈ V + r for some r ∈ Q, that is,
R =
∪
{V + r | r ∈ Q}. (A.2.1)
(For, x must lie in some equivalence class with a representative, say, h.
Then, by definition, x − h = r′ for some r′ ∈ Q, hence x ∈ V + r′.)
We show that it cannot be the case that V ∈ B. Note that if V ∈ B then it must
be that µ(V) > 0. For, otherwise, µ(V) = 0, then µ(V + r) = 0 for all r ∈ Q, since
µ is translation-invariant. But, by (A.2.1) and countable additivity,
µ(R) = µ
(∪




µ(V + r) = 0
which is impossible. Further, if µ(V) > 0 then there must be some (a, b] for which
µ(V ∩ (a, b]) = c for some c > 0. Again, by translation-invariance,
µ
(




V ∩ (a, b] + r
)
= c for all r ∈ Q. (A.2.2)
On the other hand, consider all the rationals in [0, 1], we have
∪
r∈Q∩[0,1]






V ∩ (a, b] + r
)
≤ µ(a, b + 1] = b + 1 − a. (A.2.3)
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However, by (A.2.2), the left hand of (A.2.3) is the sum of countable many c’s
which add to +∞, a contradiction. 
A.3. Szpilrajn extension theorem. The following result is due to Szpilrajn
(1930). It shows that every partial ordering can be extended to a linear ordering.
Theorem A.3.1. Let ≻ be a strict partial order on a set X. Then there exists a
strict total order > on X that extends ≻.
Proof. Let P be the set of all the strict partial orders on X that extend ≻.
Then it is plain that P is partially ordered under ⊆. Let C be any chain in the
poset (P ,⊆), then ∪ C is an upper bound of C. To see this, we show that ∪ C
is irreflexive and transitive, and hence
∪ C ∈ P . Suppose, to the contrary, that
there is an x ∈ X such that (x, x) ∈ ∪ C, this implies that there exists some
C ∈ C for which (x, x) ∈ C, which contradicts the assumption that C is a strict
partial order. As for transitivity, suppose that (x, y), (y, z) ∈ ∪ C, then there exist
C1, C2 ∈ C such that (x, y) ∈ C1 and (y, z) ∈ C2. Since C is totally ordered under
⊆, assume, without loss of generality, that C1 ⊆ C2, we get that (x, z) ∈ C2, and
hence (x, z) ∈ C.
By Zorn’s lemma, P contains a maximal element P, that is, for any P ∈ P ,
P ⊆ P implies that P = P. We claim that P must be a complete relation on X.
For, otherwise, there exist some x, y ∈ X such that neither xPy nor yPx hold. In
this case, define P′ = P ∪ A where A = {x} ∪ {z | zPx} × {y} ∪ {z | yPz}. Then
it is clear that P′ is a strict partial order on X that properly extends P, which
contradicts the maximality of P. Thus, P is irreflexive, transitive, and complete.
Finally, denote P by >, we have that > is a strict total order that extends ≻. □
A.4. Existence of uniform distribution over natural numbers. A uniformly
distributed probabilistic measure on natural numbers N is of particular interest
because (1) it serves a good purpose of delineating the difference between finite
additivity and countable additivity; (2) its use is often tied to the notion of ran-
domness: it amounts to saying that choose a number “at random.” The latter is
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commonly understood in the following relative frequentist interpretation of uni-
formity of natural numbers.
A.4.1. Density function. Let A be any subset of N. For each number n < ∞,
denote the number of elements in A that are less or equal to n by A(n), that is,
A(n) =
∣∣A ∩ {1, . . . , n}∣∣. (A.4.1)






Let Cd be the collection of all sets of natural numbers that have densities. The
following properties of the density function are easy to verify.
Proposition A.4.1. (1) d(∅) = 0 and d(N) = 1.
(2) For each natural number n, d({n}) = 0.
(3) For any finite A ∈ Cd, d(A) = 0.
(4) If A, B, A ∪ B ∈ Cd and A ∩ B = ∅, then d(A ∪ B) = d(A) + d(B).
(5) If A ∈ Cd, then, for any number n, A + n ∈ Cd and d(A) = d(A + n),
where A + n = {x + n | x ∈ A}.
(6) The set of even numbers has density 1/2, or more generally, the set of
numbers that are divisible by m < ∞ has density 1/m.
Thus, the density function (A.4.2) satisfies conditions (ii) and (iv) listed in the
preceding section. However, d is not defined for all subsets of N (Cd is not a field
of natural numbers). We hence seek to extend d to a finitely additive probability
measure µ so that µ is defined for all subsets of the natural numbers and that µ
agrees with d on Cd (Theorem A.4.6 below). One version of the extension theorem
has been given by Rao and Rao (1983, Theorem 3.2.10).1 The set-theoretic approach
explicated in the next subsection is adapted from Hrbacek and Jech (1999, Ch.
1Kadane and O’Hagan (1995, Theorem 1) show that the monotonicity condition given by Rao and
Rao (1983) in their extension theorem is also necessary, see also Schirokauer and Kadane (2007).
167
CHAPTER A. SOME MATHEMATICAL DETAILS
11). We include this construction for completion, readers may proceed directly to
Example A.4.7 below without losing much on the flow of the main argument.
A.4.2. Filter and ultrafilter. A filter on a nonempty set S is a collection F of
subsets of S such that
(1) S ∈ F and ∅ /∈ F ,
(2) if X, Y ∈ F , then X ∩ Y ∈ F ,
(3) if X, Y ⊆ S and X ∈ F , then Y ∈ F .
Example A.4.2. (1) A trivial filter F = {S}.
(2) Let A ⊆ S, a principal filter generate by A is the collection {X ⊆ S|A ⊆ X}.
In the case of natural numbers where S = N, a principal filter generated
by n0 < ∞ is the collection Fn0 of sets of numbers such that X ∈ Fn0 if
and only if n0 ∈ X.
(3) As for an example of a nonprinciple filter, let S an infinite set, the Fréchet
filter on S is the collection
F = {X ⊆ S | S − X is finite}. (A.4.3)
That is, F is the filter of all cofinite subsets of S. 
A filter U is said to be an ultrafilter if, for each X ⊆ S, either X ∈ U or
S − X ∈ U . The following extension theorem (due to Tarski, 1930) is crucial to our
construction of an finitely additive probability measure on P(N). The proof uses
Zorn’s lemma and is widely available (see, for instance, Jech, 2003, §7).
Theorem A.4.3 (Tarski). Every filter can be extended to an ultrafilter.
Recall that our main concern in the last subsection is that the density function
d(·) is not defined for all the subset of natural numbers, in other words, there
exists some A ⊆ N such that the sequence {A(n)/n}∞n=1 does not converge. The
goal is to extend d to some measure so that (A.4.2) holds for all A’s. To this end,
we define a general notion of convergence in an ultrafilter, which has the property
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that, given an ultrafilter of natural numbers, every bounded sequences converges.
As we shall see, this leads to the extension of d to P(N) as required.
Definition A.4.4. Let {an}∞n=1 be a bounded sequence of real numbers and let
U be an ultrafilter on N. For some a ∈ R, {an}∞n=1 is said to be convergent in U to
a (or a is a U -limit of the sequence), written a = limU an, if for every small ϵ > 0,
{
n
∣∣ |an − a| < ϵ} ∈ U . (A.4.4)
Lemma A.4.5. Let U be an ultrafilter on N, then, for any bounded real se-
quence {an}, there exists a unique U -limit.
Proof. Since {an} is bounded, for every x < ∞, let
Ax = {n | an < x}.
Further, let
a = sup{x | Ax /∈ U}.
We show that limU an = a, that is, we show that, for any ϵ > 0, (A.4.4) holds. Note
that, for any x < y, Ax ⊆ Ay, hence if Ax ∈ U then Ay ∈ U . Since a is the least
upper bound of x for which Ax /∈ U , we have Aa+ϵ ∈ U but Aa−ϵ/2 /∈ U . Given
that U is an ultrafilter, the latter implies that S − Aa−ϵ/2 ∈ U , that is,
S − Aa−2ϵ =
{
n









∣∣ |an − a| < ϵ} = {n | an < a + ϵ} ∩ {n | a − ϵ < an} ∈ U , and
hence (A.4.4). To show uniqueness, note that if there is some b ̸= a such that
b = limU an. Let ϵ = |a − b|, then, by (A.4.4), both A = {n | |an − a| < ϵ/2} and
B = {n | |an − b| < ϵ/2} are in U . Clearly, A ∩ B = ∅, and hence B ⊆ S − A. But
this implies, from B ∈ U and the fact that U is an ultrafilter, that S − A is also in
U , which is impossible. □
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Theorem A.4.6. There exists a finitely additive probability measure on all sub-
sets of N that extends the density function d.
Proof. Let U be a Fréchet ultrafilter on N (the existence of U is guaranteed by







where A(n) is defined as in (A.4.1). By Lemma A.4.5, µ is well defined for all
A ∈ P(N). Note that, for any A, if d(A) exists, say d(A) = a, then a = µ(A).
For, by definition, if for any small ϵ there exists some N such that, for all n > N,




∣∣ |A(n)/n − a| < ϵ} ∈ U , and hence µ(A) = a.
It remains to show that µ is indeed a finitely additive probability measure.
Clearly, µ(∅) = 0 and µ(N) = 1. We show µ is finitely additive. To this end, let
A, B be any disjoint subsets of N. By (A.4.5) and the fact that A ∩ B = ∅,



















= µ(A) + µ(B).
(Actually, it can also be easily seen that µ is also translation-invariant.) Therefore,
µ is a measure defined for all subsets of N that extends the density function d. □
The following is a classical example of finitely but not countably additive prob-
ability measure on the natural numbers which is a simple form of the density
function d introduced above.
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Example A.4.7. Let {λn} be a sequence of functions defined on N such that2
λn(i) =

1/n if 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
0 if i > n.
(A.4.6)
Clearly, each λn(i) takes the form of A(n)/n in (A.4.2) where A = {i}, and
{λn} converges point-wisely to the density function d (on singletons). By The-
orem A.4.6, there exists a function λ defined for all subsets of N that extends d.
Further, by Proposition A.4.1, λ satisfies the following properties:
(1) λ is defined for all subsets of N.
(2) λ(∅) = 0 and λ(N) = 1.
(3) λ is finitely additive.
(4) λ is not countably additive.





(6) For any A ⊆ N, if A is finite then λ(A) = 0; if A is cofinite (i.e. if N − A
if finite) then λ(A) = 1.
(7) λ({2n | n ∈ N}) = 1/2, i.e., the set of even numbers has measure 1/2.
(8) In general, the set of numbers that are divisible by m < ∞ has measure
1/m, that is, λ({1m, 2m, 3m, . . .}) = 1/m. As a result of this property, we
have that the assignment of µ can be arbitrarily small: for any λ > 0,
there exists some n such that the set of numbers that are divisible by n
has measure 1/n < ϵ. 
A.5. Convergences. Let { fn}, f be measurable functions on the measure space
(Ω,F , µ),
(1) fn is said to converges point-wisely to f , in symbols fn → f , if
lim
n→∞
fn(ω) = f (ω), for all ω ∈ Ω. (A.5.1)
2Dubins and Savage (1965) call probability measure of this type diffuse.
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(2) fn is said to converges uniformly to f if, for any ϵ > 0, there is some large
N such that∣∣∣ fn(ω)− f (ω)∣∣∣ < ϵ, for all ω ∈ Ω, n ≥ N. (A.5.2)
(3) fn is said to converge to f almost everywhere (a.e.) if there exists a measur-
able set E ⊆ Ω satisfying
µ(E) = 0 and lim
n
fn(ω) = f (ω) for all ω ∈ Ω − E. (A.5.3)





| fn − f | ≥ ϵ
]
= 0 for all ϵ > 0. (A.5.4)
Lemma A.5.1. Given any finitely additive measure µ on measurable space
(Ω,F ), if fn converges to 0 almost everywhere implies that fn converges to 0
in measure, then the measure is also countably additive.














i>n Bi, hence An ↓ ∅. We show that µ(An) → 0 as n → ∞. To this end,
let χAn be the characteristic function of An, it is plain that µ(An) → 0 if and only
if χAn → 0 in measure. By assumption, it is enough to ask χAn → 0 a.e. but this
follows trivially from the fact that
∩





















= ∑∞i=1 µ(Bi). This shows countable addi-
tivity. □
A.6. Expectations. Let { fn}, {gn} f , g be real-valued measurable functions
on the measure space (Ω,F , µ). f is said to be simple if there n-many distinct
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values c1, . . . , cn and a partition {Pi}ni=1 of Ω such that f (x) = ci for all x ∈ Pi
(i = 1, . . . , n). Define the expectation of f with respect to µ to be





Definition A.6.1 (Expection). If f is bounded and { fn} is a sequence of simple
measurable functions converges uniformly to f then
E( f , µ) = sup
{
E( fn, µ) : n = 1, 2, . . .
}
. (A.6.2)
It can be shown that the above definition does not depend on the selection of
the sequences of simple functions converging to f . As shown below, any bounded
measurable function f can be approximated by a particular sequence of simple
functions, and hence in (A.6.2) we can use this sequence of simple functions to
calculate the expectation of f through (A.6.1). Suppose that c∗ ≤ f ≤ c∗, for each




∣∣∣ c∗ + (i − 1)(c∗ − c∗)n ≤ f (x) ≤ c∗ + i(c∗ − c∗)n }, (A.6.3)
and define fn by
fn(x) = c∗ +
(i − 1)(c∗ − c∗)
n
for all x ∈ Pi. (A.6.4)
For each n, fn is a simple function by definition, then we have that for all x ∈ Ω,




Hence { fn} uniformly convergences to f , in which case we have









µ(Pi) : n = 1, 2, . . .
}
. (A.6.6)
Note that the requirement of uniform convergence is crucial for those measure
spaces with mere finitely additive probabilities. The following is the example
commonly used in the literature to illustrate this point.
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Example A.6.2. Let Ω = {0, 1, 2, . . .} and λ be a diffuse (Example A.4.7) de-
fined on (Ω,F ) and f (x) = x/(1 + x) for all x ∈ Ω. Using the construction
from (A.6.3) to (A.6.6), we can define a sequences { fn} of functions uniformly




for all x ∈ Pi =
{
x
∣∣∣ i − 1
n
≤ f (x) ≤ i
n
}
(i = 1, . . . , n).
Since, for each i < n, Pi is finite and hence λ(Pi) = 0, then we have

























Now consider another sequence gn of functions constructed as follows. Let Qi be










∣∣∣ n − 1
n





∣∣∣ i − 1
n
≤ f (x) ≤ i
n
}





∣∣∣ y ∈ Qi} for all x ∈ Qi(i = 1, . . . , n − 1).
We have that, for each n, gn is a simple function and E(gn, λ) ≡ 0, and sup{E(gn, λ) :
n = 1, 2, . . .} = 0 ̸= E( f , λ) = 1. Note that the difference between { fn} and {gn}
is that the latter does not converge uniformly to f . 
A.7. Gambler’s Ruin and Countable Additivity. The story we are about to
tell points to one important source of the countable additivity condition for proba-
bility measures. The issue is closely related to the modern philosophical debate
about finite versus countable additivity. As we shall see, countable additivity is
needed even at very early stage of the development of probability theory.
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The Gambler’s Ruin. The original Gambler’s Ruin is the problem posed by
Pascal to Fermat through a letter from Carcavi to Huygens on 28 September 1656
(cf. Hald, 2003, p.76). The problem goes like this: A and B are playing a game
which involves the rolling of three fair dice. Each player is given 12 counters as
his initial capital. The rule of the game is that if 11 points are shown, A gives a
counter to B and if 14 points are shown, B gives a counter to A, then whoever
first collects all the counters wins the game. The question is which one of the two
players is more prone to win the game.3
Solution. Let us modernize the story: suppose that a gambler enters a game
with capital a and adopts the strategy of continuing to bet at unit stakes with
chance p of winning each bet (and chance q = 1 − p of losing a bet) until his
fortune increases to c or his funds are exhausted. Then the question is what is the
probability of his achieving goal?
Let X1, X2, . . . , Xn, . . . be a sequence of random variables taking on +1 or −1
as values with probabilities Pr[Xn = +1] = p and Pr[Xn = −1] = q. Define
S0 = 0;
Sn = X1 + · · ·+ Xn.
Intuitively, Sn counts the wins of the gambler in the first n bets, and his fortune
after the n’s bet is a + Sn. The event that the gambler achieved his goal after n’s
round of betting can be described as
Aa,n =
[











0 < a + Sn < c
]
represent the set of sequences of rolling such that the
gambler’s goal is not reached in the first k tries. It is easy to see that m ̸= n
implies Aa,n ∩ Aa,m = ∅. Then the probability of the gambler winning the game
3The mathematial detail below is pulled mainly from Billingsley (2012, §2 and §7).
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sc(0) = 0, sc(a) = 1.
(A.7.2)
Now apply Huyens’ idea of shifting the betting sequence one step to the right,
that is, from X1, X2, . . . to X2, X3, . . .. Then, the initial game is equivalent to a
game where the gambler has either probability p to start betting with a capital of
a + 1 or probability q with capital a − 1. This generates the following recursive
function,
sc(a) = psc(a + 1) + qsc(a − 1). (A.7.3)




rc−1 if r ̸= 1
a/c if r = 1
. (A.7.4)
Note. The construction above involves
(1) infinite sequences of observable results: in (A.7.1), Aa,n (as n → ∞) is the
set of infinite sequence of rollings;
(2) countably additivity probability: in (A.7.2), the probability of winning
the game with initial capital a and goal c is the sum of probabilities of
winning the game after n rollings (n = 1, 2, . . .).
Hence the solution in (A.7.4) is justifiable only if it can be shown the the underly-
ing probability measure is (1) definable for infinite sequences and (2) is countable
additive, to which we now turn.
Sequence space. Let S be a (finite) set of possible outcomes and ρ be a (simple)
probability function defined on S. In the example above, S = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} and
ρ(i) = 1/6, for all i ∈ S. Let Ω = S∞ and, for any ω ∈ Ω, let zk(ω) : S∞ → S be
the kth coordinate projection function for all k ≥ 1. Define a cylinder of rank n to
4See also DeGroot and Schervish (2012, p.87).
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be a set of the form
A = [ω :
(
z1(ω), . . . , zn(ω)
)
∈ H],
where H ⊆ Sn. Let C0 be the class of cylinders of all ranks, then it is easy to verify
that C0 is a field. The goal is to define a probability measure on measurable space












We show that Pr is a well defined probability measure on (Ω, C0). For this, we
only show that Pr(·) is finitely additive: let A be as above and
B = [ω :
(
z1(ω), . . . , zm(ω)
)
∈ I]
for some I ⊆ Sm. WLOG, assume that n ≤ m, then let H′ ⊆ Sm be such that, for
each ω ∈ Ω, (z1(ω), . . . , zn(ω), . . . , zm(ω)
)




A = [ω :
(
z1(ω), . . . , zm(ω)
)
∈ H′]
Now suppose that A ∩ B = ∅, then by (A.7.5)






























= Pr(A) + Pr(B).
Pr(·) is referred to as a (finitely additive) product measure on (Ω, C0). We point out
that Pr is at the same time countably additive. To this end, we first turn to the
following observations
Lemma A.7.1. If Pr(·) is a finitely additive probability measure on the field
F , and if An ↓ ∅ for sets An in F implies Pr(An) ↓ 0, then Pr(·) is countably
additive.
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= ∑∞i=1 Pr(Bi). □
Lemma A.7.2. If An ↓ A, where An are nonempty cylinders, then A ̸= ∅.
Proof. See Billingsley (2012, p.30) □
Theorem A.7.3. Every finitely additive product measure on C0 is countably
additive.
Proof. Assume, to the contrary, that Pr(·) is not countably additive, then ap-
ply Lemma A.7.1: there is some sequence {An} in C0 such that An ↓ ∅ and Pr(An)
does not converge to 0, that is, there is some ϵ > 0 for which Pr(An) > ϵ as n → ∞.
This implies, by Lemma A.7.2, ∅ = A =
∩
n An ̸= ∅, which is absurd. □
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